The relief of Chitral

Columbia (Hntoem'tp

THE LIBRARIES

THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited

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TORONTO

Lieutenant Peterson. Lieutenant Jones. Lieutenant Moberly.

Surgeon-Captain Luard. Surgeon-Captain Browning Smith.

Colonel Kelly and his Officers. {Frontispiece -

Lieutenant Stewart, R.A. Lieutenant Beynon. Colonel Kelly. Captain Borrodaile.

Lieutenant Cobbe. Lieutenant Bethune. Sergeant Reeves.

THE

RELIEF OF CHITRAL

BY

CAPTAIN G. J. YOUNGHUSBAND

queen's own corps of guides
author of "eighteen hundred miles on a burmese tat " j i( frays
and forays"; "the queen's commission," etc., etc.

AND

COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND

K.C.I.E.

INDIAN STAFF CORPS
(LATE POLITICAL OFFICER IN CHITRAL)

WITH MAP AND ILLUSTRATIONS

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
i 9 i o

All rights reserved

V r I

First Edition October 1895,
Reprinted October and December 1895 ; April 1896 ; 1897.
Shilling Edition 19 10.

Richard Clay & Sons, Limited,
bread street hill, e.c., and
bungay, suffolk.

PREFACE

This book is the joint production of two
brothers, who are constantly being mistaken
for one another, who happened to be present
together in the same campaign and to both
act as correspondents of the Times in that
campaign. The chapters (III. IV. and V.) on
Sir Robert Low's advance are by Captain
George Younghusband, who was present
throughout the operations on General Low's
Staff. The remaining chapters are by Captain
Francis Younghusband, who from his two years'
residence in Chitral was better acquainted with
the country through which Colonel Kelly
marched his troops, and with the place in which
the defence was made.

This record of the Chitral campaign is based
on the official despatches published in the
Gazette of India and in the Blue Book on
Chitral affairs lately presented to the Houses of
Parliament, and the management of the Times
have kindly allowed that use should be made of
the letters which the authors wrote to the Times.

The illustrations are from photographs taken

vi

PREFACE

by Sergeant Mayo, of the Photographic
Section of the Bengal Sappers and Miners,
which accompanied General Low's column ;
and from sketches very kindly furnished
by Surgeon-Captain Browning-Smith and
Lieutenant Beynon, who served with Colonel
Kelly s Column.

October 1895.

A few verbal corrections and some slight
additions have been made to bring this book
up to date.

July 1910.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR ...... I

CHAPTER II

CAPTAIN ROSS AND LIEUTENANT EDWARDES . . 30

CHAPTER III

GENERAL LOW'S ADVANCE 7 1

CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS AT THE MALAKAND AND PANJKORA . . 83

CHAPTER V

THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL . . . . . . . II5

CHAPTER VI
THE DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 1 29

CHAPTER VII

COLONEL KELLY'S MARCH 175

vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

To face page

Colonel Kelly and his Officers (Frontispiece)

Map of Chitral Expedition, 1895 . . . x
The Westminster Abbey of Chitral . . .15

Lieut. B. E. M. Gurdon, D.S.0 16

Diagrammatic Sketch of the Koragh Defile . 34.

The Lowarai Pass ....... 66

The Lowarai Pass in May 76

The Malakand Pass 84

Constructing a Suspension Bridge over the

Panjkora River no

Dm Fort 116

Head-quarter Camp, Dir 124

Sir R. Low and Staff on the Janbatai Pass . .128
Chitral Fort, from the South . . . .142

Major Townshend, C.B 144

Lieut. H. K. Harley, D S.0 166

Sketch of South (Gun) Tower, Chitral Fort . 169

Native Levy 176

Sepoy 32ND Pioneers 182

Captain J. McD. Baird 226

Company of the 14TH Sikhs, which formed part
of the Garrison of Chitral during the

Siege 228

House occupied by Sher Afzul during the Siege

of Chitral Fort 231

viii

Russian Sphere of Influence- ~

Boundary of Country under Political control of Government of /ndia~,JE&
Qn nn diron- administration <cf Do. , Do.....W=.

THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL

CHAPTER I

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

In the middle of March of the year 1895,
people in England were suddenly made aware
that grave trouble had arisen upon the northern
frontier of India ; that the representative of the
British Government was besieged in the heart
of a mountainous country, hundreds of miles
from the nearest support ; and that operations
on a large scale were contemplated by the
Government of India to effect his release, and
restore British prestige. Some account of
how this trouble arose is required, and of the
causes which necessitated this campaign by
which the honour of the British name was
saved, and British officers were rescued from
an untimely end.

India is bounded on the north by successive

B

2 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

ranges of mountains of great height, and among
these mountains is the State of Chitral, a
country somewhat larger than Wales, and sup-
porting a population of 70,000 or 80,000 rough,
hardy hillmen. Both the capital and the state
itself are called Chitral, and the principal place,
where is the fort of Chitral, is situated at a dis-
tance of about forty-seven miles from the main
water-shed of the range of the Hindu Kush,
which divides the waters flowing down to India
from those which take their way into the Oxus,
and on to Turkestan and Central Asia. Chitral
is an important state, because of its situation at
the extremity of the territory over which the
Government of India exerts its influence, and
for some years past, it had been the object of
the policy of the Government of India, to con-
trol the external affairs of Chitral, in a direction
friendly to our interests ; to secure an effective
guardianship over its northern passes ; and to
keep watch over what goes on beyond those
passes. With these objects in view, Major
Biddulph was sent to the country in 1877, and
the first attempt was made to enter into
relations with the Ruler or Mehtar of the

CAUSES OF THE WAR 3

country. No very definite arrangement was
come to at this time, but in 1885, when war
between Russia and England was imminent,
Lord Dufferin despatched Sir William Lockhart
at the head of an important mission to enter
into more definite and complete relations with
the Mehtar, and to report upon the defences
of the country. Colonel Lockhart spent more
than a year in Chitral and the neighbouring
states on the north, as well as on the south side
of the Hindu Kush range, and from that time
to this the relations of the Government of
India with the Rulers of Chitral have been of a
close and intimate nature. Chitral was then
governed by old Aman-ul-Mulk, a strong,
astute ruler, who, by the force of his character,
by intriguing, by murdering those of his rivals
whom he could, ensnare with his wiles, and by
fighting the remainder, had consolidated a
number of small states incessantly at warfare
with one another into the Chitral of the year
of the campaign. Under his firm rule, the
country was held together, and, so long as
he lived, no one dared to rise against him, or
dispute his authority. But he had seventeen

B 2

4 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

sons, and those who knew the customs of
Mohammedan countries foresaw that, on his
death, these must infallibly commence a fratri-
cidal struggle for the throne.

At the end of August 1892, old Aman-ul-
Mulk died, and the long-expected scramble for
the Mehtarship immediately commenced. Of
the seventeen sons, there were two who
by reason of the rank of their mother, were
regarded as having the strongest claims to
the Mehtarship. These two youths had been
invited down to India on a visit to the Viceroy
some years before, and they were in receipt of
small subsidies from the Government of India.
Nizam-ul-Mulk was the name of the elder, and
the younger was named Afzul-ul-Mulk. At
the time of the old Mehtar's death, the second
son happened to be in Chitral, while his elder
brother was away in Yasin, 160 miles distant,
carrying out his duties as Governor of that out-
lying province. Afzul-ul-Mulk ' immediately
seized the arms and treasure in the fort,
attached a large following to himself, for he was
decidedly the more popular of the two brothers,
and then proceeded to murder all those of his

CAUSES OF THE WAR 5

other brothers who, in spite of their lower
birth, might certainly be expected to make a
bid for the throne. He killed a number of
these, and then set off with an army to fight his
elder brother, Nizam-ul-Mulk, in Yasin. Afzul
was a bold and daring leader, while Nizam was
never noted for his courage, and had none of
his brother's personal popularity. He was
therefore only able to make a very feeble show
of resistance, and he then fled to Gilgit, to the
head-quarters of the political agent, and of the
troops stationed there for the protection of this
part of the Indian frontier, to seek refuge under
British authority.

Afzul-ul-Mulk returned to his capital elated
and triumphant. He was recognised by all his
people as the Mehtar of the country, and the
Government of India, in accordance with their
principle of recognising as ruler the man whom
the people themselves chose, proceeded to con-
gratulate him upon his accession to the throne
of Chitral. The anticipated troubles seemed to
have come to an end in the space of a very
few weeks, and there appeared to be nobody
now to oppose Afzul-ul-Mulk's rule. The

6 THE RELIEF OP CHITRAL chap.

British Government saw seated on the throne
of this important state a man for whom British
officers who had met him. had considerable
admiration, and a man who, having visited
India, and become acquainted with our real
strength and resources,, and who was believed
to be loyally attached to the alliance with the
British Government, was likely to prove an
almost model ruler for the country.

Everything then seemed to have settled down
satisfactorily ; but Afzul-ul-Muik had only just
received the recognition of the Government of
India, and had not been two months on the
throne, when without warning, and suddenly as
the fall of a thunderbolt, appeared one upon the
scene who, in the space of a single night, upset
all these dreams of peace. Afzul-ul-Mulk had
by one means and another ridded himself of
those of his brothers who were likely to cause
him trouble. He was reasonably safe as regards
brothers, but there was an uncle who had been
overlooked. This was Sher Afzul, who many
years before had struggled for the throne with
the old M eh tar, but who had long since been
driven from the country, and forced to live in

CAUSES OF THE WAR 7

exile in Afghan territory. This prince suddenly
appeared before the walls of the Chitral fort.
He had successfully intrigued with a number
of men in Chitral who were inimical to Afzul-
ul-Mulk, and so secured an entrance to the
country. The fort of Chitral is situated only
forty-seven miles distant from the pass into
Badakhshan, over which Sher Afzul advanced,
and he had ridden rapidly in with a hundred or
more of horsemen, collected a few followers on
the way, killed the Governor of the valley
through which he passed, and in the dead of
night appeared before the walls of Chitral
itself.

Success or failure now turned upon the action
of a few hours. If he could gain an entrance
to the fort, and hold it, he would secure the
throne for himself; but if he were held at bay
for even that one night, he could only expect
to be swamped in the morning by the un-
doubtedly strong following of Afzul-ul-Mulk.
Sher Afzul was making a bold and daring
move, and fortune favoured his audacity.
Afzul-ul-Mulk, hearing from the inside of the
fort the clamouring at the gate as Sher Afzul

8 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

appeared, rushed out to ascertain what was the
matter. In so doing he exposed himself, was
shot down, and died almost immediately.

One king being dead, the Chitralis, \vith that
versatility of temperament so characteristic of
them, immediately proceeded to recognise as
their ruler the man who had killed him. In no
other country is the principle, so dear to the
heart of the British Government, of recognising
the de facto ruler, more fully acted upon than in
Chitral. There was now no attempt to turn
the invader out of the country, and no one
waited to call in from Gilgit the eldest son of
their old ruler. The Chitralis simply recognised
as their chief the man who was the last to say
he intended to rule them. Sher Afzul was to
be their Mehtar. They believed all the promises
so utterly incapable of fulfilment which he made
to them, and Sher Afzul, having now seized
the rifles, ammunition, and treasure which had
before been taken possession of by Afzul-ul-
Mulk, assumed the reins of government, and by
promising houses, lands, and fair wives to every
one who asked for them, and by liberal gifts of
money, speedily made himself the popular idol

CAUSES OF THE WAR 9

of the people. But his lease of power was a
short one.

While these events were occurring, Nizam-
ul-Mulk, the eldest son of the old Mehtar, had
been living quietly at Gilgit, enjoying a daily
allowance from the British Government. He
had seen his younger brother succeed to the
throne, and recognised as Mehtar by the
Government of India, and his fortunes for the
time seemed at their lowest ebb, but in these
turbulent countries, where the wheel of fortune
turns so rapidly, no claimant to a throne need
despair, however remote his chances of succeed-
ing may seem for the time. And now Nizam-
ul-Mulk, hearing of the death of his younger
brother, at once plucked up courage to make
an attempt to gain the throne of Chitral. He
wrote to Colonel Durand, the British agent at
Gilgit, asking him for his support, and saying
that, should he become Mehtar, he would agree
to British officers being stationed in Chitral, and
to the establishment of a telegraph line, and
would carry out all the wishes of Government.
Nizam also signified his intention of moving
against Sher Afzul ; and having come to Gilgit

10 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

of his own accord, and being there as our guest
and not under detention, Colonel Durand was
unable to refuse him permission to leave Gilgit,
and accordingly allowed him to go, while he
despatched 250 rifles, 2 guns, and 100 levies,
into the province of Yasin, in order to strengthen
his own position, in the event of its becoming
necessary to treat with Sher Afzul, and to
preserve order in the western part of the Gilgit
district and in Yasin.

Nizam-uI-Mulk on crossing the frontier, was
joined by a large number of men from the upper
valleys of Chitral, with whom he had been
brought up as a youth, and who were always
much attached to him. A force of 1,200 men,
which Sher Afzul sent to oppose him, also
went over to him, and he immediately marched
on Mastuj, which he occupied without difficulty.
Drasan fell into his hands on the 1st of
December, and Sher Afzul, seeing the game
was up, fled as rapidly as he had appeared, back
into Afghan territory ; where he remained, till
at the commencement of the present year he
again appeared upon the scene to set the whole
of Chitral once more in a ferment.

CAUSES OF THE WAR II

Nizam-ul-Mulk felt that his success had been
very largely due to the countenance which had
been given him by the British authorities, and
his first act on ascending the throne was to ask
that a British officer might be sent to remain
by his side. The Government of India directed
that a mission under the charge of Surgeon-
Major Robertson, and which consisted of
Lieutenant The Honourable C. G. Bruce,
Lieutenant J. H. Gordon, and myself, with fifty
men of the 15th Sikhs should be deputed to
proceed to Chitral to congratulate the new
Mehtar on his succession, and to promise him
the same subsidy and support as were given to
his late father.

In the middle of January 1893, we crossed
the Shandur Pass, 12,400 feet high, since
rendered famous by the march of Colonel
Kelly's column across it, and, in spite of the
severity of the weather and the extreme cold,
reached Chitral without mishap on the 25th of
January. Here the mission remained till May,
giving to the Mehtar that support which he so
much required in the consolidation of his rule.
Dr. Robertson and Lieutenant Bruce returned

12 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

to Gilgit at the end of May, while Lieutenant
Gordon and myself, with the whole of the escort,
remained on in Chitral. As the months went
by, the Mehtar gradually strengthened his
position, and at the end of September, we were
able to withdraw to Mastuj, a place sixty-five
miles nearer Gilgit, which the Government of
India desired should in future be the head-
quarters of the political agent. During the
following year, no event of importance occurred
upon this frontier, though the restless Pathan
chief, Umra Khan, the Mehtars neighbour on
the south, was constantly causing trouble by
attacking the villages considered by the Mehtar
to belong to Chitral. In the autumn of last
year the Honourable George Curzon, M.P. (now
Lord Curzon) entered Chitral territory from the
direction of the Pamirs. He and I rode down
together to the Mehtars capital, and were
received by him with every mark of hospitality.
We had long conversations together, we dined
with him and he with us, and we played polo
together ; and when on the i ith of October we
rode away from Chitral, no one would have
supposed it possible that in a few months' time

CAUSES OF THE WAR 13

the country, which then seemed so quiet, should
be the scene of the bloody conflict which raged
there in the first months of the ensuing year.

Nizam-ul-Mulk was by no means a pattern
ruler, but, though deficient in courage, and
unpopular with many of his people on account
of his avaricious habits, was in many respects a
good ruler, and he was certainly a firm ally of
the British Government. He had been to India,
had mixed with British officers, and had suffered
adversity. At the same time he had no wild
ambitions to lead him astray. His ruling
passion was love of sport ; and as long as he
had the support of the Government of India to
guard him from outside troubles, he felt that he
could indulge his inclinations in that respect to
his heart's content. The result, both to our-
selves and to the Chitralis, was certainly satis-
factory. The Chitralis were free from any
gross oppression or misgovernment, they could
enjoy life in their easy-going way as they would
wish, and they could be ruled by their own
ruler. At the same time, we had never to fear
that the Mehtar would not be guided by us in
any matter relating to his external affairs.

14 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, i

When, therefore, on the first day of January
of the following year Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot
dead while out hawking, by the directions of
his half-brother, Amir-ul-Mulk, a characterless
youth of about nineteen, every one who knew
the country felt that a grave misfortune had
occurred. At a stroke this miserable boy was
able to sweep away the good results of two
years' careful thought on the part of the Govern-
ment and of their local officers, and to transform
a peaceful state into the scene of a desperate
struggle. The youth who had shattered the
promising fabric, which had slowly been set up,
was a son of the old Mehtar by one of his four
legitimate wives, and Nizam-ul-Mulk would
have liked to have murdered him, knowing that
if he did not do so he ran the risk of himself
being murdered by the youth. But knowing
how averse the British authorities were to these
murders, he had refrained from carrying out
what he knew to be a prudent measure of
self-defence, and he had now suffered for his
leniency and his loyalty to the wishes of his
allies.

At the time of this unfortunate occurrence,

The Westminster Abbey of Chitrat,

Where the Mektars are buried

16 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Lieutenant B. Gurdon, who had succeeded me
a few weeks before in the political charge of
Chitral, was on a visit to the capital with an
escort of eight Sikhs : the remainder of his
escort of ioomen being posted at Mastuj, sixty-
five miles north-east of Chitral. Amir-ul-Mulk
immediately sent a deputation to him asking to
be recognised as Mehtar ; and it is significant
of the prestige and authority which we then
enjoyed, that a reckless youth, in the very
excitement of his impetuous action, should have
come cringing in to a young British officer with
only eight native soldiers at his back, asking
for his countenance and support. Lieutenant
Gurdon told him that he could merely refer the
matter to the Government of India and await
their orders. This Lieutenant Gurdon now
did, but it may be imagined that his position at
this time was one of considerable anxiety which
required all the tact and coolness which he now
proved himself to possess. He had at once
sent for a reinforcement of fifty Sikhs from his
escort at Mastuj, and these reached him on the
8th ; and that they were able to do so, and were
not hindered or molested on the way, is another

CAUSES OF THE WAR 17

sign that at that time there was no defined spirit
of hostility to the British.

In anticipation of trouble, however, 100 men
were sent to reinforce Mastuj, 200 men were
marched to Ghizr, and in the middle of January
Surgeon-Major Robertson, the British agent at
Gilgit, started for Chitral to report on the
situation. Mr. Robertson arrived in Chitral at
the end of January, and afforded timely relief
to Mr. Gurdon, who, in the meantime had, in
the words of the despatch of the Government
of India on the subject, acted with admirable
coolness and judgment, occupying a house in
an excellent position for defence, if necessary,
and quietly laying in supplies in case of trouble.

Meanwhile Umra Khan, chief of the Jandul

State, immediately bordering Chitral on the

south, had taken the opportunity which the

troubles which were occurring in Chitral afforded

to invade the country, ostensibly with the object

of supporting Amir-ul-Mulk, but with the real

intention of annexing it to his own dominions.

This enterprising chief was the son of the ruler

of the little Pathan State of Jandul, who, on the

death of his father in 1879, had make an attempt
c

18 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

to seize the throne from his eldest brother, but
not being successful had prudently retired on
a pilgrimage to Mecca. Having plucked up
heart again two years later, he murdered his
brother, seized the throne, and then commenced
a series of wars against his neighbours, which
only culminated in the disasters of the present
year. Valley after valley he annexed to his
country. Scarcely a month passed by without
a fight, and with each success his ambitions only
grew wider and stronger. His, indeed, was one
of those uncontrollable spirits which feed upon
high adventure, and tire of nought but rest.

He now thought he saw his opportunity of
acquiring the more important and larger state
of Chitral. He had dreamed one night that
this should be his, and, to the excitable
imagination of an Oriental, it seemed that his
dream was a prophetic inspiration from on high.
He was, undoubtedly, an accomplice with Amir-
ul-Mulk in the murder of the late Mehtar ; but
it is not so certain whether he had done more
than give that youth a general assurance that if
he would murder the Mehtar he should be sup-
ported. Umra Khan at the time of Nizam's

CAUSES OF THE WAR 19

murder was preparing for an expedition else-
where, and, had he been in direct communica-
tion with Amir-ul-Mulk as to the precise time
of the murder, it is questionable whether he
would have chosen the season of the year when
the high pass between his own and Chitral
territory was blocked with snow. However,
seeing that the murder had occurred, and know-
ing that all the leading men in Chitral had
previously been made away with, that the
country had now no leaders, and must of
necessity be split up into a number of opposing
factions, he, without a moment's hesitation,
seized the opportunity, and in spite of the heavy
snow on the pass, 10,000 feet in height, which
separated him from Chitral, marched with 3,000
men into that country.

The Chitralis at first opposed this Pathan
force. They had always looked upon the
Pathans as their hereditary enemies, and had
on many previous occasions resisted invasions
by them. Had they now had any leader to
keep them together, and to encourage them, the
Chitralis would have been able to repulse the

invaders. Could the British have supported

c 2

20 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

them in their resistance, as Lieutenant Gurdon
did with a few men in one of the preliminary-
skirmishes, they would have gained heart, and,
with the spirit which they are capable of
showing when once they are fairly aroused,
would have beaten back Umra Khan's men ;
but Amir-ul-Mulk, their would-be leader,
was incapable of exercising authority. He had
not been recognised by the British officers as
Mehtar, and it was doubtful whether he ever
would be ; and his hope lay therefore more
with Umra Khan than with the British, and
the British officers were unable to support the
Chitralis in a quarrel of their own with this
neighbouring chief without the direct instruc-
tions of their Government.

The resistance of the Chitralis therefore
collapsed, Umra Khan succeeded in capturing
Kila Drosh, the principal fort on the southern
frontier of Chitral, and this he immediately
commenced to strengthen, so as to form of it a
firm " pied-a-terre " on Chitral territory. And
just as affairs had taken this unfavourable turn,
just when the Chitralis were divided and leader-
less, when their country had an invader in its

CAUSES OF THE WAR 21

midst, once more 'appears upon the scene that
evil spirit of Chitral and persevering aspirant
for its throne, Sher Afzul. Scarcely more than
two years previously he had killed one Mehtar,
ruled the country for a month, and then been
ousted by the elder brother, and now, after a
further sojourn of two years in Afghan territory,
in a confinement which the Amir of Kabul had
most solemnly declared to the Government of
India would be permanent, so that he might
never again be allowed to disturb the peace of
Chitral, he was allowed to escape from Afghan
territory and join Umra Khan at Drosh in the
latter half of February.

Mr. Robertson did not receive reliable infor-
mation of his arrival in Chitral territory until the
24th of February, when he at once entered into
communication with him. On the 27th of
February, Mr. Robertson received from Sher
Afzul a demand that he should go back to
Mastuj at once. Sher Afzul promised to be
friends with the Government on the same terms
as previous Mehtars of Chitral, that is to say,
that he was to receive subsidies from the
Government, but that no British officer should

22 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

reside in the country. But his promise was
coupled with the threat that if his terms were
not accepted, Umra Khan would at once
advance. The two princes had, in fact, made an
alliance, the basis of which was really hostility
to the British Government. They were to in-
duce or force the British officers from Chitral
territory, and after that had been effected, they
could then decide who should rule the country,
one thing only being certain, that whoever
should be the nominal Mehtar, Umra Khan
would be the ruler practically. Mr. Robertson
replied to Sher Afzul that the Maharajah of
Kashmir was the Suzerain of Chitral, and that
neither Umra Khan nor any one else could im-
pose a Mehtar on Chitral without the permission
of the Government ; he added that Sher Afzul
was wanting in respect to the Government of
India, that he was informing the Government of
Sher Afzul's demands, and would communicate
their instructions to him, and that if in the
meantime he attempted any overt act of hostility,
he must take the consequences on his own
head.

At the end of February, the Chitralis were

CAUSES OF THE WAR 23

still holding a position a dozen miles below
Chitral, and Umra Khan was rapidly complet-
ing his preparations for the defence of Kila
Drosh against an attack from the Chitralis,
which he believed to be imminent. A few
Chitralis of the lower class had gone over to
Sher Afzul, but the principal men, though
suspected of being partisans of Sher Afzul, did
not openly defect. Suddenly, however, they
now changed their minds and went over in a
body to Sher Afzul. In that versatile and im-
pulsive way so characteristic of them, they
turned completely round, and, in place of join-
ing the British and opposing Umra Khan, they
now, under the impression that Umra Khan
was the stronger, because the nearer power,
and that the British were the weaker, because
the more distant, joined the Pathan chief, and
came surging on in a wave towards the fort of
Chitral, which Mr. Robertson, with the escort
of 400 men, which he had brought with him,
had now occupied.

Amir-ul-Mulk had been deposed and was
under the custody of the British officers, and
Mr. Robertson had formally recognised Shuja-

24 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

ul-Mulk, an intelligent, trustworthy little boy,
nine or ten years old, as provisional Mehtar of
Chitral, pending the orders of the Government
of India.

On the 3rd of March, the combined Chitrali
and Pathan forces appeared before Chitral, an
action took place in which one British officer
was mortally wounded, and another severely
wounded, in which a General and a Major
and twenty-one non-commissioned officers and
sepoys of the Kashmir Infantry were killed,
and twenty-eight wounded. The British force
was then shut up within the walls of the fort,
and no further news of them reached the
Government of India for many weeks to
come.

Information of the serious turn which affairs
had taken in Chitral was received by the
Government on the 7th of March, and they
immediately decided that preliminary arrange-
ments should be undertaken, in order to be
prepared if necessary to operate against Umra
Khan from the direction of Peshawur. It was
believed that the garrison in the Chitral fort
could resist an attack from Umra Khan and

CAUSES OF THE WAR 25

Sher Afzuls forces, and hold out as long as
their ammunition and supplies lasted ; but as
communications were all interrupted, and as
retreat was cut off, it appeared imperative that
no effort should be spared to effect their relief
by the end of April, if the investment was not
otherwise removed before that date. On the
14th of March, in order that Umra Khan might
have distinct notice of the decision to which
the Government of India had thus come, a final
letter of admonition was sent to him recounting
the various warnings given to him against
interfering with Chitral affairs, mentioning his
various acts of aggression, directing him to at
once quit Chitral territory, and telling him that
if by the 1st of April he had not withdrawn, the
Government of India would compel him to do
so. The letter went on to say that the Govern-
ment were making fresh preparations to send
forward their forces, for that purpose, and that
he would only have himself to blame for any
evil results that might fall upon him. At the
same time a proclamation in the following terms
was issued : —

26 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

To all the people of Swat and the people in Bajaur
who do not side with Umra Khan.

Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned,
that—

Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandul, in spite of his often
repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government,
and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from inter-
fering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected state
under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the
Chitral valley, and attacked the Chitrali people.

The Government of India have now given Umra Khan
full warning that, unless he retires from Chitral by the ist
of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawai 13 12
H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order
to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble
on the Peshawur border a force of sufficient strength to
overcome all resistance, and to march this force through
Umra Khan's territory toward Chitral.

The sole object of the Government of India is to put an
end to the present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggres-
sion on Chitral territory ; and as soon as this object has
been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

The Government of India have no intention of perma-
nently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's
misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering
with the independence of the tribes ; and they will
scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribes-
men so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or
impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies
and transports will be paid for, and all persons are at
liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect
security.

CAUSES OF THE WAR 27

Orders were also now issued for the mobil-
isation of the i st Division of the Field Army
under Major-General Sir Robert Low.

While preparations were in progress of this
force, news reached the Government of India
of the disaster to a detachment of troops under
Captain Ross on their way to Chitral, when
Captain Ross had himself been killed, his
Lieutenant, Jones, been wounded, and fifty-six
men killed out of a total of seventy-one ; another
detachment under Lieutenants Edwardes and
Fowler was also known to be surrounded ; and
finally communication with the supporting post
of Mastuj was severed. This intelligence
materially altered the situation again. It was
now known to the Government of India that
before they had taken the action described
above, Umra Khan and Sher Afzul had actually
waged war upon British Indian and Kashmir
troops.

The necessity for relieving the little garrison
in Chitral was more imminent than had been
supposed, while the reason for giving Umra
Khan a period of grace within which he might

28 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

withdraw from Chitral had now disappeared.
Colonel Kelly, commanding the 32nd Pioneers,
the senior military officer in the Gilgit district,
was placed in command of the operations in
the Gilgit district. His orders permitted him
to make such dispositions and movements as
he might think best, provided he undertook
no operations which did not offer reasonable
prospects of success. It was, however, felt
that the relief of Chitral from the side of Gilgit
was probably impossible. Gilgit is 220 miles
from Chitral, and at this season of the year was
cut off from all support from India, by passes
13,000 feet in height, which were now covered
deep in snow, and which would not become avail-
able for the passage of troops till June. On the
other hand, the road from Peshawur to Chitral
was less than 200 miles in length, and on it there
was only one pass of 10,000 feet which would
still have snow upon it. This pass was not
altogether impracticable for an army. Orders
were therefore issued for the despatch of the
Chitral Relief Force under Sir Robert Low, as
soon as it could be made ready.

CAUSES OF THE WAR 29

Before describing General Low's advance it
is necessary to relate the circumstances under
which the detachments under Captain Ross and
Lieutenant Edwardes had, as mentioned above,
suffered such signal loss.-

CHAPTER II

CAPTAIN ROSS AND LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

On the ist of March, while Mr. Robertson
with his escort was in Chitral and active hostil-
ities had not yet commenced, a native officer
had started from Mastuj with forty men and
sixty boxes of ammunition for Chitral. He
had proceeded for a couple of marches and had
reached Buni, when he found the road broken
and rumours reached him that he was to be
attacked. He accordingly wrote to Lieutenant
Moberly, the special duty officer with the
Kashmir troops in Mastuj, telling him of the
state of affairs and asking for instructions.
Rumours had by now reached Mastuj that
Sher Afzul had entered Chitral territory and
that large numbers of the Chitralis had joined
him. But he was said to have friendly inten-
tions towards the British and all the local head

3°

chap, ii ROSS AND EDWARDES 31

men reported to Lieutenant Moberly that no
organised attack upon a party of troops was at
all likely.

Still there was evidently a feeling of unrest
abroad, and as a detachment of the 14th Sikhs
under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Jones were
now at Laspur, two marches on the Gilgit side
of Mastuj, on their way up, Lieutenant Moberly
wrote to ask Captain Ross to come on into
Mastuj in a single march instead of two. This
Captain Ross did, and on the evening of the
4th of March he started from Mastuj with fifty
men to reinforce the Subadar, who was blocked
at Buni. On the same day a detachment of
twenty Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant
J. S. Fowler, R.E., accompanied by Lieutenant
S. M. Edwardes also arrived in Mastuj* The
party were on their way to Chitral with engi-
neering stores, and without halting at Mastuj
they left on the following morning, March 5th,
with the intention of overtaking the Subadar at
Buni and with the combined party continuing
the march to Chitral.

That evening Captain Ross returned to
Mastuj reporting that everything was quiet at

32 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Buni, and that Lieutenants Edwardes and
Fowler were to leave Buni on the 6th for
Chitral with the ammunition escort. On the
evening of March 6th Lieutenant Moberly
received a note from Lieutenant Edwardes
dated noon of the same day from Koragh, a
small hamlet a few miles below Buni, saying
that he heard he was to be attacked near
Reshun, the first stage beyond Buni. Upon
hearirg of this Captain Ross at once moved
from Mastuj, and also wrote to the 4 officer com-
manding at Ghizr, the nearest post on the
Gilgit side of the Shandur Pass, asking him to
send up as many men as he could possibly
spare to reinforce Mastuj. The strength of
Captain Ross's party was

2 British officers

1 Native officer

6 Havildars (sergeants)

3 Naiks (corporals)

2 Buglers
82 Sepoys

1 Hospital-Assistant

8 Hospital followers
2 Cooks
2 Water-carriers
1 Lascar

1 Sweeper

2 Dhobis

Nine days' rations and 140 rounds of ammuni-
tion per man were carried.

Leaving Mastuj on the morning of March

ii ROSS AND EDWARDES 33

7th, Captain Ross reached Buni, eighteen miles
distant, at 11 p.m. the same day. Here he left
one native officer with thirty-three rank and
file, while with the rest he and his subaltern,
Lieutenant Jones, started for Reshun, the place,
about thirteen miles lower down the valley, in
which Lieutenant Edwardes' party were de-
tained. Captain Ross's men took with them
three days' cooked rations, and at about 1 p.m.
the party reached the small hamlet of Koragh,
about half way to Reshun, and a short halt was
made here. What occurred after that may
best be told in Lieutenant Jones's own words.

About half-a-mile after leaving Koragh [he says] the road
enters a narrow defile. The hills on the left bank consist
of a succession of large stone shoots, with precipitous spurs
in between ; the road at the entrance to the defile for about
one hundred yards runs quite close to the river ; after that
it lies along a narrow maidah, some thirty or forty yards in
width, and is on the top of the river bank, which is here
a cliff ; this continues for about half-a-mile ; then at the
Reshun end it ascends a steep spur. When the advanced
party reached about half way up this spur, it was fired on
from a sangar which is across the road, and at the same time
men appeared on all the mountain tops and ridges, and
stones were rolled down all the shoots. Captain Ross, who
was with the advanced guard, recalled the point of the
advanced guard and fell back on the main body, with which

D

Diagrammatic Sketch of the Koragh Defile

chap, ii ROSS AND EDWARDES 35

I was. All our coolies dropped their loads and bolted as
soon as the first shot was fired. Captain Ross, after looking
at the enemy's position, decided to fall back upon Koragh,
as it would have been useless to go on to Reshun, leaving
an enemy in such a position behind us. With this object
in view Captain Ross ordered me back with ten men to
seize the Koragh end of the defile, to cover his retirement.
By the time that I had reached within about one hundred
yards of the sangar at this end I had only two sepoys left
with me unwounded, and it was therefore impossible for me
to proceed any further. I sent back and informed Captain
Ross accordingly. Captain Ross in the meantime had
occupied two caves in the river bank, and he ordered me
to come back to him, which I did. Captain Ross then
informed me that it was his intention to wait till the moon
rose, and that he would then try and force his way out. We
stayed in the caves till about 8 p.m., and then we started to
try and force our way out to Koragh.

When Captain Ross had got about half way across the
stone shoot under the sangars at the Koragh end he decided
to retire, as there was such a torrent of rocks coming down
the shoot, that he thought that his party would be annihilated
if he attempted to go on. Thereupon we again retired to
the caves mentioned above. After reaching here, Captain
Ross thought that he would try and get to the top of the
mountain above us, and we started up the spur nearest
above the caves. We had got some way up, when our
road was completely barred by a precipice, and we could
get no further, as we had no native of the country to guide
us, and the ground was extremely dangerous. One of the
sepoys, falling here, was killed. After looking about in
vain for a path, Captain Ross again decided to retire to the
caves, and we reached them about 3 a.m. As every one
D 2

36 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

was now tired out, Captain Ross decided to remain here for
the present. We remained in the caves all the day of the
9th. The enemy, meanwhile, did not molest us further than
firing a few shots into the cave, and, as we had built up
breastworks there, they could not do us much damage.
During the 9th Captain Ross and myself both agreed that
the only thing remaining for us to do was to cut our way
out back to Koragh at all costs, and we decided to make
the attempt about 2 a.m. On the 10th, when we thought
that the enemy would least expect it, we started accordingly,
and we attacked their sangars and drove them out of them ;
they retired a short distance up the hill and kept up a brisk
fire from behind rocks. There was also a heavy fire kept
on us from the sangars on the right bank of the river. A
large number of sepoys were killed, or so severely wounded
as not to be able to move, by the stones down the shoot
which ran right into the river, and Captain Ross himself
was killed in front of one of the sangars. I and seventeen
rank and file reached the maidan on the Koragh side of the
defile in safety, and when I got there I halted and re-formed
the men, and stayed there some ten minutes, keeping up a
heavy fire on the sangars on both banks of the river, in
order to help any more of the men who could get through.
While halting there, two bodies of the enemy's swordsmen
attempted to charge us, but were checked by volleys and
losing heavily. As the enemy now showed signs of again
cutting our line of retreat, I considered that it was time to
retire, especially as two more of my party were- killed, and
one mortally wounded, while I had been waiting here. Of
the remaining fifteen, I myself and nine sepoys were
wounded. We retired slowly to Buni, where we arrived
about 6 a.m. It was quite impossible to bring any wounded
men who were unable to walk with us, and it was equally

ii ROSS AND EDWARDES 37

impossible to bring their rifles, etc. Therefore a certain
number, about forty of these, fell into the hands of the
enemy. I estimate the enemy's numbers at about 1,000,
and think that they must have lost heavily. I spent from
the 10th to the 17 th March at Buni, having occupied a
house there and put it into a state of defence.

On the 17th he was relieved by Lieutenant
Moberly, as will be subsequently told.

In concluding his report, Lieutenant Jones
says that he cannot speak too highly of the
steadiness and gallantry shown by the men of
the detachment, whose behaviour throughout he
considers above praise.

We now have to follow the fortunes of the
party under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler,
to whose assistance Captain Ross had set out.
This party, as will be remembered, had marched
from Mastuj on the 5th of March before any
news of an outbreak of hostilities had reached
that place. They were escorting ammunition
and engineering stores for the troops at Chitral,
and their party consisted of twenty Bengal
Sappers and Miners, forty-two Kashmir In-
fantry, an orderly, three officers' servants, and
two followers. On the 6th they reached
Reshun, a large, but straggling village situated

38 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

on a sloping plain between the left bank of the
Chitral river and the steep mountain sides
which rose behind. The houses are detached
and dotted over the plain, each surrounded by
an orchard. On the edge of a cliff which over-
hangs the river was a sangar, which the detach-
ment now occupied, and here they stored their
kit and ammunition, while a small party con-
sisting of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler
with twenty Bengal Sappers and Miners, and
ten Kashmir Infantry started out to repair a
break in the road a few miles below Reshun.
Immediately after leaving the village the road
to Chitral ascends a spur to a height of about
1,000 feet, and descending again to the level of
the river passes for half-a-mile or so over a
plain, and then enters a narrow defile with the
unfordable river on one hand and inaccessible
cliffs on the other.

The British officers were unaware, though the
siege of Chitral had commenced three days ago,
that the Chitralis had risen in arms against the
British, but they saw sufficient evidence of a
hostile spirit to induce them to take every pre-
caution on entering this defile. All the hill-

ROSS AND EDWARDES 89

sides were carefully examined with telescopes,
and, as some sangars were observed, Lieutenant
Fowler was sent to scale the heights on the left
bank so as from there to be able to look down
into the sangars on the opposite bank. Mean-
while, Lieutenant Edwardes remained with the
rest of the party close outside the defile.,
Lieutenant Fowler with some difficulty found
a way up the hill-side, and was engaged in
examining the opposite cliffs, when suddenly a
shot came from them, and about two hundred
men rushed out from a village where they had
been concealed and began swarming into the
sangars. Lieutenant Fowler kept up a heavy
fire on them, as he was well above the sangars,
and did considerable execution.

But the enemy had now begun climbing the
hill-sides behind him so as to cut him off from
Lieutenant Edwardes, and he was forced to
retire. His position indeed was now a very
precarious one, for the Chitralis had succeeded
in getting above him, and were hurling down
stones upon his party, besides firing upon them.
Lieutenant Fowler himself was wounded in the
back of the shoulder, the corporal of the party

40 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

was also shot, and two other men wounded.
Scrambling and jumping down he succeeded,
however, in bringing his party with the wounded
men down the hill-side again and on to the plain
where Lieutenant Edwardes with the main body
was covering his retreat. The Chitralis with
Lieutenant Edwardes had been trying to induce
him to enter the defile, in which case he would
without doubt have suffered as Captain Ross's
ill-fated party had done. But Edwardes had
prudently waited till Fowler could report the
hill-sides clear, and then, finding that instead of
their being clear the enemy were now swarming
on to them, he saw that his only plan was to
retire to Reshun ; and this, when Lieutenant
Fowler had rejoined him, he accordingly did.

But they were nearly two miles from the
village : they had an open plain to cross and the
spur nearly a thousand feet high to climb. One
British officer and several men were wounded,
and the enemy were gaining ground along the
hill-sides. Disaster seemed imminent, but by
holding the crest of the spur, and by firing
steadily on the enemy to keep them at a distance,
the retirement was effected without serious loss,

ROSS AND EDWARDES 41

and the sangar near the village of Reshtm,,
where the rest of the party had been left, was.
reached before the enemy could cut them off.

There is one little incident in this retirement
which merits a very special mention. It has*
been said that Lieutenant Fowler was wounded.
Now his pony was awaiting him in the plain at
the foot of the hill-side up which he had been,
climbing ; and as a steep hill, a thousand
feet in height, had to be ascended on the-
way back to Reshun, it might have been
supposed that Fowler would have mounted his
pony and ridden up the hill. But there were
also some sepoys wounded ; and these ia
Fowlers opinion had to be looked after first.
So he mounted a sepoy on his pony, and walked
himself. It is not to be wondered at that when
the native soldiers see their officers ready to*
make such sacrifices for them, they should be-
willing to follow them anywhere, and stand by
them to the last, as indeed these very soldiers
were now called upon to do.

For now the first blood was drawn the people-
rose excitedly and surrounded the little British
party in the quarters they were occupying.

42 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

The British officers found it impossible to hold
the original sangar on the cliff by the river, for
it was exposed to fire from the opposite bank,
and had no head-cover. They therefore decided
upon occupying some houses by the polo ground,
the very spot where Mr. George Curzon and
myself had camped without a single man as
escort, only five months previously. In this
batch of houses, cover and fire-wood could be
obtained, and a certain amount of supplies also.
The only drawback in occupying them was that
they were more than a hundred yards from the
river, and consequently there was considerable
risk of their water supply being cut off. The
officers hoped, however, to be able to keep the
road to the river open by their fire.

Immediately upon returning to Reshun, the
officers set to work to make the position defen-
sible, and the following account of their brave
resistance against overpowering numbers of the
enemy is compiled from the report they subse-
quently submitted to Government. The first
work to be done was the construction of san-
gars on the roofs of the houses (the houses
being flat-roofed), the loopholing of the walls,

ROSS AND EDWARDES 43

blocking up entrances, and knocking out
passages of communication. The materials
available for making the sangars were the mud
bricks of which the houses were built, roof
timbers and other pieces of timber lying about,
and boxes, grain bins, etc. An attack was fully
expected that same night, and every possible
precaution had to be taken before darkness set
in. Before dusk the ammunition and the
wounded had to be transported from the sangar
near the river to the house. Some Kashmir
sepoys volunteered for this work, and though
they had to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire in
crossing the space of a hundred yards which
separated the sangar from the end of the garden-
wall round the house, they carried it out without
losing a single man. "Already dead tired,
these men behaved splendidly," say the British
officers in their report.

The enemy had been firing all day upon the
party while they were at work, but at sunset
their fire slackened and they went off to eat the
evening meal, for this was the month of the
Ramzan when Mohammedans have to fast all
day and eat nothing between sunrise and sun-

44 THE RELIEF OF CHXTRAL chap.

set. Every man on the defending side was now
posted in his place, and told to strengthen his
cover for himself. And so the first night fell
on the little party, now at bay, in the heart of
an enemy's country, -with their retreat cut off,
and impossible defiles on either side of them.
Out of the sixty-two men, they had already lost
one corporal killed, two men mortally and eight
others less severely wounded, and one of the
two British officers was also wounded. The men
had had hard work the whole day long, they had
had no food and little water, and now at night
they could take no rest, for the enemy com-
menced firing again, and the defenders had to
expect a rush from the houses and garden walls
close by at any moment. The defenders*
position was indeed surrounded by these houses,
walls, and trees, which gave ample cover to the
enemy ; and the demolition of these was un-
doubtedly a matter of the first importance. But
beyond those immediately around the house,
there was more cover occupied by the enemy's
sharp-shooters, and the British officers con-
sidered that it would have been too risky to have
taken men from their places to demolish these,

ROSS AND EDWARDES 45

and so expose them where they might have
been cut off at any moment. There was a
difficulty, too, about burning the houses, for
large quantities of kindling wood would have
been required for the purpose, and from which-
ever side the defenders should burn fires, the
enemy would attack from the other, and thus
have them between themselves and the light.

All night long the garrison remained at their
posts, and when day dawned on the morning of
the 8th they were all utterly exhausted. But
the fear of immediate attack being over, half the
men were brought down from their posts, and a
meal was cooked from the flour which had been
found in the houses. Water, which had of
course to be now carefully husbanded, was also
served out ; and after the men had refreshed
themselves, they were allowed to sleep in turns.
During the day the enemy kept up a continuous
fire from sangars which they had thrown up on
the hill-sides. At twilight the remainder of the
baggage was brought in from the sangar, and
the garrison then had to think of replenishing
the water supply. Two large earthenware
vessels were lashed on poles, and Lieutenant

46 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Fowler with the volunteers and a bhisti (water-
carrier) set out for the river. The men carried
water-bottles and the bhisti his mussuck (skin).
Fortunately no enemy were met with, and the
party were able to make two trips, and so fill
up all the storage vessels at the disposal of the
garrison.

That night, as on the previous one, the
defenders stood to their posts expecting an
assault at any moment ; but the night passed
by quietly until just before dawn on the morning
of the 9th, when the moon had gone down and
night was at its darkest. The enemy then
charged down through the houses, and got
behind the garden wall in large numbers.
Lieutenant Edwardes and his party at once
opened fire at about twenty yards range, while
the enemy were shouting and urging each other
on to the assault. There was a tremendous din
of tom-toms as they were beaten furiously to
encourage the assailants, but none of the men
could approach to within twenty yards of the
deadly fire poured out by the defenders, and as
the dim light of early dawn grew clearer, it be-
came evident to the garrison that the enemy had

ROSS AND EDWARDES 47

no stomach for further assault. Some Pathans
among the assailants were still seen urging on
the Chitralis and hurling abuse at the defenders,,
but at about 9 a.m. they all retired, and contented
themselves for the rest of the day with beating
tom-toms and howling in the village. During
the attack the native soldiers of the defence
showed the utmost steadiness, but four of them;
were killed and six others wounded. On
account of the darkness, it was impossible to
estimate the number of the enemy or their
losses. But there must have been several hun-
dreds, and a very large portion were armed with
Snider and Martini-Henry rifles.

After the assault had been thus successfully^
repulsed water was served out, a meal was
cooked, and the men allowed to sleep in turns..
In the evening it was seen that the enemy had
barred the road down to the water. At dusk
the defenders still further strengthened their
sangars, and fully expecting another attack, kept
up a vigilant outlook. But " we and the mea
were terribly weary," say the officers, "and
it was very difficult to keep the sentries awake,,
although they were posted double."

48 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

The night passed off quietly, however, and
in the morning it was seen that the enemy had
cleared off the hills, though sharpshooters still
surrounded the defenders in sangars from fifty
to two hundred yards distant. Lieutenant
Edwardes dressed the wounded, who had so
far only been bandaged. " Never a groan or
complaint was heard," says the report, though
there were no medical appliances, and though
not sufficient water was available with which
to thoroughly wash the wounds. Bandages,
crutches, and splints had to be improvised, and
the officers used a weak solution of carbolic and
•carbolic tooth-powder for the purpose of dress-
ing the wounds. The corpses of the six dead
men were also brought out and prepared for
burning. At dusk an attempt was made to
procure water again, and Lieutenant Fowler
with twenty sepoys started down towards the
river. But the enemy had now built and
occupied sangars along the cliff at the river's
edge, and the work of getting down to the
river was one of extreme risk. Lieutenant
Fowler succeeded in getting to within ten yards
of the first sangar and within five yards of

ii ROSS AND EDWARDES 49

the sentry without being observed. About
twenty men could be seen sitting round a fire in
the interior with their rifles lying by their sides.
A volley was poured into these men, and then
Lieutenant Fowler charged down on the top of
them. A few men only succeeded in escaping
down the cliff to the river bed. Meanwhile
the enemy in a second sangar, roused by the
firing, lined the walls and began firing to their
front. But Fowler had got round them behind
a wall on their flank, and he now charged right
up the wall, poured a second volley into these
men over the fires, also knocked over about six
of them, then bayoneted a few more, while the
remainder fled. And so successful had Fowler
been in surprising these parties, that not a
single man of his was scratched. The way
down to the water was open, but Fowler now
heard heavy firing and the Pathan cry of attack
in the direction of the post. So having col-
lected his men, he retired at once to rejoin
Lieutenant Edwardes. The enemy's attack
was repulsed by this latter officer before
Fowlers return, but the attempt to obtain water
had to be abandoned for the night.

E

50 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

On the following day nothing of importance
occurred, and that night the defenders succeeded
in reaching the river and bringing back water,
the supply of which was still further replenished
by collecting the rain in waterproof sheets. A
well was sunk to a depth of twelve feet, but as
rock was then struck, the attempt to procure
water in that manner had to be abandoned.

On the morning of the 13th a white flag was
shown by the enemy, and a Pathan shouted out
" Cease firing ! " The defenders also hoisted a
white flag, and sent out Jemadar Lai Khan to
parley with the Pathan while every man stood
to his post. After some talk, the Jemadar
returned with the report that Mohamed Isa,
Sher Afzul's right-hand man, had just arrived
from Chitral with a following to stop the
fighting and speak with the British officers.
Lieutenant Edwardes sent word in reply that
if Mohamed Isa would come to the defenders'
side of a gap in the wall of the polo ground,
situated only sixty yards from the wall of the
houses held by the British officers, and entirely
under fire from the defenders, one of the British
officers would go out and meet him. Mohamed

ROSS AND EDWARDES 51

Isa agreed to do this : he came to the gap, and
Lieutenant Edwardes then went out to talk
with him, while Lieutenant Fowler remained
inside the post with his men standing ready to
arms in case of treachery.

When Lieutenant Edwardes met Mohamed
Isa, that prince informed him that he had just
arrived from Chitral, where Sher Afzul and Dr.
Robertson were corresponding with a view to
the former being recognised as Mehtar. Mo-
hamed Isa said that all fighting had ceased,
and that he was most anxious to be friends
with the Indian Government. After some talk
between the British officer and the Chitral
prince, the conditions of an armistice were
arranged, and it was stipulated that the British
force should remain within their walls, that no
firing should take place, that no Chitralis were
to approach the walls, that water-carriers were
to be allowed to go down to the river, and that
supplies were to be provided by the Chitralis.
Lieutenant Edwardes also wrote a letter to Dr.
Robertson in Chitral, and to the officer com-
manding at Mastuj, stating in English that an
armistice had been arranged, and adding in

E 2

52 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL cha?.

French what his losses had been, and express-
ing very great doubt of his being able to beat
off any further assault. Having arranged these
conditions, Lieutenant Edwardes returned to
the post.

The bhistis were sent down to fetch water,
and supplies were brought to the fort wall by
the Chitralis. The night following passed in
quiet, but vigilance was not relaxed. Rain fell
heavily during the night, and a quantity of
water was collected in waterproof sheets. In
the afternoon of the 14th of March a further
parley was asked for, and on the arrival of
Mohamed Isa, accompanied now by another
Chitrali prince named Yadgar Beg, at the
former place of meeting, Lieutenant Edwardes
again went out to confer with him, while
Lieutenant Fowler remained, as before, inside
the fortified post. Yadgar Beg confirmed to
Lieutenant Edwardes the story previously
told by Mohamed Isa, and both the princes
were full of protestations of friendship.
Yadgar Beg said he had a large following
who desired to be friends, and not enemies,
of the British. The same afternoon the bhistis

ii ROSS AND EDWARDES 53

were again sent to bring in water, and having
to go some distance through the village, they
reported that the houses were full of Pathans.
They were not, however, ill-treated in any way,
and Mohamed Isa sent in a sheep and other
supplies to the British officers. Lieutenant
Edwardes sent another letter to inform Dr.
Robertson of the presumed strengthening of
the enemy, and to let him know that the rations
would not last beyond the 17th of March, i.e.
three days hence.

So far the relations between the British
officers and the Chitralis had been conducted
upon an apparently friendly footing, the aim of
the Chitralis being to lull the British into a sense
of security. On the afternoon of the following
day, the 15th of March, occurred that act of
treachery by which the two officers were cap-
tured, and the greater number of their men lost
their lives. In the afternoon, Mohamed Isa
sent in word that now peace was restored, he
and his men wished to amuse themselves, and
he asked permission to play polo on the ground
immediately outside the post which the British
party were occupying. It seemed to the

54 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

British officers that there could be no harm in
granting this permission, for no man riding on
the polo ground could escape their fire, and
they therefore decided to grant Mohamed Isa's
request. The Chitrali prince then sent to ask
that both officers would come and look on, as
so far he had only seen Lieutenant Edwardes.
He also offered to lend the officers ponies on
which to play polo. The British officers con-
sidered that as they had trusted the Chitralis so
far, they might trust them further ; so when
Mohamed Isa and his men arrived upon the
polo ground, both Lieutenant Fowler and
Edwardes, having previously ordered their men
to their posts which commanded the entire polo
ground, went out to meet the Chitralis. A bed-
stead was placed in the gap in the wall of the
polo ground, on the spot where the former
meetings had taken place, and Mohamed Isa
sat next to the officers until the men were ready
to begin the game. The British officers were
asked to play polo, but refused. Mohamed Isa,
however, joined in the game, while Yadgar Beg
sat with Edwardes and Fowler. A third arrival
from Chitral, speaking to the British officers,

ROSS AND EDWARJDES 55

confirmed the story of Mohamed Isa and Yad-
gar Beg, that peace between the British and
the Chitralis had been made.

The polo ground at Reshun is about fifty
yards broad and one hundred and twenty yards
long, and slopes away from the post occupied
by the British, the further side of the ground
not being covered by the fire of the British
garrison. Lieutenant Edwardes asked Mohamed
Isa to order the men, who numbered about one
hundred and fifty, and who were armed with
rifles and swords, to go to the further side of
the ground. The officers had some tea made
and brought out for the Chitralis to drink.
After the polo was over, Mohamed Isa asked
if the men might dance, as is the custom of the
country at the conclusion of a game. The
British officers consented, and the dance began.
Then under the excuse that there was a wet
place in front of the officers, the bedstead on
which they were seated was moved to the
right, bringing it under cover of the end of the
wall and the polo ground. The officers found
it difficult to object to this, as it seemed im-
possible that any attempt at treachery could be

56 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

unattended by heavy loss to the Chitralis. As
the dance proceeded, more men began to
collect and to press forward in a ring round the
dancers, and the officers observed that a number
had come over to the wall side of the polo
ground. At a pause in the dance the officers
stood up and said that they were tired, and
would now go back to their post. On this
Mohamed Isa himself suddenly seized the
British officers, and a rush of men was made
upon them, and they were dragged under cover
of the wall. A volley was immediately fired
by the British garrison ; but the Chitralis kept
under the wall, and none of them seemed to
have been hit. Firing then became general
for a short time, till it gradually died down into
single shots fired at intervals. The officers in the
meantime had their feet and hands bound, and
were dragged by the legs along the ground away
from the gap. All their buttons, badges, etc.,
were violently torn off and their pockets rifled,
and Fowler's boots and stockings were taken off.
In about half an hour the officers saw the enemy
carry off some of their dead and wounded, and
men came out laden with loot. They also saw

ROSS AND EDWARDES 57

at least one Kashmir sepoy being driven along
with a load. With their arms still bound, the
officers were taken off to the house in which
Mohamed Isa lived, where they were seated in
a verandah. What happened to the garrison of
the post they could not at the time ascertain ;
but they subsequently met twelve of their men
in Chitral, and it appears that the Chitralis
rushed the place, killed numbers of the men,
and carried these few off as prisoners.

In remarking upon the defence, the British
officers say they had frequently considered the
question of destroying a portion of the ammuni-
tion in their charge. This ammunition had
now fallen into the hands of the enemy, and
was a great advantage to them. It would have
been well, therefore, if the British officers could
have managed to have destroyed it ; but they
say that in the hurry of improvising the defence
on the first night of the siege, they had been
compelled to build the ammunition boxes up
into a rude parapet, to afford a cover to their
men. Subsequently these boxes had been
covered up with beams, bricks, kits, and ddbris,
and it was consequently very difficult to get

58 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

them out without pulling down the cover so
much needed. The moonlight nights, too, had
rendered the removal of them very risky, as the
long beams necessitated making large gaps, and
any noise inside the post immediately drew the
fire from the enemy, which was very effective
in the moonlight. Moreover, the ammunition
was intended for the use of local levies who
were expected from Gilgit, and these levies
without the ammunition would have been
perfectly useless.

The British officers determined therefore to
keep it till they could hold out no longer, and
to then destroy it. Lieutenant Edwardes had
also to consider the advisability of making
sorties ; but though he could have doubtless
driven off the enemy for a time by such sorties,
yet he recognised that he would have lost men
in doing so, aiid with the small number at
his disposal he could not afford to lose a single
man.

The subsequent adventures of the two officers
form a thrilling tale. After passing the night
bound at Reshun, with a man holding on to a
rope fastened to each of them, Lieutenant

ROSS AND EDWARDES 59

Fowler was sent towards Chitral, led at the end
of a rope and under the escort of two Pathans
and two Chitralis. On the following day Lieu-
tenant Edwardes, who was at first to have been
sent to Mastuj, was sent to join Lieutenant
Fowler. On the way there they were me>t by
a sergeant and ten men of Umra Khan, who,
after quarrelling with the Chitralis, insisted upon
taking them on as their prisoners. On the 19th
of March the two officers reached Chitral, and
were met there by a colonel and about a hun-
dred men of Umra Khan*s army. They were
led into the presence of Majid Khan, Umra
Khan's representative and half-brother, and
now his successor in the rule of the Jandul
State. The two officers were received civilly,
and the Janduli prince expressed regret at the
course of events, and of the treachery which
had been practised on the British officers. He
assured them of good treatment, and after a
short interview the officers were marched with
an escort of forty men to see Sher Afzul, the
claimant to the throne of Chitral. The escort
accompanied the British officers into the room
in which they found Sher Afzul sitting, sur-

60 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

rounded by a strong escort, and with a loaded
rifle in his lap. He received the British officers
civilly, and gave them tea and cakes. He also
talked to them at great length of the negoti-
ations which had taken place between him and
Dr. Robertson. He further expressed sorrow
at the treachery which had been used to them,
and said that he would see to their comfort,
and arrange supplies as far as possible, though
supplies were difficult to obtain, as everything
had been taken into the fort. Both Sher Afzul
and Majid Khan, at the earnest request of Lieu-
tenant Edwardes, promised to make strict
search for all men of their party who might still
be alive. The two officers were permitted to
communicate with the British garrison besieged
in the fort, but were not allowed to visit them.
It was the object of the besiegers to let the
defenders know, without doubt, the disaster
which had befallen the British detachment, in
order to depress as far as possible the spirit of
the defence.

On the evening of March 20th, Lieutenants
Edwardes and Fowler saw the native clerk of
the political agent, who had been allowed to

ii ROSS AND EDWARDES 61

come out from the fort for the purpose of com-
municating with the officers, but all conversation
had to be carried on in the presence of the
Pathans and Chitralis. No talk in English was
permitted, and the officers were only allowed to
ask in Hindustani for clothing, plates, knives,
forks, etc.

On the 2 1 st of March the officers received
from their beleaguered comrades in the fort
some clothing and necessaries, and they again
saw the political agents native clerk in the
presence of Sher Afzul and Majid Khan and
others. These princes explained to the British
officers their view of the situation, which was
that they did not wish to fight the British if
they would retire to Gilgit or Peshawur, and
they asked Lieutenant Edwardes to ask one of
the officers in the fort to come up and meet
them. A letter was accordingly written to
Lieutenant Gurdon inside the fort, telling him
that if he met them under the walls of the fort
they would give him some useful information.
But no reply was received from Lieutenant
Gurdon, and there is no doubt that the only
object of the besiegers was to capture the other

62 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

officers of the garrison in as treacherous a way
as they had seized Lieutenants Fowler and
Edwardes.

On the 24th of March the two captured
British officers were sent towards Drosh to meet
Umra Khan, the Pathan chief. Here on the
following day they had a long interview with
this important ruler. Umra Khan they found
to be of a tall and manly appearance, with a
straightforward, commanding manner of speak-
ing, and with a great influence over his men.
On these, and on all other occasions, he treated
his captives with civility and consideration. He
now gave them a choice of returning to Chitral,
or of going with him to his native country of
Jandul, some seven or eight marches to the
south. As the chief would not allow the sepoys
to go with the British officers to Chitral, they
decided upon accepting the alternative of accom-
panying Umra Khan to Jandul, and started for
that place on the following day.

Umra Khan had given orders that everything
that could be obtained should be given to them
before himself, but his followers did not carry
out tuese orders, and the officers suffered much

ROSS AND EDWARDES 63

from bad food and bad quarters on the way.
From the Chitral fort they had obtained a bag
of sugar and a pound of tea, which they con-
sidered great luxuries, and they cooked food with
the assistance of the sepoys who from Chitral
onwards were accompanying them. The officers
were never in any way threatened, but they
knew that they were always liable to be killed
by some fanatic who might have a blood feud
against the British. A strong guard, armed
with loaded rifles, accompanied them, however,
arid never for a moment allowed them to go
more than a few yards from them, and this was
doubtless as much for their protection as to
prevent their escape. The guard always had
in it some men who had served in our Indian
army, and although many of them were ex-
tremely ruffian-like in appearance, and probably
were thorough scoundrels, yet they mostly
treated the officers in an easy and friendly
manner, and were always willing to share with
them the scanty rations they obtained on the
march. The officers on the way occupied the
ordinary country houses, which were very dark
and dirty, and full of smoke and insects. The

64 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

guard of ten men or more always slept and lived
in the same room as the officers, and as most of
them had colds and coughs, and were inces-
santly spitting on the floor, the prisoners had
little quiet. The sepoy prisoners were given
the same food as was served out to Umra Khan's
men. But this ration on the march was a very
small one.

The three Hindu prisoners were made to learn
the Kalin, and their hair was cut ; but they were
not made to publicly declare themselves Mussul-
mans, and they never really changed their faith.
No attempt was ever made to induce the officers
to become Mohammedans, nor was any fanatical
feeling displayed by the people whom they met.
The men would eat the officers' bread, and gave
them some of theirs. The Pathans would often
ask the officers how they managed to exist with-
out wine, and while in Chitral the officers were
offered the contents of all the medicine bottles
taken in the hospital outside the fort as a sub-
stitute. This delicate attention was however
declined.

The prisoners were naturally an object of great
curiosity to the people, and crowds gathered to

ROSS AND EDWARDES 65

see them. These people specially delighted to
see the officers eat with knife and fork, and
laughed at their attempts to eat with their
fingers. This curiosity on the part of the popu-
lace the British officers found to be somewhat
annoying, and the guard soon discovering that
they did not like visitors at meal times, kept
them off while the officers were eating ; but at
other times the prisoners received the public,
and sat to be inspected whilst conversing with
the people through interpreters. Umra Khan
himself, as has been said, always treated his
captives with civility, and was much interested
in talking with them, and as long as he was
with them and had leisure sent for them every
day. He twice took them out hawking, and
asked them to walk alongside him. The
officers were not allowed to communicate with
any one, except through the chief, nor were
they allowed any writing materials, but they
had obtained some paper and a pencil in Chitral
and managed to keep a short diary of each day
hid in their clothes. They were allowed to
purchase materials with which to make clothes
for themselves and their sepoys, and the traders

F

66 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

gave them credit on their written acknow-
ledgment.

Marching towards Jandul, the party on the
28th of March reached the Lowarai Pass, 10,000
feet in height, and now covered deep in snow.
Leaving Ashreth, the last Chitrali village on
the north side of the Pass, they ascended the
deep narrow rocky valley to the Pass. At four
miles from the summit they had to send back
their ponies as the snow was now too soft to
allow of their being taken over. They then
had a very stiff pull up on foot, and on the top
were caught in a violent storm of hail and snow.
The wind was bitterly cold, and they were
almost blinded by the driven snow. On the
other side one of their sepoys complained of
pain in the stomach, and he was left behind
with another sepoy to look after him, but he
died at night. Soon after dark the officers
reached Dir, having marched twenty-four miles
and crossed a difficult pass. Here at Dir, how-
ever, they were given better quarters and
better food. On the 30th of March they
marched to Barwa, Umra Khan's chief fort,
crossing the Jhanbatai Pass, 7,000 feet high,

The Lowarat Pass.

ROSS AND EDWAXtDES 67

from which they could obtain a view over
the Pathan chiefs own native valley. On the
summit of the Pass, Umra Khan seated the
British officers beside him, and, giving them
food and sweetmeats, asked them how they
liked his country. For a long time he sat there
with the officers at his side gazing over his native
valley stretched out at his feet, and then pro-
ceeding down the hill-side he was met by crowds
of men on horseback and on foot as he marched
into Barwa.

The officers remained here about a fortnight ;
but on the ist of April the Mussulman sepoys
were told that they could consider themselves
at liberty, and the guard over them was removed.
A native officer accordingly left and proceeded
to Peshawur, where he brought the news of the
disaster to his party.

News now began to come in of the fighting
between General Low's force and the Pathan
tribes, and great excitement prevailed. Num-
bers of men began clearing out, taking all
their goods with them to hide on the hill-sides.
It is a remarkable point that as the panic
increased, the officers received greater attention,

F 2

68 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

and at the approach of our troops they were
supplied with two fowls, flour, rice, butter and
milk daily. On the 12th of April both of the
officers were taken to Munda, Umra Khans
strongest fort. There they met a native political
officer who had been sent by the British
authorities to treat with Umra Khan. A long
conversation took place between Umra Khan
and the native official, the upshot of which was
that Lieutenant Edwardes was made the bearer
of two letters to the British General, and given
his release. Umra Khan explained to him his
views at great length, and under an escort he
left at midnight. Taking a circuitous route to
avoid a collection of ruffians in the valley, he
arrived at 10 a.m. at Sadoo, the head-quarters of
the British forces now advancing to the relief of
Chitral. Umra Khan hoped by delivering up
the British officer to stave off the punishment
which the British forces were now at hand to
inflict upon him. But General Low did not stay
his advance for a moment. He pushed steadily
on towards Umra Khan's stronghold at Munda,
and on April the 16th Umra Khan played his
second card, and released Lieutenant Fowler.

ROSS AND EDWARDES 69

But still General Low pressed on as will
presently be described.

Both officers had now unexpectedly obtained
their release. They had suffered the greatest
hardships, and lived in daily peril of their lives,
but they spoke with something like enthusiasm
of the good treatment they had received at
Umra Khan's hands. It was sometimes no
easy matter for that chief to keep off those who
had wished to injure the British officers ; and on
one occasion after Lieutenant Edwardes had left,
Fowler had had an anxious time owing" to the
presence of many fanatics from outside striving
to gain an entrance into the fort. There had
nearly been a pitched fight between Umra
Khans men and these wild ruffians, and a few
days afterwards when I stood with him in Umra
Khan s fort, Lieutenant Fowler, standing in the
doorway of the house he had occupied as a
prisoner only three days before, had shown me
the spot where these fanatics came clamouring
round his guard, and trying to obtain access to
him. But Umra Khan succeeded in protecting
him throughout. He gave back to Lieutenant
Edwardes his own sword which had been

70 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, ii

seized at Reshun, and which Umra Khan had
received as a present from Chitral ; and he
promised to obtain Lieutenant Fowler's also, if
it could be found. " We both consider/' say
the British officers, at the close of their report,
"that Umra Khan treated us very well indeed,
and that he never intended to be the direct
cause of injury to us under any circumstance."

So ended the wonderful adventures of these
two British subalterns. When they were hold-
ing out at Reshun, and making their last stand
in a mere village house against overwhelming
numbers of the enemy ; and again, when they
were treacherously captured by a deceitful foe ;
and lastly, when they were in the hands of men
in the fever-heat of rebellion against the British,
no one would have supposed that they could
ever have escaped alive. But they had sur-
vived every peril, and were now once more in
safety among their fellow-countrymen.

How General Low advanced to the Relief
has now to be related.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL LOW'S ADVANCE

From the time that Lord Roberts made his

famous march from Kabul to Kandahar, the

Indian Army had hitherto taken part in no

campaign so rapid, brilliant, and successful as

the operations which resulted in the relief of the

sorely pressed garrison of Chitral. No element

was wanting to call forth the keenest instincts of

the soldier, or to arouse the anxious interest of

those who watched with breathless suspense

the keen struggle, as the columns pushed

forward over high mountain passes, girth deep

in snow, across rivers broad and deep, swollen

with rain and melting snow, and fiercely opposed

by the desperate bravery of mountain warriors

born and bred to the sword. When therefore

within three short weeks the welcome news was

flashed down the wire that Chitral was relieved,

7i

72 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

and that the British agent and his escort had
been snatched from a horrible fate, there was
perhaps hardly a corner of the British Empire
which did not feel proud of the hardy leaders
and brave men who had so signally upheld the
proud standard of British resource, pluck, and
endurance.

The general plan of operations was this.
The i st Division of all arms, some 1 5,000 strong,
belonging to the 1st Army Corps was to mobilise
at Peshawur, and moving from a southerly
position as rapidly as possible, was to pass
through Swat and Dir, falling on the rear of
Umra Khan. At the same time a small column
some 400 strong was to move from Chilas and
taking the wide circuit through Gilgit and
Mastuj, was to endeavour to force its way to
Chitral from a north-easterly direction.

Before the opening of the campaign, our
knowledge of that portion of the theatre of
operations which lies between the Peshawur
Valley and Chitral territory was limited almost
entirely to such information as had been collated
from the reports of natives. This information
though defective in accuracy of detail, yet

in LOW'S ADVANCE 73

described with sufficient exactness, the main
physical difficulties to be overcome. Speaking
generally, the theatre of war was crossed trans-
versely by ranges of high mountains and rapid
rivers, each in itself a formidable obstacle,
culminating in the lofty range through which a
pass 10,450 feet high alone gave access to
Chitral. Of the country which lies between
Chilas and Chitral, by the route followed by
Colonel Kelly's column, we had accurate
knowledge, the route having been frequently
traversed by troops and an accurate survey
made. The stupendous task placed before
Colonel Kelly, moving at this time of year, could
therefore be fairly gauged beforehand.

With the fuller knowledge we now possess it
is possible to give more in detail the physical
features of the country through which the
Relief column of Peshawur passed. Skirting
the broad open plain in which Peshawur is situ-
ated is a range of mountains varying from 3,000
feet to 6,000 feet in height, and known locally
and collectively as the " border hills," for,
generally speaking, the British border runs
along the foot of this range. Beyond the

74 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

border range lies the richly cultivated Swat
Valley, varying in width from two miles to three
miles, and having an extent of some thirty-six
miles lengthways. Down this valley flows the
Swat River, a considerable stream at all times of
the year, but after the snows begin to melt, and
the summer rains burst, a large and rapid river.
Some estimate of the size of the river may be
gained by noting that at the point first bridged
by our troops, it is about half-a-mile wide from
bank to bank, being split up into seven channels
each requiring a separate bridge. The north
side of the Swat Valley is formed by the Laram
range of mountains varying from 5,000 feet to
6,000 feet in height. Beyond the Laram range
we come to the southern extremity of the Princi-
pality of Dir, down the main valley of which
flows the formidable and treacherous Panjkora
River. This river which one day is fordable
may the next be found a roaring torrent, many
feet deep ; indeed on one occasion it rose four-
teen feet within a few hours, with little or no
warning. The Panjkora Valley throughout its
length is narrow, with steep rocky spurs con-
stantly running down to the waters edge, and

Ill

LOW'S ADVANCE

75

except in the depth of winter when the water
is at its lowest, was not suitable, without exten-
sive road making, for the passage of troops.

Lying to the east of the Panjkora Valley, and
separated from it by high ranges, we find the
broad, open, fertile valleys of Jandul and Bajaur,
the former of these being the original home
and limited territory of the chief Umra Khan,
against whose power the British expedition was
mainly directed. Skirting the north end of the
Jandul Valley comes the Janbatai range, varying
from 6,000 feet to 10,000 feet in height, crossing
which we drop into a series of narrow, rocky
valleys which betoken the approaches to some
great mountain range. Such are the Baraul
and Upper Dir Valleys, with no room for culti-
vation on any scale, and barely capable of
supporting a miserably poor and backward race.
Running transversely across the north corner of
Dir territory we come to the mighty range of
mountains, from 10,000 feet to 20,000 feet in
height, over which the Lowarai Pass alone gives
military access to the Chitral Valley. The
Chitral Valley is itself very narrow and rocky,
much on a par with the Panjkora Valley, and

76 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

was, till a track was cut, very difficult for the
passage of troops.

Briefly it may be stated that four high ranges
of mountains, and three considerable rivers,
besides mountain torrents, had to be crossed by
the Southern column of the Relief Force.

The country through which the small
Northern column under Colonel Kelly had to
pass was still more rough and rugged. Moreover
he was practically isolated and had to depend
entirely on his own resources for those necessi-
ties which are requisite for pushing an armed
force through a difficult country under the most
unfavourable climatic conditions. The highest
pass which was crossed by this column was
over 12,000 feet, the account of the passage of
which will appear when the heroic struggle of
this column is dealt with in detail.

Speaking generally then, the theatre of war
may be described as a mass of mountains,
amidst which wind deep and rapid torrents,
whilst here and there may be found small open
valleys with sufficient supplies only to maintain
the inhabitants.

As mentioned before, incidentally, the plan

The Lowakai Pass in May.

Ill

LOW'S ADVANCE

77

of operations for the Relief of Chitral consisted
of a combined movement from north and south,
the Southern column being a strong force
capable of holding it own against any combin-
ation that might arise, whilst the Northern
column consisted of a mere handful of men
lightly equipped, whose errand it was to arrive
as soon as possible, and by the moral effect
of their arrival more than by actual force of
arms, to prolong the siege sufficiently for the
arrival of the main relief force. The Southern
force was based on Nowshera (near Peshawur)
whilst the Northern column was based on
Gilgit.

The enemy s main base of operations was
Jandul, the home of the ruling spirit in the
camp of the besiegers of Chitral. Hence Umra
Khan drew the pick of his men, his treasure
lay here, and such arms and ammunition as he
possessed were drawn from here. If we look
at Jandul on the map and examine its relative
position to Chitral and Peshawur we shall at
once see that a decisive blow struck from the
direction of Peshawur must inevitably jeopardize
Umra Khans base of operations, with the pro-

78 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

bable result that he would be compelled to leave
Chitral and retreat hastily to defend his own
country. The Peshawur column in fact by the
nature of its march must take him directly in
rear, and he must either abandon his own
country to the invader in the hope of first
striking a decisive blow at Chitral, afterwards
turning on his tracks to meet Sir Robert Low,
or else he must perforce abandon the siege and
concentrate his forces to meet the British before
they could gain a footing in his territory. The
relative position of the belligerents being thus,
it is apparent that the first objective of the main
column of the Relief Force was Jandul. But
though at first sight the advantage of position
lay with the British, yet one important item
entered into the problem which made the
balance even, and that was the consideration
of time. It was calculated that the Chitral
garrison was only provisioned up to the end
of April, and therefore to effect its relief a de-
cisive blow must be struck before that date. Such
a possibility Umra Khan and his lieutenant
Sher Afzul were inclined to discountenance.
An organised army moves slowly, immense

Ill

LOW'S ADVANCE

79

physical difficulties stood in its way, and the
inveterate animosity of 30,000 tribesmen could
infallibly be counted upon. In a matter which
depended upon days and even hours here lay a
distinct advantage on the side of the besiegers.

Orders were issued for the mobilisation at
Peshawur of the 1st Division of the 1st Army
Corps on March 19th, the base being after-
wards shifted to Nowshera as more convenient.
This being the first occasion on which a serious-
mobilisation of any part of the army had been*
attempted, the experiment was watched with
much interest by military critics. It must be
remembered that to mobilise a force on the
Indian frontier is a far more complicated and
difficult problem than to mobilise a force at
Metz or Strasburg. In Europe many railways
lead to important points of concentration, the
distances are comparatively short, and countries
which are likely to become the theatre of war
are intersected by numerous railways as well as
roads suitable for heavy wheeled traffic. Large
towns and flourishing villages are to be found
at the end of every march, and the country
invaded is capable of supplying to a very great

80 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

extent the wants of the invaders in the matter
of commissariat and transport. Far differently
situated is a force on the Indian frontier destined
to penetrate into the inhospitable mountains
which frown along its whole length from the
Bay of Bengal to the deserts of Beluchistan.
For such a force in addition to food for the men
nearly all the grain, and much even of the hay
for the animals, has to been carried up to the
most advanced troops from the base in India,
and carried not along macadamised roads in
capacious carts, but by mountain paths where
pack transport is alone possible.

There is a popular error that the impedimenta
of an Indian Division is enormous ; indeed, it
has been gravely stated by a serious military
critic that it is no uncommon thing for regi-
ments in India to take their mahogany mess
tables on service with them. Of course only
ignorance of the country and its ways, with a
hazy recollection of Chillianwallah and the
historic mess table of the 24th Foot, could be
responsible for such an erroneous statement.
As a matter of fact during this campaign the
.allowance per man for everything was 10 lbs.,

in LOW'S ADVANCE 81

and per officer 40 lbs., and no tents were allowed.
When we consider that an ordinary soldiers
blanket weighs 4 or 5 lbs., an allowance of
10 lbs. need not be called extravagant in a
country where snow and ice, heavy rain, and
the fiery heat of the sun had in turns to be
encountered. Yet marching thus light 28,000
pack animals had to be collected to feed and
maintain the force. It will be apparent, then,
that the problem of mobilisation on the Indian
frontier is very materially complicated by the
conditions that exist. Not only the troops and
their stores have to be concentrated, but also
many thousands of pack animals, and the food
for the entire force, man and beast, for as long
as the campaign lasts. Add to this that units
had in some cases to come immense distances,
that the line of railway was a single one, and
that the detraining station was a small roadside
station without platforms, or conveniences, for
disembarking troops, animals, and stores, and
we have a compendium of difficulties which
would try severely the most perfectly organised
scheme of mobilisation.

It was therefore a source of gratification to the

G

82 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, hi

military authorities that the scheme and the
railway stood so well the severe test applied to
them. On the ist of April the Division, fully
equipped and provisioned, made the first march
of the campaign. The force consisted of three
Infantry Brigades, each of four regiments, two
of which were British and two native ; the
Divisional troops consisted of two regiments
of cavalry, four batteries of Mountain Artillery,
one 1 regiment of Pioneers, and three 1 com-
panies of Sappers and Miners. In addition,
three regiments of infantry were told off as lines
of communication troops. The command of
the force was given to Lieutenant-General Sir
Robert Low, K.C.B., with Brigadier-General
Bindon Blood, C.B., Royal Engineers, as his
chief staff officer. The three brigades were
commanded by Brigadier-Generals A. A.
Kinloch, C.B., H. G. Waterfield, and W. F.
Gatacre, D.S.O. ; whilst the lines of communi-
cation were entrusted to Brigadier- General
A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.

The column under Colonel Kelly will be
dealt with separately in a later chapter.

1 Afterwards increased.

CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS AT THE MALAKAND AND PANJKORA

If we look at the map of the country we

shall see that the frontier at this point is crossed

by three main passes, all leading into the Swat

Valley. These passes, in order from east to

west, are the Mora Pass, the Shahkot Pass,

and the Malakand Pass. All were reported

equally difficult and each about 3,500 feet high,

with a rough footpath, possible for laden

animals, leading over each. From reasons of

policy it was decided not to use the Mora Pass,

with the idea of not disturbing unnecessarily

possibly hostile tribes on that flank. There

remained the Shahkot and Malakand Passes.

A proclamation was sent on in advance to

the people of Swat, saying that the British

Government had no hostile intentions against

them, but merely asked for right of way through
g 2 83

84 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

their territory; such a concession being liberally
paid for. Had the people of Swat elected to
accept these pacific terms a simultaneous advance
would have been made by both passes ; but
intelligence was received that all the passes were
strongly held, and especially so the Shahkot
Pass. Sir Robert Low therefore decided to
merely threaten the Shahkot and Mora Passes,
whilst his real attack was made on the Mala-
kand Pass. With this plan in view the ist
Brigade bivouacked at Lundkwar in full sight
of, and directly threatening, the Shahkot Pass ;
whilst a strong cavalry reconnaissance was
made towards the Mora Pass to stir up dust
and to distract the enemy's attention from the
true point of attack. The passes are, roughly
speaking, about seven miles apart, and as soon
as it was found that the enemy was irrevocably
committed to defend all those passes, Sir Robert
Low issued orders to concentrate on his left,
and with his whole force stormed the Malakand
Pass.

The battle took place on April 3rd, on the
very day that Colonel Kelly's column crossed
the Shandur Pass far away to the north, the 2nd

The Malakand Pass.

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 85

Brigade under Brigadier-General Waterfield
leading, supported by the ist Brigade under
Brigadier-General Kinloch, whilst the 3rd Bri-
gade under Brigadier-General Gatacre was held
in reserve. The enemy's position extended
along the crest of the pass, holding the heights
on either flank, whilst a series of breastworks
built of stone, each commanding the one below,
were pushed down the main spurs. The posi-
tion was of extraordinary strength, and one
which in the hands of an organised enemy would
have taken a week to capture. The enemy's
numbers were afterwards found to be about
12,000, about half of whom were armed, whilst
the remainder were occupied in carrying off the
killed and wounded, fetching water, and bowling
down huge rocks on the assaulting columns.
The extent of the position may be put down at
one and a half miles. The regiments chiefly
engaged were the King's Own Scottish Bor-
derers, the Gordon Highlanders, the Guides,
and the 4th Sikhs, all of the 2nd Brigade ; and
the Bedfordshire Regiment, the 60th Rifles, the
15th Sikhs, and the 37th Dogras composing
the ist Brigade. Three mountain batteries

86 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

massed under Major Dacres Cunningham also
took a conspicuous part in the fight, whilst three
Maxim guns also did their share towards
defeating the enemy.

The plan of attack was as follows. The
Guides supported later by the 4th Sikhs, were
to scale the precipitous height on the extreme
right of the enemy's position, then turning in-
wards the two regiments were to sweep along
the crest, taking the enemy in flank whilst the
frontal attack was pushed home. It was calcu-
lated that the Guides would take three hours to
reach the crest, but so stern was the resistance,
and so jagged and perpendicular the ascent,
that it took these practised mountaineers five
hours before they had captured the last sangar
and crowned the heights. Meanwhile as the
day was drawing on it was considered inadvis-
able to delay longer the frontal attack, for the
enemy had been now under a most searching
and accurate shell fire from three batteries for
the space of upwards of three hours and were
naturally much shaken by it, whilst the action
of the Guides had made itself well felt on his
right flank ; orders were therefore given for the

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 87

King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordon
Highlanders to advance to the attack, each
being directed up a separate spur.

It was a fine and stirring sight to see the
splendid dash with which the two Scotch
regiments took the hill. From valley to crest
at this point the height varies from 1,000 to 1,500
feet and the slope looks for the most part almost
perpendicular. It was this very steepness
which partly accounted for the comparatively
small loss suffered from the enemy's fire and the
showers of huge boulders which were hurled
upon the assailants ; but the chief reason for
this happy immunity was the wonderfully spirited
manner in which the men rushed breastwork
after breastwork, and arrived just beneath the
final ridge before the enemy had time to realise
that the assaulting columns were at their very
feet.

When the whole of the 2nd Brigade had thus
got well under way orders were given for the
1 st Brigade to support them, the 60th Rifles,
followed by the 15th Sikhs, being sent up a re-
entrant, which intervened between the King's
Own Scottish Borderers and the Guides, whilst

88 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

the Bedfordshire Regiment and 37th Dogras,
heading on up the valley passed across the front
of the enemy's position, and, circling round the
rear of the Gordon Highlanders, attacked the
enemy's extreme left, overlapping it consider-
ably. The 60th Rifles after ascending some
way suddenly came across an old Buddhist
road, and turning sharp to their right along this
soon found themselves level with the lead-
ing companies of the King's Own Scottish
Borderers. The whole line now took a moment's
breathing time, to collect the men still struggling
up in small groups, and to get into wind for
the final rush. As soon as all was ready
bayonets were fixed, the bugle's cheery call to
advance was sounded, and with a great shout
the position which from below appears almost
impregnable was carried at the point of the
bayonet ; the three British regiments reaching
the crest at almost the same moment. Mean-
while the Guides and 4th Sikhs had stormed
the lofty peak away on our left, and were ready
to move inwards if such support had been
necessary ; whilst the Bedfordshire Regiment
and 37th Dogras scaling the heights before

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 89

them dashed down the far valley in hot pursuit
of the enemy, only halting when they reached
the large walled village of Khar on the Swat
River.

Thus brilliantly was an exceptionally strong
position carried, and the first obstacle which lay
in the path of the Southern column of the Relief
Force brushed away. The action lasted five
hours, and it is difficult to praise too highly the
dash and determination with which the pass
was carried. Nor is it possible to forget the
sterling bravery of the enemy, who for five
hours withstood a most searching and splendidly-
directed shell fire from three batteries, and yet
were still firm enough to stand up to a bayonet
charge at the end of it. Their loss was com-
puted by themselves at 500 killed, and the
general average of battles would make their
wounded probably reach a total of 1,000, or, say,
a total loss of from 1,250 to 1,500. The British
loss was under seventy killed and wounded.

Several curious cases of the vitality of the
wounded was furnished by both sides. A man
of the Guides, hit in the region of the stomach,
climbed down to the foot of the pass, and walked

90 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

five miles back to the Field Hospital, supported
by a comrade. One of the enemy on the other
hand, with no less than six bullets through him,
walked all the way to Chakdara, nine miles off,
and was afterwards treated by our surgeons, and,
strange to say, made a rapid recovery. There
is no doubt that Asiatics can stand wounds
inflicted by sword or bullet infinitely better than
Europeans can. Wounds that would kill a
European, or at any rate lay him up for months,
affect these hardy and abstemious mountaineers
in a very much less severe manner. Imagine,
for instance, having the whole lock of an ex-
ploded gun blown into one's shoulder, and going
about as if nothing in particular had happened !
Yet such a lock was cut out of a man's shoulder
months after the occurrence by one of our
surgeons. Marvellous cases of recovery, with-
out number, might be told, but perhaps the case
of quite a young boy is as typical as any. Like
boys in any other part of the world, hearing
that a fight was going to take place hard by, he
naturally determined to go and look on. Whilst
he was thoroughly enjoying himself in all the
excitement of the fight, and probably throwing

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 91

stones vigorously, a stray bullet hit him in the
arm, passing through it in several places and
splintering it badly. When the pass was taken
he was found lying wounded, and his wound
was examined. The doctors decided that he
must have his arm cut off, or mortification
would certainly set in, and they gave the boy
the choice between death or the amputation of
his arm. He chose the former, but in a few
days instead of being dead he was better, and in
a few days more was out and about again.

Concealed amongst the rocks, boulders, and
bushes, the enemy formed a most difficult mark
to hit ; whilst the same causes, combined with
the steepness of the ground, saved our troops
from severer loss. The admirable control under
which our infantry fire was kept may be gauged
by the fact that the average expenditure of
ammunition was under seven rounds per man
throughout the day.

Of the enemy's bravery it is difficult to speak
too highly, and individual cases were con-
spicuous. One leader, carrying a large red and
white banner, called on his men to charge the
Scottish Borderers when they were half way up

92 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

the hill. The charge was made, but all his
followers gradually fell, till the leader alone
was left. Nothing daunted he held steadily on,
now and again falling, heavily hit, but up and
on again without a moments delay, till at last
he was shot dead close to the British line.
More desperate courage than this is diffi-
cult to imagine. Again, one of the enemy's
drummers, not content with taking his fair
share of risks, persisted in mounting on to the
roof of a hut, where he showed up clear and
conspicuous against the sky line, and thence
cheered on his comrades. Every now and
again a bullet would find him out, and he would
drop to dress his wounds, and then again
mounting recommenced beating his drum. At
last a bullet got him through the heart, and he
fell headlong a hundred yards down the cliff,
and there lay stark dead, but with his drum
round his neck, and his arms ready raised to
strike it. No doubt the great Mahomed will
find a place for him in the ranks of the
Mussulman Paradise.

On the night after the battle, the crest of the
pass was held by the ist Brigade, with two

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 93

regiments pushed down as far as Khar, whilst
the 2nd Brigade bivouacked at the south
entrance of the pass. On the following morn-
ing commenced the stupendous task of pushing
over the pass the ammunition, baggage, and
supplies of the advanced brigades. The only
available path was a single track very steep and
much encumbered with boulders, which had
been hastily improved by working parties of
Sappers and Pioneers. Up this, from dawn to
dusk, toiled batch after batch of laden mules,
and yet at the end of the day small progress
had been made. At this highly opportune
moment it was discovered that the old Buddhist
road, hit off by the 6oth Rifles during the
assault, led down by a good gradient to the
plains. Every available man was immediately
employed in improving this relic of a civilisation
2,000 years old, with the result that in another
twenty-four hours the brigades were ready to
move. Had it not been for this Buddhist
road, the very existence of which appeared to
have been forgotten by the present inhabitants,
it would have taken many days to get the
division across the Malakand Pass.

94 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Whilst the work on the pass was going on,
the i st Brigade moved down into the Swat
Valley, and was fiercely assailed by several
thousand of the enemy, who, finding the
Shahkot and Mora Passes turned, came stream-
ing westward, determined on a fight. These
large bodies of men appeared on the spurs which
flanked the advance of the ist Brigade, and it
became necessary to hold them in check till the
brigade with its baggage could get clear into
the open valley. This duty was successfully
performed by the 37th Dogras, who crowned a
neighbouring spur, as well as by the Mountain
Artillery, which kept the enemy's crest well
swept. Towards evening, however, the enemy,
mistaking the defensive attitude of our troops,
who were merely covering the advance of the
remainder, were reported to be boldly issuing
into the plain to the number of 2,000, making
as if to sweep round the foot of the spur where
it meets the plain, with a view to charging on
to the head and flank of the advancing column.
Receiving warning of this movement, orders
were immediately given for the mere handful
of cavalry which had been able so far to struggle

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 95

over the pass to trot round the spur, and to
watch for a chance of falling on the enemy in
the open. This small body consisted of fifty
sabres of the Guides Cavalry under Captain R.
B. Adams and Lieutenant G. M. Baldwin, who,
on reconnoitring round the spur, found the enemy
in the open, but, like all mountaineers, hugging
the foothills. Seeing his chance, Captain
Adams, with great promptness and boldness,
charged, doing great execution, and driving the
whole mass of the enemy headlong into the
hills. Not only was the charge brilliant and
effective, but the moral effect was enormous.
The enemy had not the remotest notion that
any cavalry had crossed the pass, and like all
nations unaccustomed to horses, they had
exaggerated notions of the power of cavalry.
When, therefore, they saw their worst fears
more than realised, and fifty sabres without a
moments hesitation charging a couple of
thousand foot soldiers and completely altering
the aspect of the fight, the ascendency of the
cavalry arm was established for the campaign.
Even Fowler and Edwardes, in their far-off
captivity, heard nothing reiterated so much as

96 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

this dread of cavalry. The immediate result
was that the enemy began to melt away
even from the hill tops, and by next morning
not a vestige of them was to be seen. Our
losses on this day were slight, including seven
or eight in the cavalry, whilst the enemy suffered
severely, at least 250 being killed.

On the 5th and 6th of April, reconnaissances
under the Chief Staff Officer, General Blood,
were pushed up the valley to search for fords
across the Swat River, and to keep in touch
with the enemy, who could be seen in consider-
able force beyond Thana. Suitable points of
passage having been found, the duty of forcing
the passage was entrusted to General Waterfield
and the 2nd Brigade. The enemy now left
Thana and crossing the river were reinforced
by a body of riflemen sent down by Umra Khan
under the command of his brother. In all about
4,500 men were posted in a naturally strong posi-
tion to oppose the passage of the British force.
On the enemy's bank small rocky hills at the
waters edge, completely commanded the per-
fectly level and open southern bank, from which
the attack had to be delivered. Naturally a

tv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 97

frontal attack would have been very costly,
but General Waterfield's smart tactical instinct
showed him the way to gain his end with but
slight loss. Engaging the enemy heavily at long
ranges with his artillery and the main body of
his Infantry, he sent the Guides Cavalry and
i ith Bengal Lancers up the river with orders to
cross by a little-known ford, and to fall briskly
on the flank and rear of the enemy. To sup-
port the cavalry he sent the 15th Sikh Infantry.
The effect was instantaneous ; the defenders of
the passage the moment they saw the dreaded
Lancers, half swimming, half wading, across the
river, a mile or so up stream, began to lose
heart ; and what at first was a retirement gradu-
ally degenerated into a flight, headed by Umra
Khans brother and the body of horsemen
escorting him. But the Lancers and Guides
were not to be denied, and falling on the demor-
alised foe, left the green crops strewn with their
dead. The enemy's total loss was about 400
killed,, of whom about one hundred fell to the
cavalry. Holding the north bank with two
battalions, fords were rapidly marked out, and
the infantry, aided by inflated skins, and the

H

98 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

skilled watermen of the country impressed for
the service, struggled across with only two or
three casualties from drowning. The work was
an anxious one, for armpit deep in the rushing
torrent a man washed off his legs was lost for
ever.

During the cavalry pursuit one of the squad-
rons of the nth Bengal Lancers narrowly
missed capturing Umra Khan's brother, which
at the time would have been a great coup. For
it must be remembered that two British officers,
Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, were all this
time prisoners in Umra Khans hands, and
entirely at his mercy. It may be said that the
halter was round their necks, and every blow
our forces struck served but to tighten the knot.
With Umra Khan s brother in our hands the
situation would have been reciprocated, and we
could then have afforded to treat on equal terms
for an exchange. During this same pursuit a
curious incident occurred. One or two of the
enemy made a stand close to a tree in the plain ;
at them charged a trooper, lance well down, as
hard as he could gallop ; whether he hit his man
or not history does not relate, but the next

jv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 99

second he found himself and his horse at the
bottom of a well, which without side walls stood
behind the tree. His horse was killed, but he
himself escaped with a bad shaking. If one
may hark so far back a similar accident met an
uncle of the author's, Lieutenant George Young-
husband, of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, in the
Mutiny. He was charging with his squadron
with Greathead's column, on their march to the
relief of Agra, when he came across a blind
well, down which he fell, with his mounted
orderly on top of him. His orderly and the
two horses were killed, and he alone came out
alive, but alas ! only to be killed in another
charge shortly afterwards.

In the village of Chakdara, which lies near
the main ford on the north bank, many arms
were found, and amongst others a straight
officers sword, cavalry pattern, by Wilkinson,
of London. As the number was on the sword,
application was made to Messrs. Wilkinson to
find out from their books the name of the original
owner of the sword. It turned out to be an
officer of the name of Bellew. This proved

to be Lieutenant Bellew of the 10th Hussars,
h 2

100 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

who served in Afghanistan in 1878-79, with
his regiment This sword he had lent to Lieu-
tenant Harford, who was drowned with a troop
of the 10th Hussars in the Kabul River. We
had here evidence of the immense strength of
the class of stone fort built by Umra Khan.
The fort is called Ramora, and lay east of Chak-
dara, being Umra Khan's advanced fort, with
which he practically dominated the entire Swat
Valley. This was captured after a short resist-
ance, and sentenced to be blown up by the
Sappers. But sentence was one thing, and
execution another. A heavy charge was placed
at the foot of one of the towers, the train lighted,
and the spectators stood afar off, expecting to
see the whole structure lifted sky high. There
was a very loud report indeed, but that was all,
for the tower stood perfectly unmoved. On
-further examination it was found that the base
of each tower was perfectly solid masonry from
the foundation to fifteen feet above ground line,
whilst the walls above were of immense thickness.
All the forts built by Umra Khan were of
the same pattern, that is, four-cornered, with
one of these strong towers at each corner, and;

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 101

with high walls of great thickness and carefully
loopholed forming the four sides. Our artillery
could make no impression on these forts. The
■sites chosen in the open valleys are very good ;
but in the narrow valleys they are perforce much
commanded by the neighbouring precipitous
hills. .On the Swat River, the enemy's position,
with the fort of Ramora on one flank, rocky
hills well prepared for defence on the other, the
village of Chakdara in the centre, with much
swampy ground restricting the advance of an
enemy even after the passage of the river to a
few well-defined paths, combined to make the
position if scientifically held a remarkably strong
one.

Directly the passage of the Swat River had
been effected the Sappers were set to work to
construct a trestle and pier bridge, whilst strong
'reconnaissances were sent forward to keep in
touch with the enemy. These found the
Katgola Pass over the Laram Range un-
occupied, and the cavalry pushing on descended
on to the Panjkora River, some twenty miles
ahead. Here was found the most formidable
obstacle which the force had yet encountered.

102 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

On April 9th, the river was fordable for horses
and, with difficulty, also for infantry ; on the
nth, it was barely fordable for horses, and not
at all for Infantry ; but from that time onwards
it became a mighty torrent totally unfordable,
impracticable also for cavalry swimming, though
the Indian trooper and his horse are like ducks
in the water. It became necessary therefore
to build a bridge.

The only materials immediately at hand were
the heavy logs of wood, parts of great trees
which are annually floated down from these
regions to India, for sale. With these, and
using telegraph wire to anchor the piers, a
rough footbridge was with great difficulty and
danger constructed, and floated into position.
On the night of April 12th, the Guides were
pushed across, and strongly entrenched, so as
to cover the bridge head. The night passed
quietly, but towards morning a freshet came
down bearing great logs and washed the bridge
away, leaving the Guides on the far side. The
position was undoubtedly an awkward one, for
cavalry reconnaissances had reported that the
enemy in some strength, calculated at 9,000 by

iv ACTIONS AT MALA K AND 103

the local people, lay only about seven miles
westward, and the news of the bridge breaking
would immediately be reported by their outlooks.
However it never does in fighting these people
to hesitate or appear to be in the least discom-
posed, happen what may. Colonel Battye, who
was commanding the Guides on this occasion,
therefore adhered to the orders received over-
night, when the bridge was intact. These orders
were to turn the enemy's sharpshooters out of
the positions from which they had been annoying
our working parties, and to burn such villages
near at hand as had been furnishing armed
parties to fire across the river by night and
day. The bold offensive thus taken by the
Guides undoubtedly had a good effect. They
started early in the morning, and making a wide
sweep drove out all parties of the enemy con-
cealed amongst the rocks, and burnt such
villages as were actively hostile. All this was
easy work for troops highly skilled in hill war-
fare, though the climbing was very stiff; but
the really stern trial came when the hour arrived
to retire to the bridge head. It requires the
very best and steadiest of troops to carry out a

104 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

retirement in the face of great odds, and it
requires still greater nerve to do so in the
presence of brave and fanatical foes who count
life as nothing, who with matchless courage
charge right up to the muzzle of a breech-loader,
and who give no quarter and ask for none.

In retiring before such an enemy an almost
exaggerated deliberation is required, for the
least appearance of hurry, much more so of con-
fusion, will open the sluice gates and let in such
a stormy torrent of warriors, that science must
perforce give way to weight of numbers.

The story of the day's fighting may thus be
briefly told. The Guides had completed their
mission on which they had been despatched, and
were now retiring down the spurs of a lofty hill
which forms the angle where the Jandul River
flows into the Panjkora River. This hill is to
the south of the Jandul River, whilst the bridge
head was to the north of it. Thus, to reach
their entrenched position the Guides had to
retire down the mountain they were on and to
cross the Jandul River. At about noon two
dense columns of the enemy were seen coming
down the Jandul Valley, one column keeping

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 105

to the right bank, and the other to the left bank
of the Jandul River. The first column, breast-
ing the mountain oat of range of the Guides
and mostly hidden from them by an intervening
spur, reached the summit and attacked the
regiment strongly as it retired. The second
column sweeping down the valley prepared to
assail the Guides in flank and rear, hoping to
completely cut off their retreat. Foot by foot
- — -to the spectators it seemed almost inch by
inch — the different companies retired alternately
down the ridges they occupied, fiercely assailed
on all hands yet coolly firing volley after volley,
relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly
one strong position only to take up another a
few yards back, the splendidly-directed fire of
the Derajat Mountain Battery doing invaluable
service. So good indeed was the fire discipline
of the troops engaged under these trying
circumstances that not a shot was fired except
by word of command. Meanwhile two com-
panies of the regiment, which had been left to
hold the bridge head, moved out to check the
advance of the enemy's second column, which,
making a detour, was moving with determination

106 THE RELIEF OF CH1TRAL chap.

into the flank and rear of the retreating force.
The whole of the 2nd Brigade, a battery of
artillery, and a Maxim gun, were now ordered
out and placed in a strong position on the east
bank of the Panjkora (the Guides being on the
west bank), whence in the later stages of the
retirement their fire could be of material
assistance. Owing to the very broken nature
of the mountain sides, and the excellent cover
afforded to skilled skirmishers, our loss was
exceedingly small till the foot of the hill was
reached. Here the regiment had to cross
several hundred yards of level ground, on which
the green barley was standing waist high, and
then cross the Jandul River, here about three
feet deep, to make its way through more fields
to the bridge head. Unhappily, just as the
regiment left the last spur, the commanding
officer, Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye was
mortally wounded, dying, as he would perhaps
most wish to, at the head of his regiment, after
a quarter of a century of distinguished service
with it.

It was in crossing this open ground that the
extraordinary bravery of the enemy became

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 107

more brilliantly evident. Standard-bearers
with reckless gallantry could be seen rushing
to certain destruction, falling perhaps within
ten yards of the invincible line of the Guides.
Nay, sometimes men, devoid of all fear, and
having used up the whole of their ammunition,
rushed forward with large rocks and hurled
these at the soldiers, courting instant death.
They were like hounds on their prey. Nothing
could damp their ardour or check the fury of
their assaults. Even after the Guides had
crossed the Jandul stream, and the enemy were
under a severe flank fire from the Gordon
Highlanders and the Kings Own Scottish
Borderers, they dashed into the stream, where
each one stood out as clear as a bull's eye on a
target, and attempted to close again. But not
a man got across, so steady and well directed
was the flank fire of the British regiments.
The fight was now practically over for the day ;
fire slackened all round, and the entrenched
position was rapidly occupied, and strengthened
where necessary. During the day the enemy,
who numbered 5,000, lost from 500 to 600
men ; the Guides' total loss was only about

108 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

twenty, a result due to the skilful manner in
which the retirement was effected, as well as to
the fine cover afforded by the broken ground
•on the mountain side.

It was now evening, and preparations had to
be made to meet a night attack, for the enemy,
several thousand strong, were still close round
hidden behind the low hills. As a reinforce-
ment a couple of companies of the 4th Sikhs
and some extra British officers were sent across
•on rafts, also a Maxim gun ; whilst the near
bank, which commanded the bridge head
entrenchment at 800 yards' range, was occupied
by a mountain battery, and the troops of the
2nd Brigade. The position of the enemy being
such as it was, the night was one of some
anxiety, for a determined rush might be ex-
pected at any moment. Such an attack was
planned and on the eve of being executed,
when the unexpected, and as it seemed to the
enemy, magical, appearance of a star shell com-
pletely dumfounded the hitherto dauntless foe,
and the attack was not delivered. From the
information of spies it appeared afterwards that
2,000 chosen warriors, sword in hand, lay con-

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 109

cealed in the standing corn just outside the
picquets, merely awaiting the signal for assault,
when this happy contrivance of civilisation
staved off a fight, which could only have been
attended with enormous loss on both sides.
Before the enemy finally drew off, however, the
force sustained a serious loss in the death of
Captain Peebles* in charge of the Maxim gun.
This officers services had proved invaluable
from his intimate knowledge of the working of
the Maxim, a gun which in inexpert hands is
apt, like other pieces of mechanism, to get out
of order. The working of Captain Peebles's
gun had been the admiration of the whole force
throughout the campaign.

It had become sufficiently apparent now that
no floating bridge could hope to stand the
current in the Panjkora River, and it was
therefore decided to throw across a suspension
bridge at a point somewhat lower down.
Curiously enough at this point, where the
rocky hills shut in the river till it is like a mill
race only 100 feet or so across, were found
bridging materials collected by Umra Khan,
who had evidently ordered a cantilever bridge

110 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

to be built here. The work was entrusted to
Major Aylmer, V.C., R.E., who had had much
experience in this branch of his art up in the
Gilgit direction. The available materials were
telegraph wire and beams from dismantled
houses. With these, within forty-eight hours,
Major Aylmer constructed a suspension bridge
of 100 feet span, capable of bearing even
loaded camels, cavalry, and mountain artillery.

During the construction a very prompt and
plucky act on Major Aylmers part saved the
life of a soldier. About a mile up stream,
where the first floating bridge had been con-
structed, a flying bridge and rafts were still
working backwards and forwards, to supply the
Guides with their wants on the other bank.
One of these rafts, on which were two men of
the Devonshire Regiment Maxim Gun De-
tachment, got accidentally overturned, and the
boatmen and oars were washed away. The
two soldiers managed to climb on to the raft
and were carried down stream at a great pace.
General Gatacre, seeing the accident, immedi-
ately galloped down to the site of the new
bridge to give warning, in the hopes of saving

Constructing Suspension Bridge over Panjkora River.

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 111

the men. Meanwhile one man had made an
attempt to jump on shore, and had been swept
away and drowned, and the survivor on the
raft came flying down the torrent. With the
greatest presence of mind and pluck Major
Aylmer immediately slipped down a slack wire
'that was across the river, and just managed to
grab the soldier as he shot past. The raft was
immediately after dashed to pieces on the rocks
below. With considerable difficulty the soldier
and his preserver were hauled on shore, and
it was then found that the Major was badly
bruised and cut by the wire. The Royal
Humane Society's medal has been given for
many a less distinguished act of bravery, yet I
do not think that in the stir of passing events
it actually occurred to any of the spectators to
send the recommendation home.

Certain news came in about now that Lieu-
tenants Edwardes and Fowler, the two officers
who had fallen into Umra Khans hands, were
at Barwa, a small fort only about eighteen miles
distant, on the other side of the Panjkora.
This rather complicated matters, for according
to all precedent and our former experiences of

112 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Pathan warfare these officers' lives were not
worth an hours purchase in any case, and their
murder in cold blood might be calculated on as
a moral certainty if we were to attack. The
following note was received from the officers,
written from Barwa : — " Fowler R.E. and
Edwardes 2nd Bombay Grenadiers are shut
in Barwa can you get us out. Give bearers
Rs. 100. 7.4.94 (sic) P.S. Shall we try and
bolt people here panic." A hasty scrawl written
on the leaf of a note-book.

The title " Political " officers is one of ill
omen in the Indian Army, but in Major Deane
the force had a guide, philosopher, and friend
whose services throughout were simply invalu-
able. Added to an intimate knowledge of the
country, its people, and language, he added a
shrewd knowledge of how to deal with them.
To Major Dearie's diplomatic skill Lieutenants
Fowler and Edwardes in all human probability
owe their lives, and their release freed the
General's arm to strike, unhampered by the
thought that his action might sound the death-
knell of the two young officers. In meeting
Major Deane half way in these diplomatic over-

iv ACTIONS AT MALAKAND 113

tures Umra Khan displayed an enlightened and
civilised advancement which is far ahead of his
surroundings. Without demanding any quid
pro quo, he, when they were asked for, returned
the prisoners in all honour, having treated them
thoroughly well throughout.

Whilst the Sappers are busy building their
bridge over the Panjkora this would be a not
altogether unfavourable moment to epitomise
the campaign in so far as it had conduced to the
relief of the beleaguered garrison up to this date.
Every effort had failed to get news from the
besieged, nor had it been found possible by any
device — for many were tried — to throw news of
the coming succour into the fort. But so far
great results had been gained ; the commander-
in-chief, the soul and body of the siege, Umra
Khan himself, with one thousand of his picked
men, mostly armed with breech-loaders, had
been compelled to abandon the siege, and to
hasten back southwards and to organise resist-
ance to and raise the tribes against our advance.
On this same date, April 13th, Colonel Kelly
and his handful of men were at Mastuj, having

accomplished their celebrated passage of the
1

114 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, iv

Shandur Pass. His advance so far had been
but slightly opposed. From reliable information
it was supposed that the garrison of Chitral had
supplies to last them only up to April 22nd. A
week therefore only remained, and before the
Southern force lay Umra Khan with 9,000 men
and two mighty ranges of mountains, whilst the
Northern force, under Colonel Kelly, though
within sixty miles of Chitral, had before it a
narrow and difficult route, at any point in which
the enemy might be found strongly posted.

CHAPTER V

THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL

Truly on this thirteenth of April the outlook
was not a bright one ; but here came in one of
those flashes of genius which go to win cam-
paigns and undoubtedly helped to win this one.
It occurred to those responsible for the conduct
of the campaign that though it was impossible
to convey a large force to Chitral in the given
time, yet it was quite feasible to push through
a small number of men who, falling on the rear
of Sher Afzul, the general left by Umra Khan
in charge of the siege, might form a welcome
diversion. At first it was contemplated sending
a mixed force of regulars and levies, but after
careful deliberation it was decided that regulars
would impede the rate of march, and that the
effect being chiefly a moral one could be almost

as surely gained by levies alone. The plan
12 115

116 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

therefore was for the main force to cross the
Panjkora, and to fight a decisive battle with
Umra Khan, whilst our ally the Khan of Dir,
covered by this movement, was despatched up
the left bank of the Panjkora River, with orders
to cross the Lowarai Pass, 10,450 feet high, to
descend into the Chitral Valley, and to give out
far and wide that he was merely the advanced
guard of the force, which had conquered Swat
and Bajour, and had heavily defeated the hither-
to invincible general Umra Khan.

In pursuance of this plan the Khan of Dir
was ordered to move forward with 1,000 men
and to cross the Lowarai Pass, and immediately
the bridge over the Panjkora River was com-
pleted, General Blood moved rapidly forward
in charge of a cavalry reconnaissance towards
Umra Khans stronghold at Munda. Advanc-
ing with a squadron of the Guides Cavalry,
General Blood moved up the Jandul River till
the large and important village of Miankila was
in sight. Here a peasant was met who entered
freely into conversation. The General asked
him where Umra Khan was. He said, " Over
there in that fort," pointing to Munda, just over

Dir Fort.

RELIEF OF CHITRAL 117

the brow of a rise in the ground. " Will you
take him a note and bring an answer ? " asked
the General. " Certainly/' said the peasant, " I
will be back in half an hour." So calling to his
assistance the linguistic proficiency of Captain
Nixon, of the Intelligence Department, a polite
and cordial note was written to Umra Khan,
asking him to come out into the open and have
a talk with the General, in all good fellowship,
and " without prejudice/' The answer came
back before long, and was to the following effect :
* 4 After greetings, I should greatly like to meet
your excellency, and to have a quiet talk with
you, whereby the whole affair might be easily
settled. But unfortunately I am surrounded by
about 3,000 Ghazis, and these bad men will not
hear of my going out to see. You too I notice
are accompanied by warriors. Assuredly no
quiet conversation can take place under these
circumstances. Now I propose that you send
away your army and I will send away mine,
and then you and I can have our conference
alone in the field." This was all very nice and
friendly ; but meanwhile dense columns of the
enemy began to issue from Miankila and Munda,

118 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

and moving with astonishing rapidity, occupied
both banks of the river, which is here easily
fordable everywhere, and began to press on
the cavalry. The reconnoitring party moved
back quietly, till the head of the infantry column
became visible, hastening up. This was the 3rd
Infantry Brigade under General Gatacre, accom-
panied by the nth Bengal Lancers and the
Derajat Mountain Battery.

The battery opened fire at once, and the
cavalry moved up the river bed, here very
broad and open, whilst the infantry advanced to
the attack up the right bank of the stream.
But from the first moment, though Umra Khan
was present in person, it was quite evident that
the enemy did not mean " business." The
severe lessons of former battles had begun to tell
upon them, and their resistance was only half-
hearted. The 3rd Brigade pushed home their
advantage, and the enemy retired before them,
losing only a few men, till towards evening their
whole force was to be seen in full retreat up
the distant valley into Nawagai. The troops
bivouacked in the forward position they had
gained, and the 2nd Brigade was ordered up in

RELIEF OF CHITRAL 119

the expectation that the enemy would make a
determined stand on the morrow. But the
morrow showed nothing but deserted positions
and deserted forts, and thus easily had been
fought and won the final engagement which
decided the campaign, and sent Umra Khan,
the victor in a hundred fights, ruined and broken
to exile, and premature death in Kabul.

When we say ruined, however, let us under-
stand the word in a moral sense. Pecuniarily
Umra Khan is anything but ruined, for one of
our spies counted eleven mule loads of treasure
leaving Munda fort one night under a strong
escort. Each mule would carry Rs. 6,000 in
silver, or Rs. 120,000 in gold, or any sum one
likes to mention in jewels. Taking a rough
average between silver and gold, and leaving
jewels out of consideration, we shall be able to
calculate that eleven mule loads of treasure
would keep Umra Khan and his family very
comfortably for the rest of their days.

Some weeks after, when escorting Sher Afzul
to India, I heard many stories of Umra Khan.
Like a wise man, knowing the uncertain tenor
of an Eastern monarch's reign, he had taken

120 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

care to feather his nest whilst his power lasted.
He exacted a tithe of their profits from all,
merchants or agriculturists, and the money thus
accumulated, he changed into gold at a rate of
exchange fixed by himself. Thus if the real
value of a Russian gold coin was Rs.20, by royal
edict, and for the benefit of the royal purchaser,
it became Rs. 18. Gold is very scarce in Asia,
but a certain number of Russian coins filter
across, and gold ornaments are to be found here
and there. All these Umra Khan assiduously
collected, so that at the time of his flight he
probably had a goodly treasure.

Oneevening before the British advance began,
after attending evening prayers on the praying
platform in the clump of chenars below Munda
fort, Umra Khan, turning to his followers, said :
" I have just received a letter from Gholam
Hyder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan
army. His proposal is that I shall invade the
Peshawur Valley by way of the Malakand with
30,000 men, and that he will co-operate through
the Khyber Pass with 10,000 men. What say
you, my brave warriors ? " Whereupon the
whole assembly arose with a mighty shout, " To

v RELIEF OF CHITRAL

121

Peshawur ! " travestying a somewhat more
celebrated cry which was heard in Europe in
1870. Whether such a letter had been received
or not, and whether, if it had been, it was any-
thing more than one of those neighbourly acts
by which, in the East, one friend lures another
to certain destruction, it is not necessary here to
discuss. The anecdote is merely told as show-
ing the immense confidence Umra Khan had in
his own powers, and the faith his followers had
in his skill. Years of conquest, and years of
unchequered success, had led the petty border
chieftain into half thinking that he could with-
stand the power of a mighty empire. It was a
thousand pities that this chief took up the atti-
tude he did. If he had chosen to be the friend
of the British, he might now be despotic ruler of
all the country which lies between Chitral and
Peshawur Valley, with the firm alliance of the
British Government at his back.

When the cavalry, riding on rapidly, captured
the abandoned fort of Munda, every trace of a
rapid flight was apparent. Books and grain
were strewn about, dismounted cannon lay at
the gate, everything was topsy-turvey and

122 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

turned inside out, and the sole occupant was
a poor, deformed idiot. Amongst the papers
found lying about were some of considerable
interest. One was from a certain mullah 1 who,
before the battle, wrote from the summit of the
Malakand Pass. He said : " We see the in-
fidels, the sons of pigs, encamped down in the
plains below us. There are very few of them,
and we shall easily send them all to Hell. On
our side we have twelve or fifteen thousand
Ghazis, and the place is well fortified with san-
gars. To-morrow or next day I shall have the
honour of informing your Excellency that the
infidels have been extirpated" ; and so on. It
is highly probable that the worthy mullah spent
the next few days in breaking the record towards
Upper Swat, or else, perchance, his bones now
lie on the Malakand.

Another literary curiosity found in Munda
fort was a letter from a Scotch firm in Bombay
offering to provide Umra Khan with every
luxury in the way of arms and ammunition, from
Maxim guns at Rs.3,700 each, down to revolvers

1 A priest, often of the sporting-parson type of Joshua
of old.

RELIEF OF CHITRAL 123

at Rs.34 a piece. Luckily the benevolent in-
tentions of this patriotic firm had been frustrated
by the astute intervention of Major Deane, at
that time Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur.
The firm in question has found it expedient to
transfer itself, and the benefits to humanity
which it provides, to Cairo. Many other letters
too lay about showing how wide was the influence
of the departed chief; offers of help, spontaneous
and otherwise, showed that the total resources
at his command were not much under 30,000
men, all armed in some fashion or another, with
a good sprinkling of breech-loading rifles, lately
the property of Her Majesty the Queen of
England.

It was on the 17th day of April that Umra
Khan made his last stand and disappeared
permanently from the theatre of operations.
On the very same day the garrison of Chitral
made the splendid sortie led by Lieutenant
Harley of the 14th Sikhs, a full account of
which will appear in a future chapter, and on
the night of the 18th of April the siege was
raised, and Sher Afzul and his whole force fled
to the hills. Here the general with 1,500 of

124 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

his men, were cleverly captured and brought in
prisoners to Dir.

The history of our recent wars does not
furnish an example of a more signal and sweep-
ing success. In the space of exactly one month
from the day on which the mobilisation of the
Relief Force was ordered, the main object of
the campaign was obtained, the whole of the
enemy's numerous and ubiquitous forces were
defeated and dispersed, and every one of the
important chiefs was a prisoner in our hands, or
in those of our ally the Amir. Setting aside
the superiority in armament and organisation
which were undoubtedly on our side — though
in passing it may be noted that the Soudan and
the Cape furnish instances where both availed
not against determined savages — it may be well
to examine the chief causes which led to this
signal success. The result may be described
briefly as due to three main causes : To the rapid
and successful mobilisation of the Relief Force ;
to the crushing defeat of the enemy in Swat, on
the Panjkora, and in the Jandul Valley ; and to
the hardy and determined advance of Colonel
Kelly's small column from the north. Nor

Head-quarter Camp,

v RELIEF OF CHITRAL 125

must we forget the stout resistance of the
garrison placed perforce in an almost untenable
position against overwhelming odds, which
thoroughly damped the ardour of the besiegers
and paved the way for the effective result
obtained by the approach of the relief columns.
It was in fact the game of war played on sound
principles, and with a fine all-round combination
which commanded success.

How nice this calculation had to be will be
appreciated by the military student, when he
considers how far divergent were the bases from
which the two columns had to start, and what
immense physical difficulties had to be overcome
by each. It does not require much imagination
to show that Umra Khan, acting, as he was, on
interior lines as against exterior lines, might, if
less skilfully assailed, have first thrown his
whole force on Colonel Kelly's weak column,
entangled in almost impossible defiles ; next,
with troops elated with victory, have swamped
the small garrison of Chitral, already hard
pressed and short of food, and then, with a
dozen tribes at his back, stirred up to the
highest pitch of Mohammedan fanaticism, have

126 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

turned and assailed the main column under Sir
Robert Low. The final result of the campaign
must undoubtedly have gone against Umra
Khan, but he would have had some signal
successes to show in return. It happened to
be one of the writer's duties to escort Sher
Afzul to India as a prisoner of war, and from
conversation held with him it appeared that
such in fact had been, in the main, the plan of
campaign which Umra Khan had contemplated,
and he was frustrated only by the superior
combination and strategic skill which directed
the march of the relieving columns.

All need for any hurry was now over.
Colonel Kelly reached Chitral unopposed on
April 20th, and was the first to shake hands
with the brave defenders. Sir Robert Low's
leading brigade, under General Gatacre, set to
work to construct a mule road over the Lowaria
Pass, still deep in snow, and a few troops were
marched up the Chitral Valley just to show
themselves without straining unnecessarily the
difficult task of feeding large bodies of troops so
far from their base. The campaign ended with
one of those gracious messages with which Her

v RELIEF OF CHITRAL 127

Majesty Queen Victoria never failed to acknow-
ledge the gallantry of her Army ; whilst in the
hearty and soldierly message of the Commander-
in-Chief, Sir George White, every man of the
Force felt that his services had been appreciated
by one who knew well the difficulties that had
been overcome, and the stern hardships that had
been cheerfully borne.

The British soldier, and his friend and com-
rade of the Indian army, are accustomed to
serve in every degree of climate, and in every
nature of country, for an empire of the vast
dimensions of the British Empire must needs
embrace every variety of climate and country.
In the brief and brilliant campaign just con-
cluded perhaps these various conditions were as
numerously represented as is possible. There
was fierce heat and piercing cold, deluges of
rain and blinding storms of snow and hail ; the
Highest mountain system in the world to be
climbed, rivers, deep and wide and astonishing
in their treacherous strength, to be crossed.
With his greatcoat and a blanket for his bag-
gage, the sturdy British soldier and his strapping
Indian war comrade, face these many hardships

128 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, v

with the cheerful alacrity of men ready and
accustomed to overcome unusual difficulties, and
to face tremendous odds by land and sea.

It is seldom, too, that a British campaign
does not produce its men of mark and those
who have done heroic deeds, nor is this one an
exception to the rule, for the names of Sir
Robert Low, General Bindon Blood, and
General Waterfield stand high in the historic
roll of successful generals, whilst Colonel
Kelly's brilliant feat of arms has made him
famous for ever. But perhaps the deed of all
others which appeals most to the soldier's heart
was the desperate and successful sortie from
Chitral, made by the brave and gallant Harley
and his Sikhs on the 17th day of April, 1895.

Sir R. Low and Staff on the Janbatai Pass.

CHAPTER VI

THE DEFENCE OF CHITRAL

Chitral was now relieved ; communication
with the British officers so long shut up there
was once more established, and letters were at
last received giving an accouut of the desperate
defence and of all that had occurred since the
Chitralis had risen in revolt.

I take up the narrative from the point at
which I left it at the close of the first chapter.
The Chitralis had then suddenly given up their
opposition to Umra Khan and, joining Sher
Afzul, who had now allied himself with Umra
Khan, had advanced against the British officers
established in Chitral fort.

On the 3rd of March, at about 4.30 p.m.,
news was received by the British officers in
Chitral fort that Sher Afzul, with a large force,
was approaching. Captain Colin Campbell, of

180 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

the Central India Horse, and, for the time,
Inspecting Officer of the Kashmir Imperial
Service Troops, was in command of the troops
now in Chitral ; and, late in the afternoon
though it was, he thought it necessary to go out
with a strong reconnoitring force to ascertain
the strength and intentions of the Chitrali force.
Hostilities between the British and the Chitralis
had not yet commenced, and with a large armed
force advancing towards the fort it was necessary
for the British garrison to take every precaution
against being caught unawares. Two hundred
Kashmir Infantry under Captains Campbell,
Townshend, and Baird, and accompanied by
the British Agent, Surgeon-Major Robertson,
Lieutenant Gurdon, and Surgeon- Captain
Whitchurch, therefore set out from the fort to
reconnoitre the Chitrali dispositions. There is
no regular town of Chitral, but round the fort,
which is merely the residence of the Mehtars,
there are scattered over the valley a number of
little hamlets, and detached houses, dotted among
the cultivated lands which stretch for a distance
of about three miles down the valley. These
cultivated lands are on some gently sloping

VI

DEFENCE OF CHITRAI

131

ground, from a mile to a mile and a half in
width, which runs down from the high, steep
hill-sides on the right bank to the river.

Leaving fifty men in the serai a quarter of a
mile from the fort, and detaching a section under
Captain Baird, which Lieutenant Gurdon
accompanied, to ascend the hill-sides on the
right, Captains Campbell and Townshend
advanced for a mile and a half down the valley,
towards a house in which it was stated that
Sher Afzul had established himself. On arrival
at the house it was found that Sher Afzul was
not in it, and Captain Townshend then advanced
still further down the valley, while Captain
Baird's flanking party was strengthened by an
additional twenty-five men. Captain Townshend
could see a number of men moving about among
the trees and houses of a hamlet 500 yards be-
yond the house which it had been supposed Sher
Afzul was occupying ; and on the hill-sides
which Baird's party were ascending there were
some hundreds of the Chitralis. On these hill-
slopes firing now commenced, and Captain
Townshend concluding that the men he could

see in the front moving about in the hamlet
k 2

132 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

were the enemy, opened fire with a section
volley. The fire was immediately returned by
the enemy, who, being armed with Martini-
Henry and Snider rifles, made, says Captain
Townshend, most excellent shooting. Among
the enemy were several hundred of Umra
Khans men, drilled and trained by pensioners
from our own Indian Army ; and there were,
indeed, many of these pensioners themselves
in the force which was now advancing upon
Chitral.

Captain Townshend kept his men under cover
as much as possible, and, taking advantage, for
the purpose, of the boulders and low walls which
surrounded the fields, advanced to within 200
yards or so of the hamlet. There was now no
more cover in his front, many of his men were
hit, and he could see the hamlet towards which
he was advancing now crowded with men who
were keeping up a well-sustained fire from the
walls and loopholes. To advance with the
hundred men he had with him, and these not
veteran troops of our own army, but untried
Kashmir troops armed with worn-out Snider
rifles, against superior numbers of a better-

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 133

armed and more experienced force posted behind
walls was an impossibility, and Captain Towns-
hend decided therefore to hold his ground until
Captain Baird should move along the hill-slopes
to the westward, and so turn the hamlet, and
when Baird had done this Townshend would
then advance to attack it in front.

But time went on, and Townshend could see
no signs of Baird advancing on his flank. On
the other hand small parties of the enemy began
to overlap him on both flanks and to enfilade
him with their fire. His position was now
becoming untenable ; it was half-past six and
would soon be dark, so decisive action of some
sort — either an advance or a retirement — had to
be carried out at once. At this juncture Captain
Campbell arrived and directed that the hamlet
should be stormed. The order to reinforce was
given but the support of men in rear did not
come up, though the order was continually
repeated Captain Campbell then went back
to himself bring up the support, while Captain
Townshend fixed bayonets preparatory to a
charge and kept up a heavy independent fire.
The support all this time was lying behind

134 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap,

some low walls 1 50 yards to the rear, Captain
Campbell succeeded in bringing on about a
dozen men from among them, and then fell shot
through the knee just as he was rejoining the
advance party. Colonel Jagat Singh, of the
Kashmir troops, then went back to try and get
more men on, but he could only bring on one
or two. So Captain Townshend, finding that
to await for further support was useless, went
round his men telling them they must rush
straight in and take the houses, and he then
sounded the charge.

The little party of a hundred men scrambled
over the bank behind which they had been lying
and advanced to the attack of the strongly-held
village to their front. It was a desperate
venture, for the enemy were not only in superior
numbers and better armed, but they were firing
from behind cover, while the troops which the
British had now to lead to the attack had to
advance across 200 yards of open ground,
exposed to fire for the whole distance, and
they were men who had never been in action
before. Captain Townshend had served in the
expedition sent to relieve Khartoum, and had

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 185

been present in the battles of Gubat and Abu
Klea, where Sir Herbert Stewart and Burnaby
lost their lives, and he had taken part in the
sharp little Hunza campaign in 1891, but he
told me that he had never before been under so
hot a fire as that which now met his party as
they scrambled over the bank. The Kashmir
General Baj Singh, a fine old soldier and
gentleman, who was always keen to be in the
thickest of a fight, and whose keenness had now
led him to the front when by rights he should
have been more in rear, was shot down on one
side of Captain Townshend, while Major
Bhikam Singh, another brave old Kashmir
officer, was mortally wounded on the other side.
Their leaders fallen, the finest troops in the
world would have found it hard to face so ter-
rible a fire, and the raw Kashmir infantry could
no longer stand before it. Insensibly they
shrank under the fire, then crouched down
behind stones, till Captain Townshend finding
it impossible to carry the charge home in spite
of all his endeavours to get the men on .aban-
doned the attempt, and ordered his men back
behind the wall from which they had started,

136 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Events had now taken a very serious turn.
The British officers were nearly two miles
distant from the fort with a handful of dis-
heartened troops in the face of vastly superior
numbers of an elated enemy, who were now
commencing to overlap them on all sides. The
retirement to the fort commenced, and Captain
Campbell, even though he was very severely
wounded in the knee, mounted a pony and
helped to keep the troops in order and steady,
This trying manoeuvre was effected by alternate
parties, the men dribbling off to the rear by
word of command while the remainder kept up
a heavy fire to keep off the enemy. Captain
Townshend always remained with the last party
in order to prevent any panic or disorder arising,
and in this way the party reached a house about
a mile from the fort, where Mr. Robertson was
found rallying men who had retired before, and
here a short stand was made, while Mr,
Robertson, at great risk and exposed to a
heavy fire from the enemy now lining the
garden walls and houses on every side, rode
back to the fort to bring out fifty of Lieutenant
Harley's Sikhs to cover the retirement,

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 137

It was now quite dark, and the enemy were
firing into Captain Townshend's troops from
front, flank, and rear, from every hamlet and
wall. The Chitralis and Pathans were wild
with excitement at the unexpected success of
their first encounter with the British, and,
carried away in the whirl of enthusiasm, even
women hurled down stones upon the retiring
troops. Groping their way, and unable at a
short distance to distinguish friend from foe,
Captain Townshend brought his men along
between walls flashing out fire in the darkness
till he reached the serai near the fort, where
he found fifty Sikhs under Lieutenant Harley
come out to cover his retreat. Steady as on
parade, and calm and unmoved amidst all the
excitement around them, Harley and his
veterans headed back the storm while the
Kashmir troops retired to the fort. Then he
and his men slowly retired within the walls also
while the enemy closed thickly around, and the
investment commenced which was to last forty-
seven long days and weary nights.

But when the officers arrived within the walls
it was found that two of their number were

138 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

missing. Neither Dr. Whitchurch nor Captain
Baird had yet arrived. It was known that
Baird had been desperately wounded, and deep
anxiety regarding the fate of him and Whit-
church was felt, when, at about eight o'clock,
Whitchurch was seen from the walls staggering
along towards the gateway, supporting and half
carrying Baird along. At the beginning of the
action Baird, with about fifty men, had been
sent away on the right to work round the
enemy's flank. With his handful of men, and
with Lieutenant Gurdon by his side, he ascended
the steep rocky mountain slopes which overlook
the valley. It is a generally accepted principle
of warfare that an attacking party should be
divided into an advance party and a support,
and this principle was now acted upon ; but
Captain Baird, with his characteristic zeal, would
not remain with the support, and determined
on leading the advance himself. And Lieutenant
Gurdon, who, being Political Officer was not
present in the reconnaissance in a strictly
military capacity, was as anxious as Baird to be
in front. So the two British officers agreed to
go on together with the advance.

vi DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 139

But the enemy were now in hundreds on the
mountain side firing and hurling down stones
upon the little straggling party, who painfully
worked their way upward. Captain Baird was
mortally wounded in the stomach, many other
of his men were also hit, and the party had to
be drawn off. Lieutenant Gurdon could not
remain long to look after his wounded comrade,
for he had to collect the men and conduct their
retirement upon the main body.

News was given to Dr. Whitchurch of the
misfortune to poor Baird, and a small escort
was left to help him home, as no general retire-
ment had yet taken place. All that he could
do Dr. Whitchurch did for Baird ; but now,
as darkness was closing in, it was seen that
our troops were retiring, that the enemy were
swarming round on all sides, and that even the
retreat to the fort was threatened. Whitchurch
collected together about a dozen sepoys, and
then set off to carry the wounded officer back to
the fort. The enemy had penetrated in between
him and the main body, and were firing from
the houses and garden walls on the way to the
fort. The direct road back was therefore quite

140 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

blocked to him, and Dr. Whitchurch had to
take a circuitous route of three miles round.
They were exposed to fire for almost the entire
way, and had it not been for the darkness
nothing could have saved them. On more
than one occasion Whitchurch had to lay down
his burden, and, at the head of the men he
had collected, charge the enemy to drive them
from a wall and make a way. Then he would
go back, pick Baird up again, and carry him
through. Several of the party were killed —
how many cannot be correctly ascertained, for
in the darkness and confusion it was impossible
to ascertain the exact number of his party —
and just as they reached the fort, and when in
a few minutes more they would have been in
safety, Captain Baird was hit for the third time,
and wounded in the face. Dr. Whitchurch and
the brave Kashmir troops who had remained
with him had by their devotion and gallantry
brought back their wounded comrade to the
other British officers, only to die, indeed, on the
following morning, but to die with his brother
officers by his side, and where he could be
buried by them with the last solemn rites.

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 141

" It is difficult to write temperately about
Whitchurch, " wrote Mr. Robertson in reporting
this action to Government, and men who have
themselves gained the Victoria Cross have said
that never has it been more gallantly earned
than on this occasion by Surgeon-Captain
Whitchurch.

The total losses in this day's engagement
were twenty-three men killed and thirty-three
wounded out of 200, of whom only 1 50 were
actually engaged ; and it was with this newly-
raised Kashmir regiment depressed by these
severe losses, and with their own hearts saddened
by the death on the following morning of their
brave comrade, that the British officers com-
menced the defence of the Chitral fort against
an enemy correspondingly elated at their
s-uccess.

The Chitral fort is eighty yards square, with
walls twenty-five feet high and about eight feet
thick. At each corner there is a tower some
twenty feet higher than the wall, and outside
the north face on the edge of the river is a fifth
tower to guard the waterway. On the east
face a garden runs out for a distance of 140

142 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

yards, and forty yards of the south-east tower
is a summer-house. On the north and west
faces were stables and other outhouses.

The fort is built of rude masonry kept
together, not by cement or mortar of any
description, but by cradle-work of beams of
wood placed longitudinally and transversely so
as to keep the masonry together. Without this
framework of wood the walls would fall to
pieces.

It is situated on the right bank of the Chitral
River, some forty or fifty yards from the water's
edge, and it is commanded from nearly all sides
for Martini- Henry or Snider rifle fire, for
mountains close by the river rise above the
valley bottom. The fort is thus situated for
the purpose of maintaining water, and at the
time of its construction breech-loading rifles
were not in possession of the people of the
country, so that the fort could not then be fired
into.

The strength of the garrison of the be-
leaguered fort was 99 men of the 14th Sikhs,
301 men of the Kashmir Infantry, with the
following British officers : Surgeon-Major

Chitral Fort, from the South.

vi DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 143

Robertson, British Agent ; Captain C. V. F.
Townshend, Central India Horse, commanding
British Agent's Escort, and Commandant of
the fort ; Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant to the
British Agent; Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th
Sikhs ; Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch, 24th
Punjab Infantry ; Captain Campbell, Central
India Horse (badly wounded).

There were 11 followers and 27 servants, 16
Punyali levies, 1 2 native clerks and messengers,
7 commissariat and transport followers, and 52
Chitralis, bringing up the total number within
the fort to 543 persons. For these there were
supplies which, putting every one in the fort
on half rations, would last about two and a half
months. There were 300 rounds of ammuni-
tion per man for the Martini- Henry rifles of
the Sikhs, and 280 rounds per man for the
Snider rifles of the Kashmir Infantry.

On the 4th of March the enemy commenced
offensive action against the British in earnest
by firing the whole day long into the fort. On
this day, Captain Townshend, who, now that
Captain Campbell was wounded and unable to
leave his bed, commanded the fort, commenced

144 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

taking measures for its proper defence. It was
a most unfortunate circumstance that affairs
had come to a head so quickly, that he was
unable to carry out any demolitions of the out-
houses, etc., which surrounded the fort. His
first care, however, was to do what he could
towards carrying out this necessary operation :
even though much of the work had to be done
under fire, it was necessary to knock down all
the garden walls and houses he could, so as to
prevent the enemy occupying them and effect-
ing a lodgment, as they thus would be close up
to the very walls of the fort. As it was, the
besiegers succeeded in occupying the summer-
house at the south-east angle of the fort, which
was only forty yards distant from the corner
tower. The fort is surrounded by numbers of
trees of great height, which not only afforded
cover to the enemy, but up which it might
have been possible for them to climb, and from
their higher branches fire into the very interior
of the fort, and this formed an additional
danger.

Captain Townshend had also to take efficient
measures for protecting the way down to the

Photo Van der Weyde, Regent Street.

Major C. V. F. Townshend, C.B.

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 145

river, for as there was no serviceable well
inside the fort it was necessary to obtain every
drop of water required by the garrison from
the river. This flowed along the north face of
the fort and a tower covered the way down to
it, but in this wintry season it was low and
there was still a space of some thirty yards
between the door of this tower and the rivers
edge. It was necessary, therefore, to construct
a covered way from the gate of the tower to the
water.

To neutralise the effect of the fire from the
hill-sides which, during the whole of the day,
came pouring down into the fort, Captain
Townshend had to devise some arrange-
ment. Planks, and beams of wood, doors,
mule-saddles, boxes, and sacks filled with earth,
were piled up as parados to protect the men's
backs as they fired from the parapets. There
was not, however, sufficient material of a solid
description to protect the whole of the interior
from the enemy's fire, and where perfect pro-
tection could not be made, cover from sight
was arranged for, that is to say, cut-up tents,
carpets, and curtains were hung across passages

146 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

and doorways so that the enemy might not be
able to see men passing along. If they fired
upon these tents and carpets the bullets would
of course go through them, but they would be
unable to know when anybody was passing
along behind them, and it would therefore be
scarcely worth their while to keep firing upon
these screens on the mere chance of hitting a
passer-by. For the parapets, where the be-
siegers would know that men for certain would
be stationed, Captain Townshend arranged
sufficient protection of beams of wood, etc. ;
for the remainder, screens to serve as protection
from sight were provided. These first measures
occupied the attention of the British officers for
the few days following the commencement of
the siege.

On the night of the 7th of March the enemy
made a determined attack on the water-way.
The besiegers were well versed in every art of
the attack on such forts as Chitral, for among
the numbers were several hundreds of Umra
Khan's Jandulis, whose entire lives are occupied
in besieging and defending similar forts to that
of Chitral. They well knew therefore the

vi DEFENCE OP CHITRAL 147

importance of cutting off the garrison from
its water supply, and this is always the first
measure which they attempt. Under cover of
darkness they commenced a heavy and well-
sustained fire from the trees on the north-west
front of the fort, and sent a party of men to
effect an entrance to the water-tower. This
they actually succeeded in doing, and a small
number of them carrying faggots of wood placed
these in the interior of the tower, and set fire
to them with the object of burning down the
entire structure. The garrison, however, were
well on the alert, for the men always slept on
their alarm posts, and every one was quickly
in his place. A well-controlled fire was then
commenced on the attacking party. Captain
Townshend had given instructions that no
independent firing was to be allowed at night,
and only section volleys were employed. The
enemy's attack was driven off, and water^
carriers having been sent out to the water-
tower, the fire there was quickly put out.

At the end of the first week of the siege,
owing to the admirable arrangements for the
protection of the men, there had been only five

L2

148 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

casualties, but there were now only eighty rifles
of the 14th Sikhs and 200 rifles of the Kashmir
Infantry fit for duty. These latter, too, were
much shaken by their severe losses in the re-
connaissance of the 4th of March. They were a
new regiment, that action was the first occasion
on which they had been under, fire, and they
had then lost their general and major, and fifty-
six killed and wounded out of the total of 2 50
actually engaged. It was hardly to be wondered
at that these men should be depressed at the
prospects before them. The siege was likely
to be a long one, only half rations could be
served to the men, and Captain Townshend saw
clearly that under the circumstances he must
husband the resources and energy of his men,
and watch them and encourage them as much
as possible.

The following arrangements besides those
already detailed, were now made. First a fort
police was established to watch the Chitralis in
the fort and prevent them communicating with
the besiegers. Amongst these Chitralis were
many who were anything but loyal to the
British, and who, above everything, desired not

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 149

to be found on the losing side when the crisis
came. They had therefore to be carefully
watched to see that they did not attempt com-
munication with their friends outside the fort.
Secondly, a system for extinguishing fires was
organised. The water-carriers were ordered
to sleep with their mussucks (skins) filled with
water, and ammunition boxes and any vessels
which could be found were also filled with water
and placed ready to hand. Patrols were sent
round day and night to watch accidents from
fire. These precautions were especially neces-
sary on account of the large amount of wood-
work inside the fort, and because the walls
and towers were built almost as much of wood
as of stone. Thirdly, what sanitary arrange-
ments were possible were made. Fourthly,
followers, officers* servants, and other non-
combatants were organised into parties for
carrying water, putting out fire, carrying out
demolitions, building up cover from fire, and
for every other kind of work for which they
could be employed, and so save the regular
soldiers. Fifthly, hand mills for grinding were
made and men told off for this work. Lastly,

150 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Captain Townshend instilled into the minds of
all the men that a relieving force would soon
come, and then they would be able to sally out
and drive back the enemy.

The work of the defence practically devolved
Upon three officers only — Captain Townshend,
Lieutenant Gurdon, and Lieutenant Harley—
Surgeon-Major Robertson was engaged in his
political duties under flags of truce and so forth
in treating and corresponding with the enemy,
Captain Campbell was wounded, and Surgeon-
Captain Whitchurch was fully occupied with
his medical duties. The three officers for the
defence therefore took their turn of duty in
watches of four hours each, as on board ship.
Each, separately, would come on duty for his
four hours, rest for eight, and then come on
duty again for another four hours, and so on.
Theoretically they had eight hours' rest, but in
practice it was found that with alarms of attack
and with various extra work about the fort to be
done, they were more often at rest for four
hours and at work for eight, than at work for
four and at rest for eight hours, and the work
was now all the more trying that they were

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 151

only on half rations, and that they were never
able to sleep undressed. What sleep they
got was mostly in the daytime, and even then
with all their clothes and generally even their
belts on. It was a remarkable fact, however,
that in spite of the work they had to go through
and the anxieties they must necessarily have
had, the sepoys told me when I reached the
fort a week after the siege was over, that they
never saw on the faces of the officers any sign
of their anxiety. Captain Townshend and his
officers in fact made a point of, whatever they
might feel inwardly, always appearing cheery
and in good heart before their men, and upon
this depended in no small degree the success of
the defence. The Sikhs had sufficient back-
bone in themselves to keep up heart ; they had
suffered no loss in the engagement previous to
the siege, they were many of them veterans
who had fought in many frontier fights, and
their native officer had been engaged in the
fierce battle at McNeil's Zareba in the Soudan
campaign ; but the Kashmir troops were young
and untried, they were now placed in a position
which required all the finest qualities of a

152 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

soldier, and it was for these especially that it
was necessary that the British officers should
be able to inspire confidence and hope.

Captain Townshend still continued the work
of demolishing the outer walls beyond the main
wall of the fort whenever opportunity occurred
and he had time to spare. He used the Pun-
yalis for this, and they did it, he says, marvel-
lously quickly. They crept along on their
stomachs outside the walls, and with beams of
wood pushed down the light outer walls which
ran out round the fort. The enemy fired inces-
santly upon them while the work was being
carried out, but nobody was hit. Thirty rounds
a day were also fired at the house in which
Sher Afzul lived, in order to cause him annoy-
ance, and let him see that the garrison were
awake. When an attack was made at night,
and there was no firing, the average amount of
ammunition expended during the first two or
three weeks of the siege was between forty and
fifty rounds of Martini-Henry, and twenty or
thirty rounds of Snider ammunition daily. To
guard against attack by night, arrangements
had to be made for lighting up the ground

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 158

immediately outside the walls of the fort. At
first, light balls made up of chips of wood and
resinous pine, and soaked in kerosene oil, were
lighted and thrown over the walls. But there
were not sufficient materials to carry on this
method nightly; and the defenders adopted the
better plan of building out platforms from the
walls, and on these lighting fires which would
keep the ground in the vicinity of the fort illu-
minated for the entire night.

On the night of the I3th-i4th of March the
enemy made an attack on the east face, outside
which is a garden with a number of large trees.
They sounded the advance on a bugle, and with
much shouting and beating of tom-toms, and
keeping up a straggling fire they advanced to
the attack. The garrison received them with a
brisk fire, and though men had been heard by the
defenders shouting to them repeatedly to come
and attack the water-way, they gradually slunk
off back to their own lines. Finding the enemy
still had an intention of attacking the water-way,
Captain Townshend further strengthened the
way to the river, loopholing and occupying
the stables just by the gate.

154 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

A letter was received from Sher Afzul on
the 15th of March in which the would-be
M eh tar said that a party of troops escorting an
ammunition convoy had been surrounded and
defeated at Reshun ; and further, that a British
officer, who had come down from Mastuj, had
also been taken prisoner, and that he had written
a letter to Dr. Robertson, which Sher Afzul
would deliver if the British Agent would send
some one to receive it. This was the news of
the disaster to Captain Ross, and Lieutenants
Edwardes' and Fowler's parties. But the
officers in Chitral refused to believe it. On
the following day, however, a letter written by
Lieutenant Edwardes from Reshun on the 13th
of March was received, and in it he gave the
news of the attack upon his party, and of his
being shut up in the post which he had fortified.

On the 19th of March Abdul Majid Khan,
Umra Khan's lieutenant, who, with three
hundred Jandulis, had been with Sher Afzul
during the siege, sent a letter to Dr. Robertson
saying that he much regretted that although he
had sent off messengers to Reshun to say that
peace had been made, a fight had taken place,

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 155

and that two British officers and nine Moham-
medan sepoys had been taken prisoners, and
would arrive in Chitral on the following day.
On the 20th of March, Lieutenant Edwardes
and Fowler reached Chitral, and on the same
day a native clerk from the garrison was allowed
to come and see them, that he might be able to
assure the defenders that there was no mistake
about the disasters having occurred.

The news of this unfortunate occurrence much
depressed the garrison. They knew that it
would not only greatly elate the Chitralis, but
would also give into their hands a large quantity
of ammunition and engineering stores which
might be used against them. Captain Towns-
hend, however, in no way relaxed his efforts
in conducting a successful defence, and even
during the few days' truce which followed, he
worked incessantly at his defences, strengthening
the cover to the water-way and constructing
a semi-circular loopholed fleche outside the
water-door.

Rations were now running short and the
officers had to commence eating horse-flesh,
killing and salting their ponies. For the next

156 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

few days and nights the rain poured in torrents,
doing much damage to the walls of the fort,
a large piece of the parapet on the west front
subsiding, and giving the garrison much work
in rebuilding it with beams in the evening.

A Union Jack, made up from the red cloth
of the sepoys' turbans and other material, was
hoisted on the top of the highest tower, the
south-west,on the 29th of March, and the garrison
considered that from that time onward their
luck began to turn. Improved head-cover was
made on all the towers, and beams were put
up in the stables to protect men going out of
the water-gate down to the covered water-way.
The top of the water-tower was also strength-
ened, and its lowest story pierced with loop-
holes. An attempt was made to send a
messenger to Mr. Udny at Asmar, but the
enemy was watching so closely, that the man
was compelled to return, and not once during
the siege were the garrison able to communi-
cate with the outside world.

The amount of ammunition in hand on the
30th of March was 29,224 rounds of Martini-
Henry ammunition^ — i.e. 356 rounds per rifle for

vi DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 157

eighty-two effective sepoys and fourteen Sikhs.

Besides this, there were 68,587 rounds of

Snider ammunition in hand for 261 effective

men of the Kashmir Infantry, that is to say, 262

rounds per rifle for these. There were now fit

for duty 343 rifles in all. By these the following

guards and pickets had to be furnished : —

Main gate
Parapet .

Water pickets

„ tower .
Stable picket .
Water-gate guard
Guard over Amir-ul-Mulk

„ „ Chitralis at night

„ on ammunition

„ „ garden gate

„ „ four towers

TO

40 (10 on each parapet)
20

25
20
10
6

4
6
6

24

Total 171

Thus only 172 rifles were available with
which to make a sortie. The strength of the
guards had been reduced to the lowest number
compatible with safety, and out of 172, at least
thirty-five would be required for an inlying
picket. The garrison now had supplies to the
amount of 45,000 pounds of grain, which would
last the number of persons in the fort seventy-

158 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

four days, or up to the 13th of June, at the rate
of 540 pounds a day. Some allowance for
wastage would necessarily have to be made.
There were only left thirty-six pounds of the
clarified butter which native soldiers require so
much. And this was kept for the sick and
wounded, and for lights at guards in the fort,
and even then would only last another twelve
days. After that it was known that the already
heavy sick-list would be greatly increased,
for the men were all the time on half rations,
and were getting little else than this clarified
butter. Stenches in the stables, too, in which
were situated the latrines, were terrible, and a
picket of twenty-five men had to be placed there
every night, as it lay on the water-way. There
was still a little rum left, and some tea, and the
Sikhs were given one dram of rum every four
days, and the Kashmir Infantry were given a
tea ration every third day.

The enemy made a new sangar on the
opposite bank of the river on the 31st of March,
at a distance of only 175 yards from the place
where the garrison had to take the water from
the river. The enemy showed the greatest

vi DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 159

skill in the construction and defence of their
sangars, making regular zigzag approaches after
the manner of our own engineers, excavating
trenches, and building up breast-works of
fascines, stones, and earth. The defenders
replied by placing screens of tents to conceal
the men going down to the water, so that the
enemy should not be able to see when any one
was on the way to the river's edge. More
beams were also put outside the water-gate, to
protect the doorway from the fire of the rifle-
men on the opposite bank of the river.

But the enemy were not only advancing their
trenches towards the water-way from the oppo-
site bank of the river, they also now commenced
the construction of a covered way to the water
from their lower sangar on the north-west front
of the fort, close down to the river. This sangar
was only about eighty yards from the defenders'
covered way to the water. Captain Townshend
now commenced further protection for men
going to the water, by sinking a trench in the
stables. On the 5th and 6th of April, the
enemy showed great activity on the south-east
corner of the fort, occupying the summer-house

160 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

only forty yards distant, and they also con-
structed a large fascine sangar in front of the
main gate, at a distance of only forty yards.
The garrison commenced loopholing the lower
story of this tower to command the east end of
the stables, and more loopholes were also made
in the stable buildings at the west end. From
their proximity, the enemy were able to cause
great annoyance to the besiegers, and it was
with great difficulty that the defenders were able
to keep a proper watch over their proceedings.
On the 7th of April, at about 5 a.m., a large
number of the enemy opened a heavy match-
lock fire from the trees in front of the north
tower, and an attack was made on the covered
way to the water. The defenders were instantly
on the alert, and steady volleys were fired upon
the enemy by the Sikhs, which caused them to
decamp towards the bazaar.

While this firing was taking place on the
western face, the enemy managed with great
pluck to place huge faggots and blocks of wood
in a pile against the corner of the gun tower
on the south-east, and setting alight to it, the
tower was soon set on fire, and began blazing

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 161

up. This was a most serious matter. Captain
Townshend immediately sent up the whole of
the inlying picket with their greatcoats full of
earth, and as much water as could be obtained
was brought up to throw down upon the fire.
A strong wind was blowing at the time, and
though for a moment the fire was got under, it
soon blazed up again, the flames mounting up
in spaces between the beams and the tower.
Dr. Robertson, who was in the tower superin-
tending the putting out of the fire, was wounded
at a hole in the wall, and a Sikh shot there the
next minute. A sentry of the Kashmir Infantry
was also shot. Altogether nine men were
wounded, and as the enemy were only forty
yards distant, no one could appear above the
wall, or at any hole, for the purpose of throwing
down earth or water upon the fire raging below,
without the risk of being shot. It seemed at
one time, therefore, as if it would be impossible
to keep down the flames, which were now work-
ing right into the tower, and which, if they
could not be subdued, would quickly burn down
the whole of the wood-work of which so much
of the tower is composed, and so cause the

M

162 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

whole tower to fall a mass of ruins, and make a
great gap in the walls of the fort. Eventually
the defenders devised the plan of making a
water-spout, which they pushed out through a
hole in the corner of the tower, and then pour-
ing in water from the inside, allowed it to pour
down on the flames below\ In this way, after
working for about five hours, the fire was got
under, but water was kept pouring down inside
the walls all day long, and holes were picked
inside the tower to thoroughly damp it out. To
guard against this happening again Captain
Townshend made more strict arrangements for
watching the ground under the walls, and the
better-disciplined Sikhs were put as sentries in
place of the men of the Kashmir Infantry.

The Machicoulis galleries were gradually im-
proved and loopholed inside, in a way that all
the ground immediately under the tower could
be well watched, and a sentry always lay in each
of these galleries. Captain Townshend also
had heaps of earth collected, and sent up on the
parapets, and vessels and ammunition boxes
filled with water, placed in every story in each
of the towers. The waterproof sheets of the

vi DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 163

14th Sikhs were utilised for the purpose of
holding water, and all the servants and followers
were formed into a fire picket under Surgeon-
Captain Whitchurch. Heaps of stones were
placed at the top of the towejrs for the sentries
to throw down from time to time in the dark.
On the evening of the 8th of April, some red-
hot embers and a bundle of faggots were
observed quite close to the tower, and it was
evident that the enemy had succeeded in rush-
ing up and placing these there while the sentries
were being relieved. Captain Townshend
accordingly arranged that the sentries should
be relieved at a different time from day to day,
so that the enemy should be unaware when the
relief was taking place. On that day, Captain
Townshend demolished some remaining walls
left outside the main gate, and he also built a
stone loopholed tambour in front of the main
gate. This would hold ten men, and from it
it was possible to flank the whole of the west
front with its two towers.

The Machicoulis gallery in the gun tower
was still further improved, and good loopholes
were made in the lower story. A hole was dug

M 2

164 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chai>.

inside the tower in the floor to the depth of
about four feet, and then a shutter-like loophole
was made which commanded the ground at the
foot of the south face of the tower. Sentries
were placed in all of these. Fourteen men
were now permanently in this gun tower, and
an officer lived in it. The number of men
in hospital now were n Sikhs, 19 Kashmir
Infantry,, and 6 others, and there were 49 out-
patients besides, making the total number of
sick 85.

A great attack upon the water-way was made
on the night of the ioth-i ith of April. The
enemy came rushing in with a tremendous din,
yelling, and beating tom-toms, but the defenders
immediately sprang to their stations, and fired
section-volleys from the parapets. These
volleys caused them, as on other attacks, to
retreat towards the bazaar, and with a loss of
only one man wounded on the part of the
defenders, this last assault of the enemy was
beaten. On the following day it was noticed
that the enemy .began playing tom-toms and
Pathan pipes, in the summer-house at night,
and shouting abuse at intervals. At this time,

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL

105

large parties of the enemy were seen moving
away towards Mastuj, and the garrison began
speculating upon the approach of a force from
Gilgit to their relief. The enemy were indeed
moving off to oppose Colonel Kelly, who had
now crossed the Shandur Pass and reached
Mastuj on his way to Chitral.

On the evening of the 16th of April, it having
struck the defenders that the tom-toming, which
was so constantly kept up in the summer-house,
was intended to drown the sound of the picking
of a mine, sentries in the gun tower were
warned to be on the alert, and to listen intently.
It was thought quite possible that the enemy
might have the intention of digging a mine
from the summer-house in towards the tower,
and right under it, so as to be able to blow it
up, and effect an entrance to the fort. At
midnight one of the sentries in the lower story
of the gun tower, reported that he heard the
noise of picking. Captain Townshend himself
went up, but could hear nothing. But about
ii a.m. on the morning of the 17th, the native
officer in the gun tower reported to him that he
could hear the noise of picking quite distinctly.

166 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Captain Townshend accordingly again went up,
and there could now be no mistake that a mine
was being made, and that it had reached to
within twelve feet of the walls of the fort. Dr.
Robertson came up and listened too ; and both
officers agreed that the only thing to be done
was to rush the summer-house, and destroy the
mine, for there was no time to construct a
counter-mine, and the enemy's plan must be
frustrated at once.

Lieutenant Harley was accordingly told off
to command a party of forty Sikhs, and sixty of
the Kashmir Infantry, and he was given the
following instructions : — " He was not to fire a
shot in rushing to the assault, but to use the
bayonet only. He was, however, to take forty
rounds of ammunition for the purpose of firing
upon the enemy after he had captured the
summer-house. He was to take with him three
powder bags with no pounds of powder, and
forty feet of powder-hose, and picks and spades.
He was to go straight for a gap in the wall of
the house with his whole party without any
support. Having rushed the place, he was to
hold it with part of his men, while with the

Photo Lafayette,

Lieutenant H. K. Harley, D.S.O.

Dublin.

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 167

remainder he was to destroy the mine by pulling
down the upright and wooden supports, if any,
or by blowing it in if he saw fit. If possible he
was to take a prisoner or two."

Captain Townshend summoned the native
officers going with Lieutenant Harley, and
explained to them the object of the sortie, that
they might be able to make it thoroughly clear
to their non-commissioned officers and men.
All officers carried matches, and one officer was
told off to bring up the rear, and see that no
man hung back.

At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th
April, the gate of the east face of the fort was
quietly opened, and Lieutenant Harley rushed
out at the head of his party. A man was shot
on either side of him, even in the short space
of eighty yards which they had to cover before
reaching the walls of the summer-house. But
the enemy had been taken by surprise, and
were only able to get off a few hurried shots
before Lieutenant Harley and his men were up
to the walls, over them, and into their midst.
At the time of this unexpected assault there
were about thirty Pathans in the house. They

168 THE RELIEF OF CH1TRAL chap.vi

bolted down the garden wall, and stopping at
the far end, threw out fascines from behind it,
and from under this cover, poured a heavy fire
into the house. Lieutenant Harley told off a
certain number of his men to reply to this, and
then sought for the main shaft of the mine. It
was found outside the summer-house, behind
the garden wall, and thirty-five Chitralis were
bayoneted in the mouth of the mine as they
came out.

While Harley was employed in clearing the
mine and holding the summer-house, the enemy,
now thoroughly on the alert, began moving in
large numbers down to the river-bank and
along behind the garden wall towards the water-
way, with the intention of making a counter-
attack upon it. Captain Townshend having
considerable anxiety that an attack made now
while a hundred of his men were outside might
be successful, lined the parapets and kept an
incessant steady fire upon the assailants, while
he sent three successive messengers to Lieu-
tenant Harley to hurry up in his work, and
warning him that the enemy were gathering
round the garden with the intention of either

SKETCH OF SOUTH (GUN) TOWER, CHJTRAL FORT.

170 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

cutting him off, or striking at the water-way.
In about an hour's time Lieutenant Harley
cleared the mine of the men inside it, and
taking down the powder bags placed them in
the mine. These were exploded, and the work
being completed, Lieutenant Harley rushed
back to the fort again, the enemy from the end
of the garden keeping up a furious fusillade as
they retired. The party lost, altogether, 8 men
killed and 13 wounded, i.e. 21 killed and
wounded out of a total of 100 men. But the
work had been accomplished, the mine had
been successfully blown up, until it now lay
exposed as a trench running up to within ten
feet of the fort, and the besiegers had been
shown that now, after forty-six days of the siege,
the defenders still had pluck and spirits enough
left in them to assume a vigorous offensive. It
was the most brilliant episode in this gallant
defence.

Yet the defenders were not to be carried
away by their success, or led into slackening
their precautions in any way, and they im-
mediately began to run a subterranean gallery
round the tower, to ensure that if the enemy

DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 171

again attempted mining, they must run into it.
But now relief was close at hand, and the
labours and anxieties of the garrison were soon
to cease,

On the night of the 18th of April, a man was
heard outside the walls shouting to those inside
that he had important news to tell. With great
precautions he was let into the fort, and he was
then recognised as a man known to the officers.
He told them that Sher Afzul and the Janduli
chiefs, with all their men, had fled in the night,
and that a British force from Gilgit was only
two marches distant. The officers at first
refused to believe this story, for the news
seemed all too good to be true, and they feared
that the enemy were merely trying to entrap
them into leaving the fort or slackening their
watching, and so catching them at a disadvant-
age. But as no signs of the enemy could be
observed, patrols were sent out, and then, as
it became apparent that the enemy had really
drawn off, the famished British officers, in the
first place, showed their satisfaction at their
release by sitting down to eat a good square
meal. They had so far been only able to eat

172 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

sparingly even of their horse-flesh, but now, as
the siege was over, they could eat as they
wished. Then they tried to sleep, but being so
excited they found it impossible to do so ; so
they got up and ate again, calling their first
meal "supper," and the second meal "early
breakfast." At daylight the next morning,
patrols were sent out at some distance from the
fort, and the whole place was then found to be
deserted, and on the following day Colonel
Kelly's little force marched in from Gilgit.

So ended this memorable siege. " The
quite exemplary coolness, intrepidity, and
energy exhibited by Captain Townshend, and
the valour and endurance displayed by all
ranks in the defence of the fort at Chitral," said
the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir George
White, the defender of Ladysmith, M have
added greatly to the prestige of the British
arms, and will elicit the admiration of all who
read this account of the gallant defence made
by a small party of Her Majesty's forces, and
combined with the troops of His Highness the
Maharajah of Kashmir, against heavy odds
when shut up in a fort in the heart of an enemy's

vi DEFENCE OF CHITRAL 173

country, many miles from succour and support."
And the Viceroy, in endorsing the Commander-
in-Chiefs remarks, said : " That his words
will, he feels assured, be deeply felt by every
subject of Her Majesty throughout the
British Empire. The steady front shown to
the enemy, the military skill displayed in the
conducting of the defence, the cheerful endur-
ance of all the hardships of the siege, the gallant
demeanour of the troops, and the conspicuous
example of heroism and intrepidity recorded,
will ever be remembered as forming a glorious
episode in the history of the Indian Empire and
its army." The Viceroy joined with the Com-
mander-in-Chief in deploring the loss of Captain
Baird, General Baj Singh, and Major Bhikan
Singh, and of so many other brave soldiers
who fell in the discharge of their duty. Her
Majesty the Queen was pleased to express her
gracious approbation of the successful efforts of
the troops, and His Excellency the Viceroy in
Council tendered to Surgeon-Major Robertson,
Captain Townshend, and to the whole garrison,
his heartfelt congratulations on their gallant
defence of the position entrusted to them, while

174 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, vi

it was an especial pleasure, His Excellency
said, to recognise the devoted aid given by the
loyal troops of His Highness the Maharajah of
Kashmir.

All ranks in the garrison were granted six
months' pay, which reward also fell to the heirs
of those killed, in addition to the pensions to
which they might be entitled. Surgeon- Major
Robertson was created a Knight Commander of
the Order of the Star of India ; Captain Towns-
hend was made a Companion of the Order of
the Bath, and promoted to a Brevet majority ;
Captain Campbell was given the Decoration of
the Distinguished Service Order, and promoted
to a Brevet majority ; and Lieutenant Gurdon
and Lieutenant Harley were both also given
the Decoration of the Distinguished Service
Order ; and, lastly, Surgeon-Captain Whit-
church was awarded that most coveted of all
rewards, the Victoria Cross.

CHAPTER VII

colonel kelly's march

How it came that Colonel Kelly arrived in
so timely a way to the relief of the hard-pressed
garrison has now to be shown. In the begin-
ning of March alarming reports of the state of
affairs in Chitral began to reach Gilgit, the
head-quarters of the British Political Agent and
of the force of some 3,000 men stationed on
this frontier for its supervision and protection.
The whole of Lower Chitral was rumoured to
be up in arms against the British, and communi-
cation with Mr. Robertson and the officers who
had two months previously marched from Gilgit
to Chitral was now entirely cut off. The flame
of rebellion seemed to be spreading, and the
gravest anxiety was felt for the safety of the
detachments of troops at the various posts on

the road and of the several parties which were

i75

176 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL char

marching towards Chitral. Mr. Robertson was
the British Agent, deputed by the Government
of India for the conduct of political affairs on
this frontier ; but he was now shut up in Chitral,
and the control of our relations with the various
states round Gilgit and Chitral now, at this
critical juncture, devolved upon Captain W. H.
Stewart, and it may well be imagined that his
task in keeping the various peoples on this
frontier quiet and orderly, with the catching
influence of the troubles in Chitral, was no easy
one.

These excitable and impressionable people
of the Hindu Kush spring to arms under little
provocation when once the spirit of fighting
is abroad. News of what was occurring in
Chitral would rapidly reach them, and in every
house and hamlet little else would be spoken of.
Unless, therefore, the British officers in contact
with them could steady them by their influence,
there would be a great risk that, thoughtlessly,
and rashly, they might rise against us as the
Chitralis had done. It hung in a balance
whether they would go with us or against us,
and it is satisfactory to find that British in-

Native Levy.

VII

KELLY'S MARCH

177

fluence was still so secure even in states like
Hunza and Nagar, which had been subdued
only three years previously, that when in this
crisis Captain Stewart inquired through the
political officer in Hunza and Nagar if any
more men were willing to enlist temporarily as
levies in addition to the ninety men already
furnished and now stationed in Ghizr on the
way to Chitral, the chiefs of these two states
showed the utmost feeling of loyalty, and imme-
diately responded by arriving in Gilgit with
some 900 men of all ranks ready to serve
Government in any way required. Each man
brought a fortnight's supply in order to avoid
giving trouble, and the most enthusiastic spirit
was displayed by all. A certain number of
these men were sent on to Chitral, while others
were employed in guarding passes near Gilgit,
and as will be seen later on, these men who
three short years before were fighting desper-
ately against us, now stood by us in the time
of need and rendered to Colonel Kelly in his
march to Chitral such service as he repeatedly
acknowledged in terms of the highest praise.
Colonel Kelly was the officer in command of

N

178 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

the troops on the Gilgit frontier. He was the
colonel of the 32nd Pioneers, a regiment which
had a few months previously arrived upon this
frontier partly for the purpose of constructing
roads and fortified posts, and partly to give a
backbone to the force of Kashmir troops who
composed the principal part of the garrison.
It was the same regiment as afterwards escorted
me in Tibet.

The total strength of 3,000 men on this
frontier was made up of the regiment of Pion-
eers of the regular army of India ; 200 men of
the 14th Sikhs, also of the Indian Army; and
three battalions of Kashmir Infantry of 600
men each, and a battery of Kashmir Mountain
Artillery. This force in the beginning of
March was distributed in the following manner :
At Chitral Fort 100 of the 14th Sikhs and 300
Kashmir Infantry ; at Mastuj, 100 Sikhs and
150 Kashmir Infantry; at Ghizr, 100 Kashmir
Infantry; at Gupis, 140 Kashmir Infantry; at
Gilgit, a Kashmir regiment complete. At
Hunza and on the line between Hunza and
Gilgit, there were 200 Kashmir Infantry, and
in Chilas 400. A Pioneer regiment, 800 strong,

KELLY'S MARCH 179

was located at Bunji, and on the line between
there and Chilas.

When it became apparent how critical the
state of affairs was, the Government of India
saw that it was necessary to move up as many
troops as could be spared from Gilgit to afford
some relief to the Chitral garrison till the large
force under General Low, which was to march
from the Peshawur direction, could reach Chi-
tral ; but it was not possible to send any large
force from Gilgit, for in the neighbourhood of
that place there are several small states who
had but very recently given trouble, and would
now have to be watched, however much loyalty
they might show. Hunza had only been sub-
dued at the end of 1891, and Chilas had been
brought under submission a year later. There
was no sign of disturbance in either of these
states, and Hunza especially seemed quiet and
contented ; but it and the neighbouring state of
Nagar had to be guarded, and in Chilas, which
is in contact with fanatical and turbulent tribes
of the Indus valley, there is always constant
risk of insurrection. Under these circumstances,
and as it was not known how Yasin and the

N 2

180 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

states to the south of it might act, with Chitral
in a state of rebellion close by, it would have
been unwise to send away from the Gilgit
district any larger force than the 400 Pioneers
and two guns which it was now decided Colonel
Kelly should take with him to march towards
Chitral in order to aid, the garrison to prolong
their defence till relief could be sent from the
Peshawur direction.

Chitral is 220 miles from Gilgit, and the
road between the two places runs through
mountainous, difficult country, and crosses a
pass 12,400 feet high. The valleys through
which the road passes are all very narrow, in
just a few places opening out to a width of a
mile, but, for the greater part of the distance,
only a few hundred yards broad, and in many
cases mere defiles with the mountains thousands
of feet high on either side and standing out
in rocky precipices from the stream at the
bottom.

The Shandur Pass is about ninety miles from
Chitral and 130 from Gilgit. On the west side
of this pass, as has been already mentioned,
the whole country was up in arms against the

KELLY'S MARCH 181

British, and news now reached Gilgit, that
besides the garrison of Chitral being shut up,
the post of Mastuj was besieged, and, finally, that
the detachment of troops under Captain Ross
had been annihilated, and that officer killed, and
that a second detachment under Lieutenant
Edwardes and Fowler had been attacked on the
way to Chitral. On the east side of the Shan-
dur Pass is the province of Yasin, formerly
independent, but during recent years an integral
part of the Chitral state. This province had
so far remained quiet, but it could not of course
be known whether Colonel Kelly in marching-
through it would encounter opposition. Even
if he did not meet with actual hostility, and if
the people were only passively obstructive, his
task of reaching Chitral would be an almost
hopeless one, for both in the matter of supplies
and of transport he must of necessity largely
depend upon the people of the country through
which he passed.

On March 23rd and 24th Colonel Kelly's
force set out from Gilgit, the news having just
previously reached them of the annihilation of
Captain Ross's party. The first detachment

182 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

which Colonel Kelly himself accompanied was
composed of 200 men of the 32nd Pioneers
under Captain Borrodaile, with Lieutenants
Bethufle (afterwards killed in Tibet) and Cobbe,
and Surgeon-Captain Browning-Smith ; and the
second detachment of 200 Pioneers under
Lieutenants Petersen and Cooke. Two guns
of the Kashmir Mountain Battery also accom-
panied the latter detachment.

It was with this little force that Colonel
Kelly started on his venturesome journey to
succour the Chitral garrison, to restore British
prestige, to steady the frontier, to keep those
who were wavering from flooding over to the
opposite side, and to give heart to those who
still trusted and looked to the British. And it
may be well here to explain, for the benefit of
those not acquainted with our Indian Army, who
the men were whom Colonel Kelly was now
taking with him on this march. The Pioneer
regiment, of which he was taking a wing, is
composed of Sikhs from the Punjab. The regi-
ment is organised and equipped for the special
purpose of making roads and doing light pioneer

Sepoy, 32ND Pioneers.

KELLY'S MARCH 183

work in advance of the army. It is drilled, and
on service fights as an ordinary infantry bat-
talion, but it can be used as well for the important
work of road-making and construction of out-
posts as for ordinary fighting purposes. The
men were then armed with Martini-Henry rifles,
and carried in addition, each man, a pickaxe,
a shovel, or some other tool required for pioneer
purposes. Colonel Kelly's force, to save trans-
port, which was very difficult to obtain, travelled
without tents. Each sepoy was allowed fifteen
pounds of baggage, and he carried a greatcoat
and eighty rounds of ammunition, and wore a
short "poshtin " (sheepskin coat). The guns of
the Kashmir Mountain Battery were 7-pounders
of a rather antiquated pattern. The officers
and men of the battery belonged to the army of
the Maharajah of Kashmir, and for the last few
years had been drilled under the supervision of
British officers.

At Gupis (sixty-five miles from Gilgit), where
there is a small masonry fort, built in the pre-
vious year by Kashmir troops under the super-
vision of Captain Townshend as an advanced

184 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

post in the direction of Chitral, Lieutenant
Stewart, Royal Artillery, joined Colonel Kelly,
to be with the two guns brought from Gilgit.

Five marches further on at Ghizr a small
detachment of sixty Kashmir Infantry under
Lieutenant Gough, forty Kashmir Sappers and
Miners under the supervision of Lieutenant
Oldham, R.E., and 100 levies from Hunza-
Nagar, were stationed.

Ghizr is 10,000 feet above the sea-level, and
is a small village occupied by a hardy and
somewhat independent set of people. Here it
was that Colonel Kelly's chief difficulties were
likely to commence. He had been able to get
so far without encountering any serious obstacle.
The people of Yasin had shown no hostility, and
Ghizr had been reached without mishap ; but
here at Ghizr snow lay deep on the ground, and
at the time of Colonel Kelly's arrival had been
falling steadily for five days previously. The
Shandur Pass (two marches ahead) had to be
crossed, and the British officers had to bear in
mind that if the pass could not be crossed, or if
any sort of disaster befell them on the opposite
side, there was the almost certainty that the

KELLY'S MARCH 185

loyalty of the people of Yasin in their rear
would not stand the test of further trial, and
that the Yasinis, believing that the Chitralis in
rebellion on the western side of the pass must
be in the ascendant, w T ould begin to trim their
sails to join them so as to save their" own
necks.

On the 31st of March both detachments of
Colonel Kelly's force had reached Ghizr, and in
spite of the heavy snowfall and of the unprom-
ising look of matters, it was decided to push on
the next day towards Chitral, for the British
officers in the fort there had now been shut up
for four weeks, and it was urgently necessary
to press forward as rapidly as possible to their
aid.

On April 1st, Colonel Kelly left Ghizr with
the whole force, but difficulties commenced at
once. The start, which was to have been made
at 7 a.m., did not take place for three hours
later on account of the coolies required for the
carriage of the supplies in crossing the pass
having absconded. For some hours the force
plodded resolutely through the snow, but at
about 2 p.m. it became apparent that, eager as

186 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL cha*>.

they were to push on to the relief of their
comrades in Chitral, it would be impossible to
proceed with the means at their disposal.
What was most necessary was to take on tha
guns ; for the mere rumour that Colonel Kelly
was bringing guns with him had been sufficient
to produce the strongest moral effect upon the
Chitralis, unaccustomed as they were to these
weapons. The Chitralis might formerly have
dreaded the regular troops of the Indian Army,
but they had already annihilated two detach-
ments of these troops, and were now engaged
in besieging others, and Colonel Kelly's
Pioneers alone might not have been able to
produce that strong moral effect which was so
necessary ; but if guns could be brought over,
the Chitralis would certainly be terrified, and
Colonel Kelly was above everything anxious
that the two guns he had brought from Gilgit
should accompany him over the pass.

Here, however, just at the critical time, there
seemed no possibility of his being able to carry
out his object. The gun-carriages and the
ammunition boxes, etc., are carried on mules,
and, on this march from Ghizr towards the

VII

KELLY'S MARCH

187

pass, it was found that the mules could scarcely
move through the snow ; they were floundering
about in it, up to their bellies, and in the after-
noon it became apparent that it was no longer
possible to take them any further, much less to
bring them over the pass. This was the state
of affairs on April ist, as Colonel Kelly was
marching out from the last village towards the
pass. Colonel Kelly had now, therefore, to
decide whether the enterprise should be aban-
doned for the present and a more favourable
season awaited, or whether a part of his force
should be sent to cross the pass while the
remainder returned to quarters at Ghizr. He
elected the latter arrangement, and while the
guns and 200 of the Pioneers, with 50 Nagar
levies, returned with him to Ghizr, 200 of the
Pioneers, with Captain Borrodaile, Lieutenant
Cobbe, and Surgeon-Captain Browning-Smith,
and 40 Kashmir Sappers and Miners under
Lieutenant Oldham, R.E., with 50 Hynza
levies, remained at Teeru, a small hamlet about
seven miles beyond Ghizr in the direction of
the pass.

On the 2nd of April snow fell the whole day,

188 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

and Captain Borrodaile, with the detachment
which was to make the first attempt to cross the
pass, had to remain patiently at Teem. In the

afternoon Lieutenant Stewart, R.A., arrived
from Ghizr again with the two guns. It was
impossible to carry these guns over on mules,
but the Pioneers, unwilling to leave them
behind, had themselves volunteered to carry
them over on their backs. They had gone to
their officers and said, that in addition to their
own rifles and ammunition, pioneer equipment,
and kit, they would guarantee that they would
themselves transport the guns with the gun-
carriages, ammunition, etc., over the pass. A
detachment of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, under
Lieutenant Gough, had also volunteered to
assist in this work, and they, too, now arrived
in Teeru.

This splendid offer, which showed so clearly
the noble spirit which animated the troops, was
eagerly accepted by the British officer, and on
the 3rd of April Captain Borrodaile set out from
Teeru to cross the pass with his spirited little
body of native troops. The snow was very
deep and the work of marching through it

KELLY'S MARCH 189

excessively heavy. A more arduous task than
the men had voluntarily set themselves to do,
it would be hard to imagine ; but hard though
it was, to their everlasting credit, the feat was
successfully accomplished. Sledges were at
first tried, but they had to be given up as use-
less. Narrow as these sledges were, a single
man track was still narrower and extremely
uneven with great holes every few steps, so
that they could not be hauled easily and were
abandoned. All day long the men struggled
through the snow with the guns, till between
nine and ten o'clock in the evening it was so
dark that the track could scarcely be seen, and
it was then decided that if the men were to get
in at all, those behind would have to drop their
loads. This was accordingly done, ammunition
boxes, etc., were stacked in the snow, and the
troops marched on to Langar, the camping
spot at the foot of the pass.

There was only one small hut in which the
more exhausted men were placed, and the
remainder being without tents had to remain
in the open for the whole night. The men
with Captain Borrodaile were Sikhs from the

190 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

plains of the Punjab, brought up for generations
in one of the hottest climates in the world, and
they were now called upon, after the severe
struggles of this and previous days, to spend a
night on the snow at nearly 12,000 feet above
sea-level, and with the thermometer somewhere
about zero (Fahrenheit). Sleep for most of
them was out of the question ; the men as far
as possible gathered round small fires which
had been made up from the brushwood to be
obtained near the camping spot, and wearily
awaited the dawn and final struggle of the
coming day.

On the following morning Captain Borrodaile
set off for the pass ; but as it had now become
clear to him that if his men were to attempt to
carry over the guns as well as their own kit,
they would inevitably break down altogether,
he decided to leave Lieutenants Stewart and
Gough behind, and directed these two officers
to employ that day in bringing the remaining
loads into camp and storing them there till
either Captain Borrodaile could send back
assistance from the opposite side of the pass,
or until aid could come from Ghizr. Captain

VII

KELLY'S MARCH

191

Borrodaile s men found the task of crossing the
pass just heart-breaking ; every few steps they
would sink in through the snow, although some
sort of a track had been beaten out by the
levies going on in front. At times they would
fall in almost up to their armpits, so that they
had to be pulled out by their comrades. This
was fearfully trying to men loaded as they
were, to men too who had passed an almost
sleepless night and started for this, the crisis of
the enterprise, thoroughly exhausted.

By the time the party had reached the middle
of the pass men were falling out in twos and
threes, sitting down in the snow as if they were
on the point of giving up the struggle. The
heavy loads which they had to carry, rifles,
ammunition, haversacks, greatcoats, etc., were
weighing them down and utterly exhausting
them. The snow was from three to five feet
deep and quite eighteen inches of it was soft and
fresh. At the same time the sun was pouring
down upon the men, and adding to their dis-
comfort by the glare which it produced from the
white surface of the snow. Although all the
men were provided with blue spectacles, many

192 THE BELIEF OF CHlTKAL chap.

cases of snow-blindness occurred. The absence
of water too caused the men additional suffering.
Little relief was afforded them from sucking
snow, and many were afraid to do that, think-
ing it might produce some bad influence. So
exhausted were the men that it seemed at one
time to the British officers that it would be
necessary to spend another night on the snow,
but at about 5.30 the advance guard came to
the end of the flat part of the top of the pass,
and the descent was at last commenced. News
was at once passed along the line and fresh
spirit came into the men. They pulled them-
selves together for a final effort, and when a
little further on some water was obtained, they
began to step out briskly. A critical time had
now been reached ; the party were descending
the western side of the pass into the part of the
country which had for a month now been up in
open arms against the British. It was known
that there was a village at the foot of the pass,
and it was quite possible that Captain Bor-
rodaile's exhausted troops might find resistance
offered them here at the very culminating point
of their troubles. Captain Borrodaile had

KELLY'S MARCH 193

therefore to send on his few levies to scout and
discover if the enemy were in any force in the
village of Laspur, at the foot of the pass, and to
report on the state of affairs there. Fortunately
no opposition was met with, for the Chitralis
had scarcely expected that the troops would be
able to cross the pass in its then condition, and
at about 7.30, nearly twelve hours after the
first start had been made from Langar, Laspur
was reached.

In this straggling village a few inhabitants
were found, who immediately came in to pay
their respects, as, 200 men in their midst, even
though they were so exhausted, were to be pro-
pitiated. Captain Borrodaile's party then made
themselves snug for the night in the various
buildings and outhouses, improvised a few
rough defences against a night attack, and then
prayed that for this night at least, after all their
terrible exertions, they might be left in peace.

On the next morning (April 5th) Captain
Borrodaile, having seized a number of inhabit-
ants of the village, sent them back over the
pass to Langar to help Lieutenant Stewart and

Lieutenant Gough to carry over the guns and

o

194 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

the remaining loads, which had been left on the
near side of the pass. These two officers, with
the small detachment of -Kashmir Infantry,
succeeded in their task, and to them is due the
credit of performing this splendid feat of carry-
ing guns over a high pass in, perhaps, its worst
condition, and bringing them down into Chitral
territory to give so important a help to Colonel
Kelly's force. On the 4th, Surgeon-Captain
Browning-Smith made an examination of the
men who had crossed the pass, and found
twenty-five cases of frost-bite and thirty of
snow-blindness. These were fortunately not
severe, but it was evident that even one more
day's work such as these troops had had tq<
undergo would have quite incapacitated the
force.

We must now try and realise what was the
position of this small detachment which Captain
Borrodaile had with such resolution brought
over the Shandur Pass. They were now in the
presence of an enemy elated with success, and
behind them this terrible pass, practically cut-
ting off their retreat. The village of Laspur had
to a certain extent been surprised, though two

KELLY'S MARCH 195

spies stationed on the pass had been observed
by Captain Borrodailes party, but a considerable
number of Chitralis were known to be in the
valley lower down, and an attack on Captain
Borrodaile might be made at any moment.
Colonel Kelly's instructions to Captain Bor-
rodaile were to entrench himself on arrival,
return his coolies, and endeavour to open up
communication with the garrison of Mastuj, two
marches below Laspur, who were besieged by
the Chitralis.

On the evening of April 5th a short recon-
naissance was made below the camp, as the
levies had brought back information that a
small body of the enemy had been seen.

On April 6th a reconnaissance in force was
made by Captain Borrodaile to Gasht, twelve
miles distant ; the two guns and one hundred
and twenty of the pioneers taking part in the
movement. Gasht was reached without op-
position, and the villages on the route were
found almost deserted, but Captain Borrodailes
troops were able to seize some thirty inhabit-
ants and twelve ponies to serve for transport

purposes. Captain Borrodaile returned to
o 2

196 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

Laspur the same night, and he then found
Colonel Kelly with Lieutenant Beynon, his
staff-officer, and about fifty levies had crossed
the pass and arrived in Laspur.

On the 7th the troops rested and prepared
for an advance on the following day.

On the 8th the force reached Gasht un-
opposed, and a small reconnaissance in the
evening showed that the enemy were occupying
a strong position across the valley at a place
called Chokalwat, a few miles below. This
position Colonel Kelly decided to attack the
next morning. The Chokalwat position is one
of great natural strength, and of that order
which is generally described as impregnable.
Any one looking at it would say that here a
hundred men could keep a whole army at bay.
On each side of the valley mountains tower up
thousands of feet in rugged precipices ; a river
flows along it, and the only road leads either
along the bottom of a stone-shoot, down which
the enemy from above could hurl rocks on any
force passing beneath ; or else over the river
and. by a zigzag path up some cliffs, the edges
of which the enemy had lined with sangars or

vii KELLY'S MARCH 197

stone breastworks. At accessible points on the
mountain sides the enemy had also constructed
these breastworks, and if the Chitralis were
determined to offer Colonel Kelly at all a
resolute opposition, he might have been brought
to a standstill here at his first contact with the
enemy, and his main object of affording speedy
relief to the garrison in Chitral would be
frustrated. In the Hunza campaign of 1891,
our troops had been kept at bay for nearly a
fortnight in just such another position. The
Hunza men were few of them armed with rifles,
while the Chitralis had numbers of breech-
loaders, and it was not difficult to imagine that
a check might here be offered to the relief force,
and a check, anything else indeed but complete
success, would have involved the British in
most serious trouble, and might have caused
the people all along the lengthy line of com-
munications to show hostility.

On the morning of April 9th, at 10.30 a.m.,
Colonel Kelly advanced to the attack of this
position. In the early morning Lieutenant
Beynon with the Hunza levies were sent up the
high hills on the left bank of the river, so as to

198 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

turn the right of the enemy's position and attack
in rear. The Punyalis were ordered up the
hills on the right bank to turn out the men
above the stone-shoots on that side. The
enemy's position consisted of a line of sangars
blocking the roads from the river up to the
alluvial fan on which they were placed. The
right of the enemy's position was protected by
a snow glacier which descended into the river
bed, and also by sangars which were built as
far up as the snow-line on the hill-side. The
road down the valley led on to the alluvial fan,
the ascent to which was short and steep — it was
covered with boulders, and intersected with
nullahs. The road led across this fan and then
along the foot of the steep, shaly slopes and
shoots within 500 yards of the line of sangars
crowning the opposite si'de of the river bank,
and totally devoid of any sort or description of
cover for some two miles. It could also be
swept by avalanches of stones set in motion by
a few men placed on the heights for that
purpose.

The force with which Colonel Kelly advanced
to the attack of this position consisted of 190

KELLY'S MAKCH 199

men of the 32nd Pioneers, two guns of the
Kashmir Mountain Battery, 40 Kashmir
Sappers and Miners, and 50 levies — in all, 280
men. Colonel Kelly considered that any delay
to wait for the second detachment of his troops,
who were on their way over the Shandur Pass,
would only give the enemy an opportunity for
collecting in greater strength, and for improving
the fortification of their position, and he decided
therefore to attack at once, and advanced in
the following order : — A half company of 32nd
Pioneers formed the advance guard, and these
were followed by the forty Kashmir Sappers
and Miners, a half company of the 32nd
Pioneers, the two guns which were carried by
coolies, and the other company of the 32nd
Pioneers completed the main body. The
baggage, under escort of the rear guard,
remained at Gasht till ordered forward to the
action.

The advance was made up to the river where
the bridge had been broken by the enemy, but
was now sufficiently repaired by the Sappers
and Miners for the passage of the infantry.
The guns forded the river, and the force

200 THE BELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

ascended to the fan facing the right sangar
of the enemy's position. Colonel Kelly's plan
was for the advance guard to leave the road
and form up on the highest part of the fan
facing A sangar, which was to be silenced by
volley firing and the guns. He also proposed
to adopt the same course with regard to B
sangar, when an opportunity should offer for
the infantry to descend into the river bed and
ascend the left bank to enfilade the enemy in
the remaining sangars, which it was expected
would be vacated as soon as Lieutenant
Beynon's flank attack with the levies had
developed.

The advance guard of the Pioneers formed
up at about 800 yards from the position, while
the main body followed in rear. The Pioneers
then advanced to the attack — one section of C
company extended, another section of the same
company in support ; two sections of C company
and the whole of A company in reserve. The
guns then took up a position on the right and
opened on A sangar at a range of 825 yards.
As the action progressed the supporting section
of C company advanced and reinforced the

KELLY'S MARCH 201

remaining half of C company, which also
advanced, and leaving sufficient space for the
guns, took up their position in the firing
line on the extreme right. Volley firing was
first opened at 800 yards, but the firing line
advanced 150 to 200 yards as the action pro-
gressed. At a later stage one section of A
company was pushed up to fill a gap on the
right of the guns in action in the centre of
the line. A few well-directed volleys and
accurately-aimed shells soon caused the enemy
to vacate A sangar in twos and threes, till it
was finally emptied. Meanwhile Lieutenant
Beynon with his levies had found his way up
the hill-sides on the left bank of the river, and
as the Pioneers advanced across the fan
Lieutenant Beynon drove the enemy from their
sangars on the hill-sides. As soon as the enemy
had been cleared from A sangar, Colonel Kelly
directed his attention to B sangar, and attacked
it in a similar manner, and just as the enemy
had fled from the first, they now vacated B
sangar also. At the same time those of the
enemy who had been driven from the positions
on the hill-side came streaming clown into the

202 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

plain, and a general flight ensued. An advance
of Colonel Kelly's whole force was then made
down the precipitous banks to the bed of the
river. This advance was covered by the fire of
the reserves ; the river was forded, and sangars
A and B occupied. The guns were then
carried across, and the whole line of sangars
having been vacated, the column was re-formed
in the fan, and the advance was continued to a
village one and a half miles further along
the bed of the river, and there a halt was
made.

So terminated the first successful action with
the enemy. It was carried out, says Colonel
Kelly, with the extreme steadiness of an ordi-
nary morning parade ; the volleys being well
directed and properly controlled. The action
lasted but one hour, and the casualties on the
side of the British were only one man of the
32nd Pioneers severely wounded, and three
Kashmir Sappers slightly wounded. The
strength of the enemy was computed at from
400 to 500 men, and they were armed with
Martini-Henry and Snider rifles. Several dead
were found in the sangars, and the loss of the

KELLY'S MARCH 203

enemy was estimated to have been from fifty to
sixty men.

After a short halt the troops continued the
advance by the left bank of the river till within
three miles of Mastuj, where the river was
forded. Here, drawn up on the crest of an
alluvial fan above the river, were seen the
British garrison of Mastuj, who had been shut
up in the fort for eighteen days, but who had,
on hearing the firing of Colonel Kelly's troops,
and seeing the enemy gradually vacating their
position round the fort, now come out to join
hands with the relieving force.

At 5 p.m. Colonel Kelly's force reached
Mastuj itself, and so in a single day a successful
action had been fought, the beleaguered garrison
of Mastuj relieved, and another march made in
the direction of Chitral.

Lieutenant Moberly, who was in command
at Mastuj, was now able to relate the story of
his adventures since his investment by the
Chitralis. In a previous chapter the story of
the disasters to the parties under Captain Ross
and Lieutenant Edwardes has been told. These
detachments had in the beginning of March set

204 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

out from Mastuj for Chitral, but no news of
what had happened to them, or of what was
occurring in Chitral reached Lieutenant
Moberly. He had sent messengers down to
Buni three times, but each time they were cut
off. On March ioth Captain Bretherton (who
was afterwards drowned in the Brahmaputra
on the way to Lhasa), the Deputy-Assistant
Commissary-General for the Gilgit force,
arrived in Mastuj with a detachment of 100
Kashmir Sepoys from Ghizr, and so brought
up the Mastuj garrison to a total strength of
1 70 men. Sixty more men arrived from Ghizr
on the 13th, and on the 16th Lieutenant
Moberly, who had been trying for some days
to obtain coolies to enable him to march down
to Buni to ascertain the fate of Captain Ross's
party, set out from Mastuj with 150 Kashmir
Infantry. No coolies had been obtained, and
each man had to carry his poshtin (sheepskin
coat), two blankets, 120 rounds of ammunition,
and three days' cooked rations. Sanoghar, a
village eight miles below Mastuj, was reached
that day, but no longer march could be made,
as a bridge over the river had to be repaired.

vii KELLY'S MARCH 205

Fifty Punyali levies had joined Lieutenant
Moberly, and on the next morning he left for
Buni. This he reached at 5 p.m., and found
there Lieutenant Jones and the seventeen sur-
vivors of Captain Ross's party, and thirty-three
men who had been left in Buni by Captain Ross
before his march to Koragh. Lieutenant
Jones had been unable to proceed towards
Mastuj for fear of attack on the difficult road
there, and had remained on in Buni trying
to communicate with Lieutenant Moberly, and
hoping that relief might be sent him.

This relief Lieutenant Moberly at no small
risk, for there are many points on the eighteen
miles of road between Mastuj and Buni where
his retreat might have been cut off, had now
gallantly brought. But Buni was no place in
which to stay longer than was absolutely neces-
sary. It is an open village ; there is no defens-
ible post in it, and above everything there
were not supplies sufficient to last any length
of time. The enemy were already in strength
at Drasan, a few miles distant on the opposite
bank of the river, and Lieutenant Moberly
heard that they intended to cut off his retreat

206 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

that very night at the Nisa Gol, a strong
position on the way between Buni and Mastuj.
Lieutenant Moberly heard also that the enemy
were collecting on the road between Mastuj
and Gilgit, and that no more of our own troops
had yet started from Gilgit.

He had no choice left but to return to Mas-
tuj immediately. So after remaining there only
two hours he set out at 7 p.m. on the 17th on
his return jotarney. A party had been pre-
viously despatched to seize the bridge over the
river and the difficult piece of cliff along which
the road passes, and the Punyali levies had been
sent forward to if possible prevent the enemy
from occupying the Nisa Gol position. These
precautionary measures were successfully carried
out ; the enemy did nothing more than follow
the party along the path, and Lieutenant
Moberly after marching steadily all night halted
for a few hours at dawn, and proceeded on to
Mastuj, which he reached in safety about 10 a.m.
on the 1 8th, having thus by a bold and care-
fully-planned march rescued Lieutenant Jones's
party from probably the same fate that befell
Lieutenant Edwardes's party. He did this,

VII

KELLY'S MARCH

207

too, just in the nick of time, for only a few
hours after he had left Buni, the enemy arrived
there in force, and afterwards occupied the Nisa
Gol position.

On the three days following his return to
Mastuj, Lieutenant Moberly and Captain Bre-
therton were busily occupied in cutting down
trees, from them making up fence-work round
the fort, and completing defensive arrangements
generally. The Hunza-Nagar levies, to the
number of one hundred, were sent back to
Ghizr on the other side of the Shandur to rein-
force that post and be in communication with
Gilgit. On the 25th news reached Mastuj that
Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes had been
captured by the Chitralis. The enemy were
now closing round the fort. A reconnaissance
which Lieutenant Moberly had taken out on
the 22nd showed that about six hundred of
them were building and holding sangars at
Chokalwat position, a few miles above Mastuj
on the way to Gilgit, and a regular blockade of
the fort now commenced.

Mastuj fort is about ninety yards square, and
is built of masonry and woodwork, in the same

208 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

manner as are all the forts in these parts. The
walls are about twenty-five feet high, but at the
time of the siege were in a dilapidated condition,
for the place had only been temporarily occu-
pied by the British as a residence for the polit-
ical agent and his escort pending the decision
of the Government as regards our permanent
policy towards Chitral. And unfortunately
a very severe earthquake in the previous
year had shaken the walls very nearly to pieces.
At that time I was the political agent there,
and a little incident which occurred while the
earthquake was taking place is worth recording
as an instance of the steadiness of the native
troops. Lieutenant Gurdon, the officer in com-
mand of the escort of Sikhs, and myself were
seated in a room of the fort when we suddenly
felt the whole place shaking. But earthquakes
are common in Chitral and we did not at first
move, till we heard stones crashing down out-
side and the whole room tossing about like a
cabin on board ship. Then we dashed out of
the door to the courtyard, and as we did so
passed a sentry, who quietly proceeded to pre-
sent arms in salute as if nothing was happening.

KELLY'S MARCH 209

The mountains round were in a cloud of dust
from the avalanches of rock set rolling down
their sides by the earthquake, and the rickety
walls of the fort tumbling on all sides ; but all
this did not disturb the Sikh sentry ; his sense
of discipline was so ingrained that he saluted as
usual, in the ordinary, everyday manner.

The Mastuj fort is situated on the edge of a
sloping plain running down from the hill-side
which at one point approaches to within about
400 yards of the fort. The enemy occupied a
row of houses some 300 yards from the fort,
which they loopholed, and from these com-
menced firing upon the fort. They also built
sangars at a distance of 800 yards, but the
garrison succeeded in silencing their fire by
aiming volleys into them ; and on one occasion
Punyali levies were sent out at night to white-
wash the loopholes of sangers out of which the
enemy had been driven during the day, so that
it would be possible for the garrison to aim
correctly if the enemy attempted to reoccupy
them. The enemy did subsequently come back
to the sangars, but only to be driven out again

by the carefully-aimed fire from the garrison.
P

210 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

On another occasion the Chitralis had built
a sangar on the hill-side and from it wounded
two ponies in the inside of the fort. The enemy
were armed with Martini- Henry and Snider
rifles and could fire from long ranges into the
fort. It was necessary therefore to dislodge
them from the sangar, and the Punyali levies
were sent early one morning to destroy it before
it had been occupied for the day by the
enemy. Some days afterwards a sangar was
built about 300 yards below the fort, but Lieu-
tenant Moberly moved out with a party of
eighty sepoys and rushed it. The enemy only
fired a few shots, and then retired into some
houses from which they harassed the return
of the party. The sangar, which was found to
be strongly built of fascines and stones, was
destroyed.

All this time the Chitralis had been trying to
induce Lieutenant Moberly to come out under
the promise of a safe conduct to Gilgit, and he
was assured that Sher Afzul, the pretender to
the throne of Chitral, had no wish to fight the
British. Had Lieutenant Moberly listened to
these insinuating advances he would undoubt-

KELLY'S MARCH 211

edly have been captured as soon as he came
outside, and he acted wisely to wait for the
relief which, though he was not aware of it, was
now near at hand. On the 9th of April large
numbers of the enemy were observed to be
moving off, and Lieutenant Moberly took out
his men to follow them up and harass them.
Then it was that he met Colonel Kelly's force
marching in to the relief of the garrison. The
siege was now at an end ; the tables were
turned, and relieving and relieved forces now
marched down to succour Chitral.

From the 10th to the 12th of April Colonel
Kelly halted in Mastuj to allow of arrangements
for supplies and transport for the further march
to Chitral to be made, and to await the arrival
of a second detachment of the troops catching up
from the Shandur Pass. On the nth of April
this detachment arrived accompanied by Sur-
geon-Captain Luard with the Field Hospital,
which was now established at Mastuj ; and on
the same day a reconnaissance was made by
the levies in the direction of Chitral, as the
enemy were reported to be holding a strong
position a few miles below Mastuj. On the

P2

212 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

i 2 th of April a further reconnaissance was
made by Lieutenant Beynon, the staff-officer,
and an accurate sketch of the enemy's position
brought back by him, which enabled Colonel
Kelly to settle the course of his action. The
position was generally considered to be im-
pregnable, and the late Mehtar of Chitral had,
standing on the very spot, himself explained to
me its natural strength, and affirmed that it was
one of the strongest positions in his country.
In Chitral all the positions in the mountain
valleys are well known and are ^regularly occu-
pied in each successive invasion which occurs,
and this position, Nisa Gol, is the one which has
been selected from time immemorial by the
Chitralis in the defence of their valley.

The valley of the Chitral River at the Nisa
Gol position is about a mile wide, arid is
bounded on either hand by steep rocky
mountains, rising for several thousand feet
above the river. On the left bank especially
the mountain sides are very precipitous, and up
against these the Chitral River runs. On first
looking down the valley it appears as if, in
between the mountains, there was nothing but

KELLY'S MARCH 218

a smooth plain running down from the right-
hand side, and it is not till one is actually on it
that it is discovered that the seemingly open
plain is cleft by a nullah between 200 and 300
feet deep, and with absolutely perpendicular
sides. The nullah is the Nisa Gol, and only
one path leads across it, that of the road to
Chitral, and this path the enemy had now cut
away. There had been a small goat-track
across this nullah at another point, but the
enemy had now entirely obliterated it. Sangars
had also been erected at the head of these
paths and along the right bank of the nullah.
These sangars were sunk into the ground and
head-cover was provided by a covering of
timber and stones. On the left of their posi-
tion they had sangars on the spur of the hill in
a general line with the sangars on the plain,
and on the hill parties of men were stationed
to throw down stones. On the right of their
position across the Chitral River, and slightly in
advance of the general line, they had another
line of sangars on a spur stretching away high
up into the snow-line.

Such wa,s the position which Colonel Kelly

214 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

had now to attack, and in it the Chitralis had
collected to the number of about 1,500 men
under their chief leader, Mohamed Isa, to
make their principal stand, so as to prevent
Colonel Kelly joining hands with the British
garrison in Chitral.

Colonel Kelly, reinforced by the garrison of
Mastuj, now had with him 382 Pioneers under
Captain Borrodaile, two guns under Lieutenant
Stewart, 100 Kashmir Infantryunder Lieutenant
Moberly, 34 Kashmir Sappers and Miners
under Lieutenant Oldham, R.E., and 100
Hunza and Punyali levies. With this force he
advanced from Mastuj at 7 a.m. on the 13th
of April. His plan was to send on an advance
guard, which, on gaining the plain which the
enemy's position bisected, would make its way
well up to the right where the ground favoured
an advance under cover to within 500 yards of
the ravine, whose further bank was occupied
by the enemy. This advance guard was
ordered to direct its attack on the sangar on
the right with well-directed volleys till the guns
and the remainder of the force could come into
position. As soon, as the advance guard could

KELLY'S MARCH 215

silence the fire in this sangar, which commanded
the advance across the plain, the main sangars
along the banks of the ravine were to be fired
upon. At the same time levies were to make
their* way high up in the ravine nearer its
source in the mountains on Colonel Kelly's
right, to find some path by which the enemy's
left could be turned.

The advance guard, composed of A company,
at about 10.30 a.m. deployed into line and
advanced in extended order when within 900
yards of the position, the C company following
soon after prolonging the line to the right.
Each of these two formed their own supports,
E and G companies were in reserve, marching
in column of half companies forming single
rank, and opening out into one pace as they
advanced. Reinforcements being called for, E
company advanced and prolonged the line to
the right, G company being called up similarly
later on, formed the extreme right of the firing
line. The levies were well on the right, high
up towards the head of the ravine. While
these movements were being executed, the
guns came into action at a range of 500 yards,

216 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

firing common shell, and knocking down the
wall of the sangar to a height of about three
feet, and so, for a short time, silencing the fire
from it. The guns were afterwards advanced
to a distance of 275 yards from the enemy's
main sangar.

The infantry having deployed, A and G
companies kept the enemy engaged directly in
front along the main line of sangars, the latter
company occasionally directing its fire half
right against the sangars on the hills in that
flank. The fire of E and G companies was
almost entirely directed against the hill sangars
— -occasional volleys being directed on small
parties of the enemy occupying hill tops from
800 to 900 yards distance. The general
average distance at which firing was opened to
the front was from 2 50 to 300 yards. As soon
as the guns had silenced the fire from the
sangars on the hill-sides to the right, they
shelled at ranges from 875 yards to 1,200 yards
the sangars along the edge of the ravine.

The existence of the goat-path across the
ravine already referred to was now reported to
Colonel Kelly by his staff-officer Lieutenant

KELLY'S MARCH

217

Beynon, and Colonel Kelly accordingly di-
rected that an attempt should be made to make
it practicable so that the force might cross by
it. Some ladders had been brought with the
force for the special purpose of crossing the
ravine, and the Kashmir Sappers under Lieuten-
ant Moberly were sent forward with Lieutenant
Beynon to carry out the work. The scaling-
ladders were lowered down the sides of the
ravine by means of ropes, and after half an
hours work a track was made by which the
bottom of the nullah could be reached and an
ascent by the goat-track on the further side
assured. TJie troops then descended into the
nullah, and eventually a party of about fifteen
succeeded in climbing the opposite bank, which
they reached almost simultaneously with the
levies, who had now worked their way round
by the right, turned the enemy s left and
reached the sangars on the hill-side. The ap-
pearance of these bodies on the enemy's left
caused a general flight, and they streamed out
of their sangars in a long line, with the guns
firing at ranges from 950 to 1,400 yards, and
under volleys of rifle fire from the infantry,

218 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL char

Colonel Kelly then ordered a general advance
across the nullah by the road leading to Chitral.
A company, as soon as it could be mustered,
was sent in pursuit, but the enemy's flight was
extremely rapid, and they succeeded in effecting
a retreat towards Drasan and over the hill-sides
on the right bank of the river.

Colonel Kelly in reporting this action said
that he could not speak too highly of the extreme
steadiness and bravery of the troops during the
course of the action, which lasted two hours,
and during which they were subjected to a very
heavy and trying fire from the front and left
bank. The fire discipline he also said was
excellent, and contributed materially to keeping
down the fire from the enemy's sangars.

The enemy's casualties were estimated at
some sixty killed and one hundred wounded.
Amongst the enemy were some forty of Umra
Khans men, and the fire which Colonel Kelly's
force had to face was entirely from Martini-
Henry and Snider rifles.

This second success was even greater than
the first. All the principal men of the country
not employed before the fort of Chitral were

KELLY'S MARCH 219

present in the action, and the utmost reliance
had been placed in the strength of the position.
It was therefore a serious blow to the Chitralis
when they found that the principal position
on the road to Chitral had been summarily-
captured.

Colonel Kelly halted that night opposite the
village of Sanoghar, and on the following, day,
the 14th of April, marched to Drasan to ascertain
the strength of the enemy and his whereabouts,
as it was reported that Mohamed Isa had fled
in that direction. The road had been broken,
and a long detour had to be made up the spur
some 2,000 ft. high above the road, necessitating
a march of some twenty miles.
s The fort at Drasan was found to be un-
occupied, and in it were large quantities of grain,
which would have been very acceptable to
Colonel Kelly had he been able to carry it
away, but no transport was available for the
purpose as no men could be captured from the
neighbouring villages.

The usual road to Chitral runs down the op-
posite side of the valley to that on which Drasan
is situated. It was by this road on the left

220 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

bank of the river that Captain Ross and Lieu-
tenants Edwardes and Fowler had advanced,
and along it the parties under them had been
annihilated. The enemy had intended to have
arrested Colonel Kelly's progress at or near
the spot where Captain Ross's party had suffered
so severely, but Colonel Kelly outwitted them
by avoiding the terrible defiles on that road
and by marching from Drasan high up along
the hill-sides on the right bank of the river till
he had passed these difficult positions.

In the midst of heavy rain he marched on
the 15th of April to Khusht, and on the 16th to
Loon ; and then on the 17th, being well behind
the worst defiles, he descended to the river bed
again and crossed the Chitral River to Barnas,
though the river at this point is not generally
considered fordable, for it is breast-high and
runs with rapid current. It was of course with
only great risk that men could be taken across,
but by linking them together in bands of ten or
twelve, and by stationing levies in the stream to
help men who might be washed off their legs,
and to save kits which might be carried away,
Colonel Kelly's force was able to effect the

KELLY'S MARCH 221

passage of this deep and rapid mountain river.
A strategical move of the highest importance
had thus been effected and an almost impreg-
nable position turned without the firing of a
single shot.

All this time Colonel Kelly had not been
able to hear a single word from the garrison in
Chitral, nor had he been able to pass a message
in to them to give warning of his approach.
He was now only two marches distant from
Chitral, and the crisis of his arduous march was
approaching. This date was indeed the turning-
point of the whole campaign — Colonel Kelly
had turned the enemy's last position ; it was
on this day that Lieutenant Harley made his
brilliant sortie ; and it was on this day Umra
Khan was making his last futile effort against
General Low's force. The high-water mark of
the rebellion had been reached, and from now
the tide began to turn rapidly.

On the 1 8th Colonel Kelly made a short
march to Moroi and on the 19th arrived at
Koghazi, only one march from Chitral. Here
he received his first letter from the beleaguered
garrison, and obtained the welcome news that

222 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

the siege had just been raised and that the
enemy had finally fled.

In the afternqon of April 20th the force
marched into Chitral and joined hands with
their comrades, who had for forty-seven days
been invested withi-n the fort.

This famous march of native troops from the
plains of India, led by a mere handful of British
officers, over a snow-clad range, through
precipitous defiles into the heart of a country
flushed with successful rebellion, will ever be
remembered as a unique exploit of the Indian
Army. The news of the success of the little
force was soon spread throughout the empire.
Everywhere the highest admiration was excited,
and critics in the great armies of the Continent
joined with ourselves in the praises of the high
military qualities which its accomplishment
showed that our officers and men possessed.
Her Majesty the Queen immediately tele-
graphed to India her gracious approbation of
this remarkable exploit, and the Commander-
in-Chief in India, Sir George White, expressed
his warm appreciation of the manner in which,
in the face of extraordinary difficulties, the

KELLY'S MARCH 223

advance and operations of the force were con-
ducted, and of the indomitable energy displayed
by Colonel Kelly and the officers and troops
under his command in overcoming them. The
Commander-in-Chief considered the arrange-
ments made for the crossing of the Shandur
Pass, the perseverance and skill displayed by the
officers, and the excellent behaviour of the troops
worthy of the highest praise, and while com-
mending all, recorded especially the important
part taken by Captain Borrodaile and his detach-
ment, who were the first over the pass.

A week after Colonel Kelly had reached
Chitral Major "Roddy" Owen and myself,
riding on ahead of the advanced parties of
General Low's force arrived in Chitral. It
was a bright sunny day, the country was
clothed in all the fulness of spring, the young
corn was waving in the fields, the blossoms
were forming on the trees and all nature was
smiling as we rode through the forty miles
of country which separated Chitral from the
advance guard which General Gatacre had
just led over the Lowarai Pass. But the looks

224 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

of the people were in striking contrast. Worn,
trembling and utterly cowed the Chitralis
shrank from even two British officers riding
without an escort through their country. It
was pitiable to see them. Men, whom a few
months before I had seen gay as few but
Chitralis in their contented moments can be,
were now moving about with careworn faces,
thin and exhausted. The people of Chitral
had flamed up into rebellion, and were now
lying burnt out like the charred remains of
a firework. When I asked them why they
had been so foolish as to fight us, they wrung
their hands and said, " Why were we ? We
hate these Pathans ; they have plundered our
houses and carried off our women, but they
were strong and close while you were far away,
and we never knew you were so powerful a§
you are. We did not want to fight you, but
we were led away."

It was only very few people, however, that
we met as we rode through the villages, for
most had fled to the hills, believing that
General Gatacre s brigade, now just over the
Lowarai Pass, was to advance and exact a

KELLY'S MARCH 225

terrible retribution by massacring them for the

space of three days.

Late in the evening of the 27th of April, we

rode into Chitral, and had the honour to be the

first to congratulate the famous garrison and

the officers of Colonel Kelly's force upon their

splendid achievements. We found the officers

just sitting down to dinner in the very house

in which I had lived for many months, and

in which Mr. Curzon and I on the previous

October had entertained the late Mehtar at

dinner. It was situated half-a-mile from the

fort, and here we found Sir George Robertson

and the other officers, recovered somewhat

indeed from what Colonel Kelly's officers had

found them, but still looking pale and worn,

thin, and with the set, anxious look which had

not yet left their faces. They were cheery ;

they brought out a long-treasured bottle of

brandy from the reserve for hospital purposes,

and they produced a Christmas plum-pudding

which had only that day arrived, and insisted

upon our sharing these luxuries with them ;

but even now they hardly realised that the

struggle was yet over, and one or other of them
Q

226 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

would from time to time go round the sentries
posted everywhere round the house.

One of the first subjects on which they spoke
to us was about poor Baird. Few officers
have ever attached their comrades more
sincerely to them than did this brave officer,
and he was one of the best and keenest soldiers
in the service. He was noted for his tact
and for the amiability of his character, and he
studied his profession with the spirit of an
enthusiast. His coolness was as remarkable as
his zeal, and suffering though he was and know-
ing that he must die, he remained cheerful and
collected to the last. He said that he would
not have wished to die any other death than
the soldier's death which he was now to meet ;
he had done his duty and led his men as a
soldier should do, and he never regretted his
fate. He gave a few last messages to those at
home and then with a smile on his face and,
thinking of his profession to the very end,
wished his comrades success in their plans and
bade them good-bye.

He died on the morning of the 4th of March,
and was buried in the dead of night outside the

Photo Bassano, Old Bond Street.

Captain J. McD. Baird.

KELLY'S MARCH

227

main gate of the fort while the enemy were
firing all round. A little over two months
later, when the advance brigade of the Relieving
Force arrived in Chitral, General Gatacre read
a funeral service over his grave, and Major
Aylmer, R.E., who had served together with
Baird in the Hunza Campaign three years
before and won his Victoria Cross there, erected
a tombstone to his memory and with his own
hands carved an inscription. His comrades
and fellow-countrymen will know then that, far
away though he now lies, his grave has not
been neglected, but will ever be cared for by
the soldiers who follow after him.

After poor Baird I think the subject on which
the officers of the garrison spoke most feelingly
was the devotion and noble spirit of discipline
and determination shown by the Sikhs. There
were but a hundred of them in a garrison of
nearly four hundred, but the officers said that
without them they could never have held out,
and that but for these Sikhs not one of them
would have been there now. They only grew
more enthusiastic as the siege became closer
and times seemed harder. With calm self-

228 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap.

reliance they stood proudly at bay like a rock
with the waves beating against it. And so
great was the sense of discipline which their
stern old native officer Gurmukh Singh instilled
into them, that when during an attack the sick
struggled out of hospital to join in the fight he
would not excuse even their impulsive bravery,
but told them that a soldier's first duty was to
obey, that they had been ordered to hospital
and there they must stay. It was the discipline
ingrained into these men that saved the garrison.
As long as a Sikh was on sentry, and while
Sikhs were holding a threatened point, Captain
Townshend had nothing to fear. The enemy
would never catch a Sikh off his guard and
could never force their way through a post of
Sikhs while one remained alive. They saved
the garrison, and the officers gratefully ac-
knowledged their service.

The skill of the enemy was, too, a subject on
which the officers specially dwelt. The Chitralis
had not previously been considered of much
account as a fighting race ; but even they, once
their blood was up, fought hard and well, and
their Pathan allies were as skilful and brave as

Company of the 14TH Sikhs which formed part of the Garrison of Chitral during the Sieoe,

vii KELLY'S MARCH 229

troops of a regularly- trained army. Umra
Khans men were born warriors ; unlike the
Chitralis, who by nature prefer polo and sport
and dancing to fighting, the Pathans from their
childhood upwards think of little else than
warfare. They are for ever raiding upon one
another, attacking each others villages, and
besieging and defending the forts scattered over
their country nearly as thickly as public-houses
in England. They therefore showed every
ingenuity in the siege of Chitral. To make
the most of their ammunition they never fired
a shot without clearly making out an object to
aim at, and usually with the rifle resting on a
stone so as to enable them to aim correctly.
The skill which they displayed in the construc-
tion of trenches and breastworks to approach
the walls ; the sagacity they evidenced in re-
peatedly attacking the water-way and in setting
fire to the towers and walls of the fort ; and
the courage and determination they showed in
their attempts to carry out these objects, excited
the highest admiration of the besieged.

No less remarkable was their well-directed
effort to undermine the walls ; and at the close

230 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, vii

of the siege the defenders found a huge pent
roof, which was to have been borne along and
placed against the walls of the fort so as to cover
the assailants, and huge scaling-ladders, capable
of carrying three men abreast. With the aid
of these contrivances the enemy had hoped,
when the mine had been successfully fired, to
have made one last desperate assault upon the
devoted garrison before the Relieving Force
could arrive. They calculated that the defenders
must be getting very short of supplies, for Mr.
Robertson in his negotiations with them had
always been careful to lead them into this
belief. They thought, too, that the native
troops must be low at heart, and ready to throw
up the sponge at any day. They considered,
therefore, that if one great effort could be made
they would be able to first crush the Chitral
garrison, and then annihilate Colonel Kelly,
who they knew had with him only a handful of
men with no supplies and no transport to speak
of, and who was now in the middle of the worst
defiles of the country. But the carefully-planned
and brilliantly-executed sortie under Harley
had effectually frustrated this last supreme effort

Now the British Agency

232 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL chap, vn

of the besiegers, and Colonel Kelly's force had,
by their skilful tactics and bravery in action,
thwarted the enemy's most cherished plans.
Just on the brink of a disaster the British forces
came out triumphant ; and once again in our
fair island's story it was shown that British
officers, even though unsupported by a single
British soldier, and with only their own stout
hearts and strong right arms to trust to, and
to the influence they could exercise over men
of subject races, had been able to uphold the
honour of their race ; and the story of the
defence and relief of Chitral will be handed
down to posterity as one of the most brilliant
chapters in the annals of Indian military history.

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